Auctions in the post‐change‐order period

A change order is frequently initiated by either the supplier or the buyer, especially when the contract is long‐term or when the contractual design is complex. In response to a change order, the buyer can enter a bargaining process to negotiate a new price. If the bargaining fails, she pays a cancellation fee (or penalty) and opens an auction. We call this process the sequential bargaining‐auction (BA). At the time of bargaining, the buyer is uncertain as to whether the bargained price is set to her advantage; indeed, she might, or might not, obtain a better price in the new auction. To overcome these difficulties, we propose a new change‐order‐handling mechanism by which the buyer has an option to change the contractual supplier after bargaining ends with a bargained price. We call this the option mechanism. By this mechanism, the privilege of selling products or services is transferred to a new supplier if the buyer exercises the option. To exercise the option, the buyer pays a prespecified cash payment, which we call the switch price, to the original supplier. If the option is not exercised, the bargained price remains in effect. When a switch price is proposed by the buyer, the supplier decides whether or not to accept it. If the supplier accepts it, the buyer opens an auction. The option is exercised when there is a winner in the auction. This article shows how, under the option mechanism, the optimal switch price and the optimal reserve price are determined. Compared to the sequential BA, both the buyer and the supplier benefit. Additionally, the option mechanism coordinates the supply chain consisting of the two parties. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 248–265, 2015     

A general strategic capacity planning model under demand uncertainty

Capacity planning decisions affect a significant portion of future revenue. In equipment intensive industries, these decisions usually need to be made in the presence of both highly volatile demand and long capacity installation lead times. For a multiple product case, we present a continuous‐time capacity planning model that addresses problems of realistic size and complexity found in current practice. Each product requires specific operations that can be performed by one or more tool groups. We consider a number of capacity allocation policies. We allow tool retirements in addition to purchases because the stochastic demand forecast for each product can be decreasing. We present a cluster‐based heuristic algorithm that can incorporate both variance reduction techniques from the simulation literature and the principles of a generalized maximum flow algorithm from the network optimization literature. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Stochastic duels with displacements (suppression)

The stochastic duel is extended to include the possibility of a near-miss on each round fired, which causes the opponent to displace. During displacement, the displacing contestant cannot return the fire but is still a target for his opponent. An alternative interpretation of this model is to consider the displacement time as the time a contestant's fire is suppressed by his opponent's fire and that he does not move, but merely ceases fire temporarily. All times are exponentially distributed.     

The challenge and meaning of justice in northern Uganda

Even though the peace talks in northern Uganda have faltered, attempts at negotiations between the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army are continuing. The current rapprochement between the two sides is the most significant move towards peace in the twenty-year civil war in northern Uganda. Even though the war has been extreme in its brutality, it is little known of outside the region—with reports on the conflict often portraying a protective government pitted against a crazed rebel group. But the issues are much more complex. The article examines the history of abuses and atrocities committed by both sides; the wider implications of the conflict for the north; why the rest of Uganda are seemingly disinterested in the conflict; and the politics behind why northern civil society have little trust in the Ugandan government or the International Criminal Court (ICC). The current prospect of peace has also stirred up the debate around justice and the forms of justice for victims of both rebel and government atrocities. And this is where the biggest cleft between the northern civil society and officialdom (government and international NGOs) resides. The article further examines the implications of the ICC's work in Uganda, and why there has been such widespread hostility towards it from northern civil society. The article also asks if—beyond the end of fighting and terror—peace will really mean that northern Uganda can finally partake in the prosperity the rest of the country has almost taken for granted.