Understanding Proto-Insurgencies

Abstract

Why do some small terrorist and guerrilla groups succeed in becoming full-blown insurgencies while many others fail? Proto-insurgencies face many difficulties in creating an insurgent movement: they must create a politically salient identity, harness a compelling cause, create an effective sanctuary, and defeat both violent and peaceful organizational rivals, all while evading the police and security services of the much more powerful state. Outside support is a mixed blessing for proto-insurgents. Often, the ultimate success of the proto-insurgency in becoming a full-blown insurgency depends on the mistakes of the government it opposes.     

Loyalty and Defection: Misunderstanding Civil-Military Relations in Tunisia During the ‘Arab Spring’

Scholars have widely adopted the view that the behaviour of the Tunisian military during the ‘Arab Spring’ constitutes a positive case of military defection. This paper argues that, contrary to this dominant interpretation, the military remained loyal to the authoritarian civilian leadership throughout the protests as it had repeatedly done in the past. Defection occurred, however, within the Police and the National Guard, which are mistakenly portrayed as having been loyal to Ben Ali. The paper shows that scholars have sought to explain exactly the opposite of what actually happened and, thus, it questions their conclusions regarding civil-military relations in Tunisia.     

The Fallujah awakening: a case study in counter-insurgency

The successful pacification of Fallujah in 2007 during the Anbar Awakening movement was due to the coordinated efforts of US and Iraqi forces to physically and psychologically separate the people from the insurgency. Efforts along security, political, and development lines along with a robust tribal effort eliminated the armed insurgency and set the basis for victory in the area. But a synchronized delivery of these resources was insufficient to defeat the insurgency by itself absent the population's decision to turn against the insurgents. This process began to occur in 2006 and was successfully capitalized upon by Coalition Forces in Fallujah in 2007.     

Optimizing submarine berthing with a persistence incentive

Submarine berthing plans reserve mooring locations for inbound U.S. Navy nuclear submarines prior to their port entrance. Once in port, submarines may be shifted to different berthing locations to allow them to better receive services they require or to make way for other shifted vessels. However, submarine berth shifting is expensive, labor intensive, and potentially hazardous. This article presents an optimization model for submarine berth planning and demonstrates it with Naval Submarine Base, San Diego. After a berthing plan has been approved and published, changed requests for services, delays, and early arrival of inbound submarines are routine events, requiring frequent revisions. To encourage trust in the planning process, the effect on the solution of revisions in the input is kept small by incorporating a persistence incentive in the optimization model. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 301–318, 1997.     

A comparison of waiting time approximations in series queueing systems

The determination of steady-state characteristics in systems of tandem queues has been left to computer simulation because of the lack of exact solutions in all but the simplest newtorks. In this paper, several methods developed for approximating the average waiting time in single-server queues are extended to systems of queues in series. Three methods, due to Fraker, Page, and Marchal, are compared along with results gathered through GPSS simulation. Various queueing networks with Erlangian service distributions are investigated.     

Remaking alliances for the war on terrorism

This essay contends that allies are vital for counterterrorism, but what we ask of them and their institutional form is quite different from what was asked of traditional alliance partners during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Despite these differences, some of the alliance dilemmas that plagued the United States in the past are likely to remain, though they will have different manifestations relevant to the war on terrorism. This essay concludes by arguing that, for purposes of the war on terrorism, the list of key allies has shifted and offers recommendations for improving US alliances.     

Reviews

A. Hamish Ion and E.J. Errington (eds.), Great Powers and Little Wars: the Limits of Power. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Pp.246, select biblio, index. $49.95. ISBN 0275–93965–0

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