White hull or white elephant? Soft power and the Chinese hospital ship,the Peace Ark

Although soft power is now seen as an indispensable foreign policy tool, its efficacy has rarely been put to a rigorous empirical test. Using data from HARMONIOUS MISSIONs 2010, 2011 and 2013, this article seeks to examine the degree to which the soft power engagement missions of the Chinese hospital ship, the Peace Ark, has advanced Chinese interests. Although any conclusions drawn must be considered preliminary, as so little time has passed between the ship's visits and the current analysis, this research indicates that these missions’ impact on advancing Chinese interests was at best limited. Although observations from a single set of cases are unlikely to settle the debate between soft power advocates and detractors, it is hoped that this research will serve as a catalyst to further empirically based research on this topic.     

Evolutionary Psychology and Global Security

Peace and global security are human endeavors, and thus their attainment depends as much on psychology as it does on governance and technology. In this paper I outline 3 ways our evolved psychology is an obstacle to achieving international cooperation and peace. First, humans show strong evidence of adaptations for cooperation within groups, but equally clear evidence that this cooperative nature does not extend to members of other groups. Second, humans evolved to have a relative sense of fairness, and thus will often reject even mutually beneficial agreements if they benefit others more than themselves. Third, humans evolved to be self-deceptive and hypocritical, believing in the unique righteousness and inevitable victory of their own cause, which tends to exacerbate conflict. Nevertheless, these obstacles are not insurmountable and an awareness of them can help in the development of strategies to increase the chances of lasting peace and security.     

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY EXPENDITURE,THREAT, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NONLINEAR APPROACH

The main objective of the paper is to decipher the military expenditure–economic growth relationship, taking the level of economic development (income) into consideration. Our findings suggest the following: (i) military expenditure has a significantly negative relationship to economic growth for the 23 countries with initial incomes (threshold variable) less than or equal to $475.93; (ii) when the threat level is heightened, economic growth (23 countries) is expected to decrease. However, military expenditure in the presence of sufficiently large threats increases growth; (iii) for the remaining 69 countries whose initial incomes (real GDP per capita in 1992 price) exceed $475.93, no significant relationship exists whether the threat variable is taken into consideration or not.     

A note on the financial condition of defense contractors

In recent years, there have been several changes in the weapon‐system acquisition market which have the potential to negatively impact the financial condition of defense contractors. This study evaluates the financial health of defense firms vis‐a‐vis nondefense firms using a fiscal distress identification model developed by E.I. Altman. We conclude that the financial condition of defense firms has deteriorated but the deterioration is the same as experienced by nondefense firms.     

THE HARD CASES

Many countries received Soviet-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) for civilian nuclear research purposes. Because of inadequate nuclear security at a number of the research sites, U.S. policy has sought to remove or otherwise safely dispose of their HEU stocks as quickly as possible. Although the pace of HEU disposition has accelerated significantly in recent years, several sites have posed formidable technical, economic, and political challenges. This article identifies the major obstacles to HEU removal at two key installations—Kharkiv in Ukraine, and Sosny in Belarus—and recommends a strategy for overcoming these impediments. Key components for a successful disposition strategy include: treating these cases with the urgency they deserve, expanding potential compensation packages, explicitly addressing the institutional and political issues involved, engaging high-level political leaders, working with third parties, and promoting these efforts as part of a nondiscriminatory initiative to phase out HEU in the civilian nuclear sector globally.     

An Analysis of the Threat of Malicious Chemical Use by Nonstate Actors: Questioning the State-based Approach to Chemical Nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to evaluate the threat of malicious chemical use by non-state actors. It finds that non-state actors have primarily turned to ready-to-use crude chemical weapons (CW) instead of traditional CW agents. Interestingly, the worst crude CW attacks have been more destructive than those employing traditional CW. Scenarios for catastrophic consequences exist, but chemical attacks have typically been used to accomplish tactical goals, which leverage psychological and economic impacts. Therefore, successful efforts to counter CW proliferation by non-state actors must be substantially different from those targeting states.     

Reflections on Transparency and Monitoring under the 1993 United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement

ABSTRACT

The 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement between the United States and Russian Federation is often described as one of the world's most successful nuclear nonproliferation programs. In 2013, the two states achieved the agreement's major goals of downblending 500 metric tons of Russian weapon-origin HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) and delivering all resultant LEU to the United States. At one time, the LEU delivered under the agreement generated nearly 10 percent of all electricity in the United States. The agreement achieved its nonproliferation goals through a unique government/industry partnership. Commercial executive agents contracted for the annual sale and delivery of downblended LEU, while the US and Russian governments exercised reciprocal transparency monitoring measures to demonstrate that all LEU delivered under the agreement was derived from Russian weapons-origin HEU, and that the same LEU was used for exclusively peaceful purposes in the United States. The commercial development, negotiations, and implementation of the agreement have been well documented. This article describes the scope of US transparency monitoring activities in Russian HEU processing facilities, as well as Russian monitoring in the United States. In addition, it discusses the results of twenty years of reciprocal transparency monitoring and data analysis, and outlines lessons learned that are potentially applicable to future transparency monitoring and verification regimes and similar cooperative efforts.     

Marketing Systems and Insurgency in Western Guatemala

Guatemala is a nation with a history of severe political and socioeconomic problems. These crises contributed to the growth and durability of insurgent movements, which from 1961 to 1996 were endemic in certain regions of the nation, particularly western Guatemala. This paper examines insurgent activity in the four marketing subsystems described by Smith1 ?1. Smith, ‘Marketing Systems’, pp. 117–46. found in western Guatemala: dendritic, primate, top-heavy and interlocking. Peasants are said to be severely disadvantaged in the dendritic marketing systems, disadvantaged in primate markets, and relatively capable of making a decent living in top-heavy and interlocking systems. If this is so, support for system changing revolutionary movements should predictably be highest in dendritic systems, significant in primate systems, and only marginal in top-heavy and interlocking systems. An examination of the political-military situation in western Guatemala from 1976 to 1996 supports this thesis.