Applying Lanchester's linear law to model the Ardennes campaign

In modern warfare, many believe the decisive factor in winning a battle is seizing the right moment to shift from defense to attack, or vice versa. This paper attempts to bring that perspective to Lanchester's differential equations of warfare, and continues the application of Lanchester's linear law to the analysis of the World War II battle of Ardennes, as reported in earlier issues of Naval Research Logistics by Bracken and by Fricker. A new variable, shift time, accounting for the timing of the shift between defense and attack is explicitly included in our version of the model, and it helps obtain improved goodness of fit to historical data. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48:653–661, 2001     

Product commonality in multiple‐period,make‐to‐stock systems

It is well known that replacing several products by a single common product can reduce required safety stock levels due to the benefits of risk pooling. Recent research utilizing single‐period models has investigated the cost savings (or losses) from doing so. This paper uses a very general multiple‐period model, with general demand distributions, any number of products, and the objective of minimizing production, holding, and shortage costs. Two scenarios are considered—one that utilizes a common product and one that does not. Prior results utilizing single‐period models indicate that even if the common product is more expensive than the products it replaces, there are many circumstances under which it is still worthwhile to employ. Surprisingly, this paper will show that this is almost never the case in a multiple‐period model. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 46: 737–751, 1999     

An extensible modeling framework for dynamic reassignment and rerouting in cooperative airborne operations

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), increasingly vital to the success of military operations, operate in a complex and dynamic environment, sometimes in concert with manned aircraft. We present an extensible modeling framework for the solution to the dynamic resource management (DRM) problem, where airborne resources must be reassigned to time‐sensitive tasks in response to changes in battlespace conditions. The DRM problem is characterized by diverse tasks with time windows, heterogeneous resources with fuel‐ and payload‐capacity limitations, and multiple competing objectives. We propose an integer linear programing formulation for this problem, where mathematical feasibility is guaranteed. Although motivated by airborne military operations, the proposed general modeling framework is applicable to a wide array of settings, such as disaster relief operations. Additionally, land‐ or water‐based operations may be modeled within this framework, as well as any combination of manned and unmanned vehicles. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Was World War Two a Completely Just War?

ABSTRACT

According to Brian Orend’s binary political model, minimally just states possess a robust set of moral rights, while other states essentially exist in a moral vacuum in which they possess no moral rights. I argue that a more plausible comparative model would allow for a state to acquire (or lose) discrete moral rights as it improves (or damages) its moral record. This would generate a more accurate portrayal of both domestic policy within states and military conflict between states; including, in particular, the role of the Allied forces during World War Two.     

Reinterpreting western use of coercion in Bosnia‐Herzegovina: Assurances and carrots were crucial

This article demonstrates that assurances and carrots accompanied credible threats every time Western coercion succeeded in Bosnia. This finding is hardly surprising as it merely confirms earlier research on coercive diplomacy, but it is nevertheless important because the crucial role played by assurances and carrots has been completely ignored in most analyses to date. It also has important policy implications at a time when Western, and particularly American, policy‐makers tend to ignore this fact at their peril. US policy towards Iraq and Western policy towards Yugoslavia have been based almost exclusively on the stick in recent years, and its lack of success is therefore not surprising. If Western policy‐makers had learned the right lessons from Bosnia, they would have known that strategies coupling credible threats with credible assurances and carrots would have been more likely to succeed.