Army reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003–2009

Since the peace agreements of 2002–2003 which ended the second war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, reconstruction of the army has been an inherently political process, in common with other attempts to carry out security sector reform (SSR). This article briefly sketches out the Congolese army's history, then attempts to fill a gap in the literature on Congolese SSR by detailing what can be found of the actual structure and shape of the present army. The efforts that have been made to reform the army are then examined, followed by a conclusion which examines the major issues and possible ways forward.     

Baixa do Cassang: Ending the abuse of Portuguese Africans

On 4 January 1961 in Baixa do Cassange, in the north of Angola, the blacks who worked in the cotton fields began a strike. The army with air support was called to quell the rebellion, and the article emphasizes the importance of air support tethered to the ground forces, particularly in a remote and vast area of operations in the tropical rainy season. In this case, the support originally came in the form a squadron of Lockheed PV-2 Harpoons from Luanda, some 300 kilometers away. These open-ocean reconnaissance aircraft and their crews were ill-suited for the task. When this became apparent, four small Auster D5/160s were relocated from Negage to Malange, among the ground forces. The Austers flew reconnaissance missions over the troubled zones, dropped provisions and messages to the advancing ground forces, and served as a backup communications link. When the strike ceased after three weeks, the Austers assumed a humanitarian role in support of the starving population. The conclusion is that air support to ground forces is indispensable, must be properly tailored to the job, and must operate as an integral part of the ground forces.     

A more complex and conventional victory: revisiting the Dhofar counterinsurgency, 1963–1975

Following the emergence of a communist regime in South Yemen and the multiplication of subversive movements in the United Kingdom's Gulf protectorates, British policymakers genuinely feared the spread of communism throughout southern Arabia. Defeating the People's Front for the Liberation for the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) insurgency in Oman's Dhofar province was considered central to preventing such an outcome. In their pursuit of victory, British officers overthrew the sultan of Oman, escalated the war by conducting attacks in South Yemen, and, ultimately, appealed to Islam as a means of rallying support against communism. However, lessons learned in previous counterinsurgencies (Malaya, Kenya, and Borneo) proved of only limited value in Oman's physical and cultural environment. Unfortunately, none of these measures worked as anticipated. Only Iran's direct military intervention and the dramatic growth of Oman's financial resources after the 1973 oil crisis provided the resources to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Even so, victory was only achieved in 1975 because the rebellion's leaders unwisely attempted to oppose the Anglo–Omani offensives conventionally.     

Institutionalizing supreme command: explaining political–military integration in the Vietnam War, 1964–1968

Under what conditions can leaders achieve wartime political–military integration? In the Vietnam War, political–military integration exhibited dramatic variation: in the air war, the US was able to tightly integrate its political objectives and military conduct, but in the ground war, the American military prosecuted a strategy that was both divorced from broader political objectives and was immune from Washington's influence. I argue that the nature of information management between the military and civilian leadership explains the pattern of political–military integration in the Vietnam War more completely than do explanations that focus on the organizational cultures of professional militaries.     

Fighting on Their Own Terms: The Tactics of the Irish Republican Army 1919-1921

Abstract

The 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish War represents one of the earliest instances of a successful insurgent movement in the twentieth century. By combining a fluid organizational structure with effective hit-and-run tactics and accurate intelligence, the Irish Republican Army was able to defeat militarily the security forces of Great Britain. Combined with a successful propaganda campaign, these tactics allowed the IRA to drive the British to the negotiating table, where its representatives secured greater autonomy than Ireland had known in centuries. The outcome of the Anglo-Irish War demonstrates the success which a well-organized guerrilla campaign can achieve, and the tactics used by the IRA must therefore be understood by any serious student of small warfare.     

On the roles of free play in army exercises and the Russians

The article outlines the essential role of free play elements in various types of exercises for the development of in-depth and practical military professionalism. It thereafter argues why such use of free play contradicts the military science founded Russian Way of War.     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.     

Historical and Political Background to the Erosion of the Rule of Law and Human Rights During Sri Lanka’s Civil War and the Way Forward

The Sri Lankan Civil War (1983–2009) is regarded as a violent reflection of deepening divides along political and ethnic lines. During this civil war the Sri Lankan Government and its security forces have been implicated in unlawful killings carried out in a pervasive manner against civilians, whilst at the same time specifically targeting ethnic Tamils, humanitarian workers and journalists. The human rights of all citizens suffered as a result and ultimately led to the weakening of the rule of law. With the end of the civil war, the Sri Lankan Government has made little progress in providing accountability for wartime abuses. Its absence of and reluctance to ensure justice is seen as a logical culmination of decades of impunity. The importance of acknowledging historical behaviour and taking accountability for past violations will be discussed. In an analysis for paving the way to a new democracy in Sri Lanka, the main outcomes of this article are calls for accountability arising out of the government’s actions during the war; an investigation into the present state of human rights, the rule of law and finally; an examination into the political solution going forward to ensure a process of reconciliation and peaceful co-existence.     

Development of proxy relationships: a case study of the Lebanese Civil War

Proxy warfare is a consistent element in international warfare. However, it is unclear why proxy relationships form in cases where states have multiple options of groups to support. Existing research identifies the presence of transnational constituencies, shared interstate rivalries, and moderate relative strength of militant groups as highly influential on the development of a proxy relationship. This study examines the presence of these variables within the context of the Lebanese Civil War. The results of this demonstrate that each state places greater importance on some variables and ignores others when choosing a proxy. Additionally, this study further demonstrates the presence of new variables that are key to the development of proxy relationships.     

Population transfers in counter-insurgency: a recipe for success?

Since control over the population constitutes the most crucial determinant for victory in irregular warfare, how should a state authority isolate the insurgents (the “fish” in Maoist terms) from the population (the “sea” in which the “fish” thrive)? Should a state authority simply drain the “sea” by diverting its “water” elsewhere? Does the forcible transfer of the local people who support an insurgency truly work? This article studies how the royalist regime of Greece forcibly transferred thousands of villagers (over 10% of the total population) to counter the communist insurgency during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) and shows whether and how these deportations could be crowned with success.