Traffickers,terrorists, and a ‘new security challenge’: Russian counternarcotics strategy and the Federal Service for the Control of the Drugs Trade

The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated the massive expansion of drug use and trade in Russia. The country now has one of the largest populations of injecting drug users in the world and has become the largest single-country market for Afghan heroin. In 2003 the Federal Service for the Control of the Drugs Trade was created to coordinate a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy appropriate to the scale of this threat. The service continues to face a number of challenges in its early stages of development. However, it has made considerable advances in improving responses to large-scale organised crime and in building international cooperation.     

Country survey XVI the defence sector in the economy of a declining superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001

The Soviet Union was able to develop a large military-industrial complex and become the world's second superpower despite deficiencies in its centrally planned economy because defence was given high priority status and special planning, rationing and administrative mechanisms were used to attain national security objectives. However, in the period 1976-85 the effectiveness of priority protection diminished and defence institutions experienced more of the problems typical of the shortage economic system. The heavy defence burden also created growing difficulties for the civilian economy. The attempts by the Gorbachev government to reform the defence sector and improve defence-economic relationships during perestroika (1985-91) uniformly failed. For most of the transition period, the Russian military-industrial complex has been adversely affected by its low priority status, cuts in defence spending, instability of the hybrid politico-economic system, and negative growth of the economy. The armed forces and defence industry have been reduced in size and their outputs of military services and equipment have fallen to low levels. Nevertheless, the Russian armed forces still have over one million troops, significant stocks of sophisticated conventional weapons, and a large nuclear arsenal. The government of President Putin has raised the priority of the defence sector, increased real defence spending, and adopted ambitious plans to revive Russian military power. It is likely, though, that tight resource constraints will hamper efforts to reform the armed forces and to upgrade weapons. By 2010 Russia will be an important, but not dominant, military power in Eurasia.     

AID,GLENEAGLES AND THE RUN-UP TO THE MILLENNIUM +5 SUMMIT

Africa has emerged as a strategic location for transcontinental narcotics trade. Particularly the West African subcontinent has turned into a cocaine warehousing and trans-shipment hub along the way to the European underground markets. At this juncture, African drug networks (ADNs) began to play a momentous role in global drug trade, and pose a considerable threat to international security, as they operate in more than 80 countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Interpol, and Europol perceive ADNs as one of the primary issues in international counter-narcotics policy. These agencies have launched several multilateral initiatives to contain the West African threat. None of these initiatives, however, retarded the expansion of the problem. Indeed, the containment efforts turned out to be quite embryonic. The ADNs eventually entered the Turkish market by the early 2000s. West African drug networks (WADNs) in particular have begun to operate within Turkey extensively, often supplying and distributing drugs. The gravity of the threat became ever more serious by 2012. The upsurge of the new threat has compelled the Turkish drug-law enforcement agencies to adopt new policies and counter-strategies. These policies have to be based upon proper strategic analysis of the threat. This paper seeks to address the need for a threat assessment of ADNs. It investigates the dimensions of the problem, profiles the members of WADNs, their modes of operation, and the factors that compelled them to exploit the illicit Turkish drug markets. The analyses are based upon the scrutiny of 227 narcotic interdictions files and statements from the African individuals in these case files. The paper concludes by presenting policy implications and recommendations for the Turkish security and foreign-policy institutions to cope with this impending threat.     

THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE

The African Union is preparing for its enhanced role in the maintenance of peace and security by establishing a Peace and Security Council that is tasked with identifying threats and breaches of the peace. To this end, the AU has recommended the development of a common security policy and, by 2010, the establishment of an African Standby Force capable of rapid deployment to keep, or enforce, the peace. The ASF would comprise of standby brigades in each of the five regions, and incorporate a police and civilian expert capacity. G8 leaders have pledged support for the AU proposal through funding, training, and enhanced co-ordination of activities. For its part, the AU will need to undertake a realistic assessment of member capabilities, to clearly articulate its needs, and to set realistic and achievable goals. The latest plan for establishing a rapidly deployable African peacekeeping force will require something that similar proposals have lacked: the political will to fund and implement a long list of recommendations. Success will ultimately be judged by the AU's future responses to situations of armed conflict. Even if such responses are largely symbolic in the short term, a sufficient display of political will among African leaders could inspire the confidence needed to galvanise international support.     

