Book reviews

European Security in the New Political Environment by James H. Wyllie, London: Addison, Wesley Longman, 1997, ISBN 0-582-24403-X (pbk), £13.99

Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda edited by Vladimir Baranovsky, Oxford: Oxford University Press, SIPRI, 1997, ISBN 0-19-829201-5 (hbk), £45.00

The Defeat of Japan by David Rees, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, ISBN 0-275-95955-4 (hbk), £46.50

The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, 1900-1940 by Nicholas Tracy (ed.), London: Ashgate, for the Navy Records Society, 1997, ISBN 1859-284-027 (hbk), £59.50

Knights in White Armour The New Art of War and Peace by Christopher Bellamy, London: Pimlico Press, 1997, ISBN 0-7126-739-03 (pbk), £12.50

Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World by avid A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds), University Park: Penn State Press, 1997, ISBN 0-271-01703-i (hbk), £49.50/$55, ISBN 0-271-01704-X (pbk), £7.95/$19.95

Contested Social Orders and International Politics by David Skidmore (ed.), Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-8265-1284-4 (hbk), $32.95

The Politics of Threat: Minuteman Vulnerability in American National Security Policy by David H. Dunn. London: Macmillan Press, 1997, ISBN 0-333-67816-8 (hbk), £45.00

The Sociology of the Military by Guiseppe Caforio (ed.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998, ISBN 1-85898-619-2, 704 pp., £150

The Nordic Nations in the New Western Security Regime by Ingemar Dorfer, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-943875-83-8 (hbk), £27, ISBN 0-943875-82-X (pbk), £13     

Application of disjunctive programming to the linear complementarity problem

In this article we address the question of developing deep cuts for disjunctive programs using rectilinear distance measures. The method is applied to linear complementarity problems where the matrix M need not be copositive plus. Some modifications that are needed as a computational expediency are discussed. The computation results for matrix M of size up to 30 × 30 are discussed.     

Sequential tests for hypotheses concerning the product of poisson parameters with applications to problems in reliability and biometry

Sequential tests for the product of Poisson parameters based on the generalized incomplete modified Bessel (g.i.m.B.) distributions are given. Applications to reliability and biometry are indicated.     

The financial performance of aircraft manufacturers during world war II: the vicissitudes of war

Controversy has long surrounded the role and profitability of US defense contractors. From a financial perspective the question becomes whether defense contractors earn greater profits and investor returns than other companies during military conflicts. We explore this question by examining the accounting profitability and investor returns of US aircraft manufacturers before, during, and after World War II and compare them to a sample of non-defense firms. We also examine the reactions of aircraft stock prices to important political and military events of the time. We find that (1) aircraft stocks exhibited positive abnormal returns around events associated with defense buildups and outbreaks of hostile action and negative returns around events signaling an end to hostilities, (2) the company’s accounting returns improved during the war but these higher accounting returns did not translate into higher stock returns for the shareholders, and (3) investors could have earned higher stock returns had they switched out of aircraft stocks after Pearl Harbor and reinvested the proceeds in the overall market.     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.