Between vigilantism and ethnocultural preservation: An investigation into the legitimacy of the non-state policing activities of the Ombatse group among the Eggon people of Nassarawa State,Nigeria

Postmodern contradictions in postcolonial Nigeria have led to the fetishisation of alternative local security measures often labelled as vigilante activities. The profiling of these groups as ethnic militia often undermines their essential bid to provide security while delimiting security needs to the physical. The fallouts of such profiling are frictions between federal security agents and ethnic-based security groups, often resulting in violence, as exemplified by the 7 May 2013 incident between the Nigerian federal security agents and the Ombatse. This study focuses on the emergence and activities of the Ombatse as an alternative security apparatus of the Eggon. It presents three years of field research which entailed the use of ethnography, key informant interviews and observation. The findings reveal that the Ombatse emerged to assert historical legitimacy for both the physical and spiritual securitisation of the Eggon through a return to the ancestral ways of social engineering. The study considers the security challenges in Nigeria, and also situates the Eggon historical context within political, religious, sociocultural and economic intersections of securitisation. It concludes that the Ombatse situates its legitimacy within the Eggon past and retains its relevance through the holistic focus of providing both physical and spiritual security.     

Nonlinear programming the choice of direction by gradient projection

Rosen's method of Gradient Projection chooses a search direction which is not necessarily the direction of steepest ascent. However, the projection of the gradient onto a “suitably chosen subspace” does yield the direction of steepest ascent. The suitable choice is easily recognized as a result of some theorems relating gradient projection to steepest ascent. These results lead to a modification of Rosen's method. The modification improves the choice of search direction and usually yields the steepest ascent direction without solving a quadratic programming problem.     

Self-Interest versus the Common Cause: Austria,Prussia and Russia against Napoleon

This essay re-examines coalition warfare during the Napoleonic era by looking at the three eastern European powers – Austria, Prussia and Russia – how they interacted over time with France as well as each other, and how they managed French preponderance on the Continent. Before 1812, coalition warfare was dominated by eighteenth-century military and diplomatic attitudes: overall foreign political goals were ill-defined and were characterised by deep mistrust. The result was that the eastern powers pursued their own interests with little regard to coalition cohesion. If the coalition held together in 1813 and 1814, on the other hand, it was largely because individual powers' self-interest coincided with the overall objectives of the coalition – an increased determination to defeat Napoleon – along with a never before seen numerical superiority in allied troops. In this, Austria and especially Chancellor Metternich's role in juggling conflicting interests between the allies so that they could present, for the first time, a united front against France was fundamental.     

Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency

Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school. The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination of the evolution of these two schools of counter-insurgency reveals how the interplay between them ultimately leaves us with a confused and contradictory understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and the policies and strategies necessary to combat it.     

The Radford Bombshell: Anglo-Australian-US Relations,Nuclear Weapons and the Defence of South East Asia, 1954-57

This article looks at the emergence of nuclear planning assumptions within the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) during the mid-1950s. It does so by examining US strategic concepts for the defence of the treaty area, and the ways these produced major problems for the Australian Government as it switched the emphasis in its defence policy toward a permanent commitment of forces to the South East Asian mainland. At the same time, Britain was struggling to reconcile its membership of SEATO with the need to effect economies in defence spending that would not alarm their Australian Commonwealth partners. As dissatisfaction within SEATO grew, both the US and Britain moved toward a more overt acceptance of nuclear planning assumptions that would reassure their allies without producing a greater call on their resources.     

LEARNING TO LIVE WITH A NUCLEAR IRAN

Claims that China is the only nuclear power currently expanding its arsenal fail to take into account the technical, historical, and bureaucratic realities that shaped China's nuclear posture and drive its ongoing modernization. China's strategic modernization is largely a process of deploying new delivery systems, not designing new nuclear warheads; the majority of its new missiles are conventionally armed. Today, China maintains the smallest operationally deployed nuclear force of any of the legally recognized nuclear weapon states, operates under a no-first-use pledge, and keeps its warheads off alert. The modernization of China's delivery systems is the culmination of a decades-long plan to acquire the same capabilities deployed by the other nuclear powers. U.S. concerns about this modernization focus too much on deterring a deliberate Chinese attack and ignore the risk that modernized U.S. and Chinese forces could interact in unexpected ways during a crisis, creating uncontrollable escalatory pressures. To manage this risk, Washington should assure Chinese leaders that it does not seek to deny China's deterrent, in exchange for some understanding that China will not seek numerical parity with U.S. nuclear forces.