Remaking alliances for the war on terrorism

This essay contends that allies are vital for counterterrorism, but what we ask of them and their institutional form is quite different from what was asked of traditional alliance partners during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Despite these differences, some of the alliance dilemmas that plagued the United States in the past are likely to remain, though they will have different manifestations relevant to the war on terrorism. This essay concludes by arguing that, for purposes of the war on terrorism, the list of key allies has shifted and offers recommendations for improving US alliances.     

Reviews

A. Hamish Ion and E.J. Errington (eds.), Great Powers and Little Wars: the Limits of Power. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Pp.246, select biblio, index. $49.95. ISBN 0275–93965–0

John M. Rothgeb, Jr., Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Pp.205. $39.95 (hbk); $18.70 (pbk). ISBN 0312–086–822 and 061–056

Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security in Third World States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, Pp.257. $37. ISBN 1–55587–267–0

Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (eds.), Low‐Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World. Westview Studies in Regional Security, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992. Pp.310, maps, figures, index. $55 (hbk); $18.85 (pbk). ISBN 0–8133–8593–8 and 8594–6     

Factors that affect the optimal amount of central control in complex systems

Whereas much of the previous research in complex systems has focused on emergent properties resulting from self‐organization of the individual agents that make up the system, this article studies one vital role of central organization. In particular, four factors are conjectured to be key in determining the optimal amount of central control. To validate this hypothesis, these factors are represented as controllable parameters in a mathematical model. For different combinations of parameter values, the optimal amount of central control is found, either analytically or by computer simulation. The model is shown to provide results that match well with the level of control found across a broad spectrum of specific complex systems. This model also provides general guidelines as to how combinations of these factors affect the desirable level of control and specific guidelines for selecting and evaluating leaders. These results indicate that all of these factors, though not exhaustive, should be considered carefully when attempting to determine the amount of control that is best for a system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

A finite descent theory for linear programming,piecewise linear convex minimization,and the linear complementarity problem

A descent algorithm simultaneously capable of solving linear programming, piecewise linear convex minimization, and the linear complementarity problem is developed. Conditions are given under which a solution can be found in a finite number of iterations using the geometry of the problem. A computer algorithm is developed and test problems are solved by both this method and Lemke's algorithm. Current results indicate a decrease in the number of cells visited but an increase in the total number of pivots needed to solve the problem.     

The social structure of armed groups. Reproduction and change during and after conflict

Current research on civil wars and conflict increasingly turns to the inner structure and functioning of state and non-state armed groups and their impact on aspects such as violent practice, internal cohesion and the dissolution of these groups during the conversion to peace. The first aim of this introduction is to set out the theme of this Special Issue on the social structure of armed groups and previous research within the field. The second aim is to introduce the contributions within the Special Issue, alongside possible trajectories of future research on the ‘meso-foundations’ of civil war and conflict.     

Insurgent Groups During Post-Conflict Transformation: The Case of Military Strongmen in Cambodia

The article discusses the experiences of a group of military strongmen during the post-conflict transformation of two Cambodian insurgent movements into a society of peace after a decades-long civil war. It explains the reasons why some of these strongmen were able to transfer their high status within the insurgency into senior positions in the incumbent government, while others became impoverished and sometimes even preferred to relapse into further conflict. Even though all of these strongmen shared a very similar life course and fought until the end of the conflict, their post-conflict fates have been very different. Central to the explanation of their behaviour during the transition is their habitus, the set of resources at their disposal and the nature of their vertical and horizontal social networks.