Managing Global Counterinsurgency: The Special Group (CI) 1962–1966

The contemporary American counterinsurgency discourse has emphasised a particular historical narrative of Vietnam to justify large-scale military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent from this narrative is any reference to the broader Cold War context in which Vietnam existed alongside numerous other small-scale counterinsurgencies and was therefore the exception, not the rule. This article seeks to redress this shortcoming by examining the way counterinsurgency was conceived and managed at the level of ‘grand strategy.’ Specifically, it focuses on the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) to demonstrate that senior policymakers under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson understood ‘counterinsurgency’ as involving ‘indirect’ assistance to foreign governments, rather than taking ‘direct’ military action with American ground forces.     

Varieties of Assurance

Strategies that seek to assure other states about their security have the potential to reduce international conflict and dissuade states from seeking nuclear weapons. Yet, relative to other tools of statecraft such as deterrence, assurance remains understudied. To facilitate further empirical research on assurance strategies, this article identifies variations in the terminology scholars and policymakers have used to refer to such strategies and describes the concept of assurance associated with each variant. It seeks to clarify and standardize usage and show that there is a general, overarching concept of assurance that links the different variants. It also summarizes existing bodies of empirical research that are relevant to assessing the utility of different forms of assurance.     

UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S ANTISATELLITE TEST

In discussing China's January 2007 hit-to-kill intercept of the Chinese weather satellite FengYun-1C, most American analysts sought the “message” for the United States—either by asserting that China's test was a deliberate step toward a comprehensive counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority or an attempt to force the United States to the negotiating table on “the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” Chinese officials, after a long silence, eventually claimed the test was an “experiment” that was “not targeted at any country.” We traveled to China several times in 2007 and had a series of conversations with Chinese individuals knowledgeable about the history of this particular antisatellite program and with access to information about the decision-making process prior to and after the final test. These discussions were off the record, not for attribution, given the sensitivity of the subject. They reflected the views of some of the key institutions involved in the test from the State, the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army, and aerospace experts involved in debris calculations. The information conveyed to us suggests that American commentators tend to place much greater importance on the United States as a driver in China's decision to develop the technology and conduct the test than do the Chinese.     

Helpless or Deliberate Bystander: American Policy towards South Vietnam's Military Coups, 1954–1975

The USA's role in fomenting and responding to military coups remains an understudied and politically contentious subject despite it being a recurring foreign policy problem exemplified most recently in both Egypt and Mali. To the extent this topic has been addressed in any depth by scholars, it is mainly limited to an examination of a small number of coups that occurred during the Cold War that the CIA was accused of sponsoring. However, this emphasis on well-known cases to the exclusion of lesser-known cases has resulted in a biased view of omnipotent US power. This limitation is reflected in the case of South Vietnam, in which the focus has been placed on the 1963 coup that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem, whereas the numerous other coups that occurred have received little or no attention. In this article, a more inclusive approach will be taken in which US policy will be examined with respect to all of the main coups and coup attempts that occurred during the period 1954–1975.     

Security assurances and proliferation risks in the Trump administration

Comments that Donald Trump made while campaigning to be U.S. president have raised concerns that his administration will pull back from U.S. alliance commitments and encourage countries such as Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arms. The new article by Frühling and O’Neil outlines an institutional framework that can be helpful in assessing the risks that Trump administration policies will lead to nuclear proliferation. An institutional perspective shows that important elements of U.S. security assurances will continue to function, and this reduces the chances that President Trump’s actions or statements will trigger proliferation by U.S. allies. The greatest risk to global non-proliferation efforts posed by a Trump administration in fact lies elsewhere, in the possibility that President Trump will seek to abrogate the Iran nuclear deal.     

The nuclear education of Donald J. Trump

During the 2016 American presidential campaign, Democrats and Republicans alike repeatedly raised concerns at the prospect of Donald Trump being in charge of America’s nuclear arsenal based on his seemingly unstable personality. Unfortunately, this emphasis on Trump’s character distracted attention from any in-depth investigation into his long-standing interest in nuclear issues. This article seeks to remedy this shortcoming by highlighting the nuclear legacy Trump will inherit from Obama, surveying his statements on nuclear issues over more than three decades, and providing an analysis of constraining factors on his administration’s nuclear agenda, particularly domestic institutions. It finds that most of Trump’s views on nuclear issues are relatively consistent with past Republican presidents. Where he is unique, however, is in his use of social media, which has potential implications on nuclear signaling.     

The Colonial War revisited

The Carnation Revolution on 25 April 1974 toppled the authoritarian regime in Lisbon. It is fallacious to conclude, however, that the 1974 coup d’état signaled Portugal's defeat in the Colonial War. The status of each conflict on the eve of the Carnation Revolution varied, and it was by no means inevitable that Portugal would have been defeated in all three theatres had the coup not occurred. This brief research note therefore advances a novel approach to examining the Colonial War by assessing the outcomes prior to the 1974 coup. In particular, the author proposes that Portugal achieved military victory in Angola and Mozambique, but was defeated in Guinea-Bissau.     

Outbound supply chain network design with mode selection and lead time considerations

We present a large‐scale network design model for the outbound supply chain of an automotive company that considers transportation mode selection (road vs. rail) and explicitly models the relationship between lead times and the volume of flow through the nodes of the network. We formulate the problem as a nonlinear zero‐one integer program, reformulate it to obtain a linear integer model, and develop a Lagrangian heuristic for its solution that gives near‐optimal results in reasonable time. We also present scenario analyses that examine the behavior of the supply chain under different parameter settings and the performance of the solution procedures under different experimental conditions. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007