Ridge regression analysis of the defence‐growth tradeoff in the United States

An examination of past analyses suggests that today's sailors may be less responsive to compensation changes than previous generations. Such a change could make recruiting and retaining high‐quality sailors more difficult. However, variation in researchers' decisions over time may simply have created the appearance of such a change. Our results suggest there is little variation in the pay elasticity over time. In contrast, the different reduced‐form models we use to measure this relationship can explain most of the variation in the literature. Therefore, the evidence suggests that while sailors may have changed over time, their response to compensation has not.     

Country Survey XIII: Japan's security posture and defense industry prospects

Defense budgets in Japan have been complicated compromises from numerous inputs ‐ including threat perceptions, domestic industrial/technological base development, support for the bilateral security treaty with the United States and internal bureaucratic politics ‐ but with the fall of the former Soviet Union, the clearest justification for higher spending disappeared. Double‐digit defense spending increases that were common in the 1980s have been replaced by annual increases lower than present inflation rates, resulting in negative real growth in the country's defense budget. Domestic economic problems and consistent government pressures for smaller budgets have further slowed annual growth in total spending and have contributed to lower procurement budgets. As a result, the domestic Japanese defense industry is facing far more constrained conditions from the growth years of a decade before.

Government policymakers are examining Japan's regional security environment as well as its alliance with the United States to determine the appropriate course for the country to take in the coming years. The formal security treaty with the United States is likely to remain a major element of government positions, but other aspects of the country's overall security posture are open to debate. Perceptions of a reduced threat environment are fueling additional pressures for defense budget cuts.

The domestic defense industry seeks means to assure its survival in domestic defense markets in this constrained environment. Expansion into overseas markets to offset declining domestic markets is an option that currently is constrained by policy restrictions on arms exports. Industry is advocating re‐examination of those policies and unlike earlier years, government appears willing to respond positively but cautiously to this lobbying.     

WHY IRAN WANTS THE BOMB AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US POLICY

Understanding why the Iranian regime wants to possess nuclear weapons is essential to formulating the best policy to prevent (or perhaps to simply manage) the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. Three general theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—provide a framework for looking at Iran's nuclear motivations. However, contrary to many analyses, the regime's desire to possess nuclear arms stems not from neorealist defensive concerns, but rather from offensive goals driven by domestic politics. The use of extremist Islamism by the Iranian regime to justify its autocratic rule is the primary motivating factor. Accordingly, the outlook for diplomatically addressing the Iranian regime's nuclear aspirations appears dim.     

Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is.     

The Wilson government and the demise of TSR‐2, October 1964 – April 1965

Domestic factors play an important role in the formulation and evolution of a country's foreign and security policy. This is clearly seen in the case study of a Soviet successor state, Ukraine. The article brings together in seven sections theory with the key domestic factors that influence Ukrainian security policy, such as economics, energy, national identity, elites and political parties. The article provides an insight into how these domestic factors influence the course of Ukrainian security policy which is striking a balance between the twin extremes of Soviet re‐integration, which would be tantamount to the loss of independence, and nationalist maximalism which seeks to place as much distance as possible between Ukraine and Russia.     

The Rebirth of Insurgency in Peru

Peru has battled two major insurgent movements since 1980. Around 25,000 Peruvians have died in this war between the government against the Shining Path and the MRTA. The Peruvian military has been incapable of achieving total victory after several major operations and the capture of just about every major rebel leader. Even worse, after a few years of almost no activity, Shining Path seems to be re-emerging. The last remaining members of this insurgent group have made alliances with foreign terrorist groups, used drug traffic to fund their fight and sweet talked people who are very disappointed and mad at the current Toledo administration, to gain more supporters. Major changes have to occur to prevent both groups from becoming threats to national security and society as a whole, taking the country back to times when around half of the nation was declared to be under terrorist control. The defense budget must be increased to open new bases, buy new equipment and train soldiers better to fight the insurgents more effectively. At the same time, major social changes need to occur; Toledo and his government must gain the trust and sympathy of Peruvians again by working for and with them.     

Book reviews

Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing”. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. Pp.xiv + 247; app., map, notes, cartoon.

Maria Jose Moyano, Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969–1979. New Haven: Connecticut Yale University Press, 1995. Pp.xiii + 226, biblio., abbreviations, 10 figures, 1 map, tables, index; $25/£16.95. ISBN 0–300–01622–6.

Donald E. Schulz and Deborah Sundloff Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America, Westview Thematic Studies in Latin America, Boulder, Co: Westview, 1994. Pp.368, map, figure, select biblio., abbreviations, index. $52.50/£37.50; (cloth) $17.95/£11.95 (paper). ISBN 0–8133–1324–4 and 1323–6.

Joseph H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare 1945–1991. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995. Pp.iii + 178, 1 map, 29 illus, biblio, index. $32.95. ISBN

Gary P. Cox, The Halt in the Mud: French Strategic Planning from Waterloo to Sedan. Westview Press, 1994. Pp.258, maps, notes, biblio, index. £33.50. ISBN 0–133–1536–0.     

Whatever happened to South America's splendid little wars?

South America has gained international media attention due to its ongoing arms race, with politicians and analysts warning about the possibility of war. Nevertheless, since the Chaco War in the 1930s, the region has seldom faced major inter-state wars, all of which have been short-lived and with relatively few casualties. This article will discuss in greater detail the ongoing arms race in South America, portraying it as a race ‘of levels’, with not all countries carrying out massive weaponry purchases. Finally, I will discuss regional geopolitics, geosecurity and integration as part of an analysis regarding the unlikelihood of war.     

It's all the rage: why mechanization doesn't explain COIN outcomes

A recent article, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, does a disservice to the debate over what explains counterinsurgency (COIN) success. While it establishes a negative correlation between the diffusion of military mechanization in the state system and COIN success, its theoretical argument does not hold up under close scrutiny and its micro-case comparison of two units in Iraq during 2003–2004 ignores obvious counter-examples and factors that influence COIN success, such as leadership. A deeper inquiry would have revealed that there is much more to COIN success than simply not having access to vehicles.