Transit vessel scheduling

A transit vessel traffic scheduling algorithm has been developed to limit the negative effects on cargo volume throughput in two‐way waterways where separation distances between transiting vessels must be maintained and passage restrictions may hold. It runs in time that is polynomial in the number of ships involved in the computation and finds schedules which increase the utilization of waterways. Three examples illustrate its use. The first example is situated in the Sunda Strait where the algorithm is used to enhance the safety of merchant shipping against a terrorist threat. It illustrates important features of the algorithm and demonstrates how it can be used with cross traffic. The second example is situated in the Strait of Istanbul and offers a comparison between the developed algorithm and the transit vessel scheduling algorithm of Ulusçu et al., J Navig 62 (2009), 59–77. This was done using a plausible model of the Strait of Istanbul. The third and last example shows how the algorithm can be used to schedule transit vessel traffic in two‐way waterways with junctions. This feature is especially useful in congested waters with a high risk of collisions like the Inland Sea of Japan. An extreme test case proves that the developed algorithm is a practical algorithm ready for such use. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 225–248, 2017     

Defence Procurement Policy: The Way Ahead

Abstract

The Defence Procurement Executive is the single largest customer of British industry and controls some 127 000 contracts. As Chief of Defence Procurement, Dr McIntosh explains the effects of expanding market forces on defence contracts and the suppliers, before continuing to outline the prospects for future competitive contracts in view of the recent cuts in defence budgets.     

The concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz: All that is required so that the fighting force can be taken as a given

This article assesses the existing literature on logistics in war, concluding that there is no satisfactory conceptual definition of logistics. It proposes a concept of logistics derived from Clausewitz's theory of war to fill that void. This is presented as a derivation because Clausewitz's distinction between (1) the use of the fighting forces (tactics and strategy) and (2) all other activities in war that were required so that forces could be taken as a given. The latter, left unnamed by Clausewitz, corresponds to a concept of logistics that proves to be an analytical peer to Clausewitz's categories of politics, tactics and strategy.     

Disregarding the Bear: How US Intelligence Failed to Estimate the Soviet Intervention in the Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition 1

This article analyzes the main factors that contributed to the failure of the US intelligence community to alert against Soviet intentions and the intervention in the Egyptian–Israeli War of Attrition in 1969–70. Based on fresh archival sources, this research describes the US intelligence conception concerning the USSR; explains the crystallization of the intelligence estimate on the probability of Soviet intervention in 1970; deals with the intelligence data that were acquired but eventually ignored; and concludes with several plausible explanations for the intelligence blunder.