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Jonathan B. Tucker 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3):363-384
In 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi agreed to eliminate his country's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and long-range Scud missiles under strict verification by U.S. and British experts and international inspectors. This article examines the negotiation and implementation of Libya's WMD rollback, with a primary focus on its chemical weapons program, and draws some lessons for the future. Although the Libyan case was unique in many ways, some aspects have relevance for other countries, including the critical role played by multilateral nonproliferation organizations, the utility of economic sanctions and export controls, the importance of a flexible U.S. disarmament funding mechanism, the value of rotating technical assistance teams in and out of the country that is disarming, and the desirability of remaining politically engaged with a former proliferator after rollback is complete. 相似文献
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Jonathan Ferguson 《Arms and Armour》2017,14(1):49-69
The aim of this article is to settle once and for all the question of the term ‘Brown Bess’, as applied to the British soldier’s musket. The specific origin and meaning of this obviously affectionate nickname has long confounded arms and armour scholars, re-enactors, and collectors alike. As a result, various possible solutions have been offered. The article outlines the historical usage of the name, including earlier written references not widely known in the field. The scope of the term is also addressed, using period sources to demonstrate what ‘Brown Bess’ meant to those who actually used the name historically. The many false etymologies of the name are assessed and found wanting or ‘debunked’ outright. Finally, drawing upon existing research from the field of linguistics, the article details the real meaning behind ‘Brown Bess’ the firearm and places ‘her’ in a wider sociohistorical context. 相似文献
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Jonathan Lipow 《Defense & Security Analysis》2012,28(3):226-233
The European Monetary Union (EMU) is inherently unstable, and will be prone to repeated financial and fiscal crises. These crises pose a clear threat to NATO security and the political institutions of Alliance member states. There is no definitive way to eliminate the risks posed by monetary union, but straightforward reforms in EMU sovereign debt management represent a low-cost near-term means of mitigating these risks. With EMU nations facing a seeming leadership vacuum, it is well within NATO purview to press for adoption of such reforms. 相似文献
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Jonathan Lipow 《Defense & Security Analysis》2012,28(4):316-325
Recent discoveries of significant mineral deposits offer Afghanistan the opportunity to attain a level of economic development sufficient to stabilize that country's volatile security situation while providing Afghans with a reasonable standard of living. Much, however, depends on whether Afghanistan can avoid the “Natural Resource Curse,” an inter-related set of economic and social pathologies that often bedevil resource-endowed countries. In this article, the authors describe the Natural Resource Curse, evaluate the obstacles it raises for Afghan economic development, and offer a strategy to minimize the risks Afghanistan faces in its efforts to exploit its mineral wealth for the benefit of the population. 相似文献
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David French Jonathan Boff Jacqueline L. Hazelton Eric Sayers Bradford Lee Colin S. Gray 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(6):897-909
The purpose of this article is to analyse British strategic nuclear targeting between 1974 and 1979, prior to the successful completion of the sophisticated modification to Polaris submarine-missile system codenamed Chevaline. It will use as its starting point the parameters for UK strategic nuclear targeting, and the foundation of the ‘Moscow Criterion’, prior to the deployment of Britain's Polaris submarines which began in 1968. It will then discuss the recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff to retarget Polaris in 1975/76 and the implications of that recommendation in terms of the British approach to strategic nuclear deterrence. The article will conclude with an assessment of these retargeting decisions on the decision to replace Polaris with the US Trident system in 1980. 相似文献