Economic reconstruction amidst conflict: Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq

Economic reconstruction typically takes place after the end of war. Yet recently, economic reconstruction has been viewed as a means to ‘win hearts and minds’ during ongoing conflict. Drawing on a variety of reconstruction experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq, we identify four ‘reconstruction traps’ that result from the incentives and constraints faced by actors involved in economic reconstruction during ongoing conflict. These traps include: 1. the credible commitment trap, 2. the knowledge trap, 3. the political economy trap, and 4. the bureaucracy trap. Avoiding these traps is critical for successful economic reconstruction; and we discuss potential strategies for doing so.     

NUCLEAR ISLANDS

Current International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards do not provide adequate protection against the diversion to military use of materials or technology from certain types of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In view of highly enriched uranium's relatively greater ease of use as a nuclear explosive material than plutonium and the significant diseconomies of commercial spent fuel reprocessing, this article focuses on the need for improved international controls over uranium enrichment facilities as the proximate justification for creation of an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Association (INFCA). In principle, the proposal is equally applicable to alleviating the proliferation concerns provoked by nuclear fuel reprocessing plants and other sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The INFCA would provide significantly increased nonproliferation assurance to its member states and the wider international community by holding long-term leasehold contracts to operate secure restricted zones containing such sensitive nuclear facilities.     

JUST WAR AND CYBERWAR

My aim in this paper is to reflect on a very narrow question: under what conditions might a cyber-attack provide a just cause for war? I begin by articulating what makes for a just cause, briefly address the problem of attribution, and then discuss three broad categories of cyber-attack: those that clearly do not satisfy the just cause requirement, those that clearly do satisfy the just cause requirement, and three ambiguous cases – the destruction of property, the emplacement of logic bombs, and the failure to prevent cyber-attacks. My conclusions are exploratory and suggestive rather than definitive, partly by virtue of the extreme paucity of literature on the moral assessment of cyberwar.     

Book reviews

Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: a Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking. By Honore M. Catudal. Mansell, London (1988), ISBN 0–7201–2000–4, £25.00

The Military: More Than Just a Job? Edited by Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood. Pergamon‐Brassey's, London (1988), ISBN 0–08–034321‐X, £17.00 ($30.00)

Douglas Haig, 1861–1928. By Gerard J. de Groot. Unwin Hyman, London (1988), ISBN 004 4401922, £20.00

Defence Policy Making. A Comparative Analysis. Edited by G. M. Dillon. Leicester University Press, Leicester (1988), ISBN 0–715–1268–5, £10.95

The Future of U.K. Air Power. Edited by P. Sabin. Brassey's, London (1988), ISBN 0–08–035825‐X (hardcover), 0–08–036256–7 (flexicover), hardcover £18.95 ($34.00), flexicover £9.95 ($17.95)     

Book reviews

Small Wars Manual. United States Marine Corps 1940, with introduction by Ronald Schaffer, Sunflower University Press, Manhattan, Kansas, (1990), ISBN: 0-89745-112-0.

Military Mindlessness: an Informal Compendium. Edited by Raymond Horricks. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, (1993), ISBN: 1-56000-105-4. Price $26.95

Sipri Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1993) ISBN 0-19-829166-3 - Price £50.00

Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment and Democracy. By Julius O. Ihonvbere. Transaction Publishers, London & New Brunswick (1994), ISBN 1-56000-093-7, Price £34.95     

Book reviews

Military Strategy in a Changing Europe: Towards the Twenty‐first Century.. Edited by Brian Holden Reid and Michael Dewar. Brassey's (UK), London (1991), ISBN 0–08–037706–8 £27.50 (US$49.95)

On Future War. By Martin van Creveld. Brassey's (UK), London (1991), ISBN 0–08–04179–65 £22.50 (US$38.25)

American and Soviet Intervention: Effects on World Stability. Edited by Karen A. Feste. Taylor and Francis, New York (1990), ISBN 0–8448–1632–9. £40.00

Soziale Deutungsmuster von Bataillonskommandeuren der Bundeswehr: Ein Beitrag zum beruflichen Selbstverstandnis einer militarischen Elite. By Georg‐Maria Meyer. Deutscher Universitätsverlag (1992)

The Laser in America: 1950–1970. By Joan Lisa Bromberg. MIT Press, Cambridge MA (1991), ISBN 0–262–02318–0, £26.95     

Tilting at windmills: The flawed U.S. policy toward the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war

ABSTRACT

This article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger’s own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon’s policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors.