Allies at arm’s length: Redefining Egyptian–Soviet relations in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war

This article examines Egyptian–Soviet relations in the run up to the 1967 Arab–Israeli war. It argues that Egypt and the Soviet Union stumbled into brinkmanship with little coordination and no agreement on common objectives or goals. The article demonstrates how frustration and mutual disappointment were recurring features of the interactions between the two allies during the critical weeks prior to the war. In doing so, the article exposes new aspects of how Cairo and Moscow managed their alliance and assesses what that means to our understanding of the origins of this transformative war. These conclusions challenge revisionist accounts that attribute the start of the war to Egyptian–Soviet collusion and some traditional narratives that present the Soviet Union as an enterprising risk-taker invested in regional brinkmanship. The article draws heavily on Egyptian and Arabic language sources to examine Egyptian–Soviet interactions during this key period of Middle Eastern history.     

美国在非洲维和的经验教训及其启示

开展维和行动是实现联合国宗旨和维护世界安全与稳定的重要手段。作为联合国安理会五大常任理事国之一,美国是联合国完成维和任务不可或缺的,甚至具有决定性作用的国家。冷战时期美国的非洲维和行动在争吵和小心翼翼中进行,冷战后美国的非洲维和战略经历了积极主动向有选择地介入转变的过程,当前美国的非洲维和行动则是在崇尚自主的前提下推广美国特色的维和,以期最大限度地彰显美国实力、维护美国核心利益。审视美国非洲维和战略的演变,汲取足够的经验教训,有利于更好地根据世情和国情定位中国未来的维和战略。     

Why Boko Haram should be on the European Union list of designated terror groups

In the course of the last few years, the Islamic sect Boko Haram has become of great interest to academics, researchers and analysts. At the same time, experts, especially at the European Union (EU) level, have been reluctant to include Boko Haram in the EU list of terrorist organisations, despite the fact that this group has clearly demonstrated its transformation into a terrorist organisation. Security challenges and threats are, by definition, subject to change, and it is the task of security institutions to create policies to address these challenges and threats. Terrorism cannot be addressed in isolation, and policymakers are confronted at all levels with the difficult task of making sense of this evolution. By assessing the current security situation in Nigeria, this commentary tries to ascertain the potential repercussions to regional stability from the Boko Haram phenomenon. Insurgencies have often been initiated from and supported by neighbouring countries and have expanded conflicts across borders. Countering Boko Haram will require various institutions to conduct similar and concurrent counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist operations. At the global level, such co-ordination has often proven difficult. The EU has to keep the pace in this case.     

From control to parasitism

This article sets out to investigate the current paradoxical roles of border control agencies in order to contribute to the theoretical debate on border porosity and related security issues in West Africa. The colonial demarcation of African borders accounts for their porous nature initially, as borderland populations challenged the unjust scission of their cultural, economic, geographical and geopolitical spaces. However, new forms of porosity also evolved over time, masterminded by new actors. Drawing on the Ghana–Togo border case, and through interviews, observation and documentary analysis, this article argues that border control agencies are partly responsible for the current border porosity and attendant security problems as their jurisdiction has shifted to a multi-layered border parasitism. The article is not, however, an attack on border law enforcement agencies; rather it attempts to explore their roles in shielding the region, already exposed to terrorism and piracy, from further security threats.     

SYMBIOTIC SPIES

Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb, by Michael S. Goodman. Stanford University Press, 2007. 295 pages, $50.     

AID,GLENEAGLES AND THE RUN-UP TO THE MILLENNIUM +5 SUMMIT

Africa has emerged as a strategic location for transcontinental narcotics trade. Particularly the West African subcontinent has turned into a cocaine warehousing and trans-shipment hub along the way to the European underground markets. At this juncture, African drug networks (ADNs) began to play a momentous role in global drug trade, and pose a considerable threat to international security, as they operate in more than 80 countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Interpol, and Europol perceive ADNs as one of the primary issues in international counter-narcotics policy. These agencies have launched several multilateral initiatives to contain the West African threat. None of these initiatives, however, retarded the expansion of the problem. Indeed, the containment efforts turned out to be quite embryonic. The ADNs eventually entered the Turkish market by the early 2000s. West African drug networks (WADNs) in particular have begun to operate within Turkey extensively, often supplying and distributing drugs. The gravity of the threat became ever more serious by 2012. The upsurge of the new threat has compelled the Turkish drug-law enforcement agencies to adopt new policies and counter-strategies. These policies have to be based upon proper strategic analysis of the threat. This paper seeks to address the need for a threat assessment of ADNs. It investigates the dimensions of the problem, profiles the members of WADNs, their modes of operation, and the factors that compelled them to exploit the illicit Turkish drug markets. The analyses are based upon the scrutiny of 227 narcotic interdictions files and statements from the African individuals in these case files. The paper concludes by presenting policy implications and recommendations for the Turkish security and foreign-policy institutions to cope with this impending threat.