UNITED STATES—SOUTH AFRICA RELATION

Abstract

The article evaluates the security challenges that are likely to occur along international borders in East Africa with the advent of the East African Community Common Market in July 2010. In an attempt to illustrate the porosity of borders and the likelihood that criminals could take advantage of the situation, the author describes the ease with which transnational crime could thrive (in the absence of efficient border security measures) under the guise of informal cross-border trade that derives its basis largely from the customs and historical linkages in the region. Border towns in the region are considered zones of risk but also opportunities for quick money-making ventures and deals that tend to attract a variety of criminals. While the danger is not alarmingly high, there is a likelihood that with the opening up of the East African Community to the free movement of goods and people, criminals will exploit this freedom to commit crimes such as human trafficking, drug smuggling and moving terrorists and contraband goods unless mechanisms are put in place to curtail these activities. Should this not happen, the mission of the East African Community could be jeopardised.     

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EVOLVING ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN

In 2003, the “E3”—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—engaged Iran in talks over Tehran's nuclear program and were joined in negotiations the next year by the European Union (EU). Given the dim prospects of success for these talks, why did the E3/EU pursue nuclear negotiations with Iran? This article's three-track analysis attempts to answer that question by examining the emergence of the EU nonproliferation policy prior to the E3/EU-Iran talks, analyzing the European-Iranian relationship as it pertains to cooperation and negotiations over nonproliferation and other issues, and considering contemporary influences on the E3/EU. The European Union was ultimately unsuccessful in its negotiations with Tehran, but its efforts were worthwhile. In the future, the organization can play a vital nonproliferation role; today, the circumstances that hampered previous European efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear standoff have improved and could be capitalized on by the European Union and the international community.     

One Step Forward,Two Steps Back

This article explores the potential impact of U.S. disarmament leadership on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, the “defiant states.” The first part of the article introduces the concept of “interaction capacity,” which measures a state's integration into international society, based on its physical communication systems and its adoption of shared norms. The theory predicts that lower levels of interaction capacity will generate a greater propensity for nuclear defiance, as the affected states reject and try to resist integration pressures. In the second and third parts of the article, this conceptual framework is applied to the cases of North Korea and Iran. The analysis suggests that efforts to reassert U.S. disarmament leadership could increase the alienation of North Korea and Iran, leading to provocation and escalation of nuclear tensions. The final part of the paper explores the policy implications of this analysis for the potentially defunct six-party talks, for hopes of renewed negotiations with Iran, and for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.     

SYMBIOTIC SPIES

Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb, by Michael S. Goodman. Stanford University Press, 2007. 295 pages, $50.     

Interreligious violence in the Central African Republic

The outbreak of violence following the insurgency by a coalition of armed groups called Séléka represents one of the darkest pages in the contemporary history of the Central African Republic (CAR). Although the country has experienced chronic instability since independence from France in 1960, it has never before descended into the current near-genocidal situation, which has pitted Muslims against Christians. The CAR has been embroiled in conflict since March 2013, with unprecedented security and humanitarian consequences. In December 2013, the United Nations representative for the first time described the situation as an alarming security threat and evoked the likelihood of genocide and humanitarian disaster if nothing is done.     

The next step in Somalia: exploiting victory,post-Mogadishu

From 2006 to 2011, al-Qaeda's East African proxy, al-Shabaab, served as the de facto ruling party of Somalia despite the efforts of the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During these five years, a violent struggle between al-Shabaab and the peacekeeping force of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) resulted in thousands of dead civilians, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and a strategic environment inhospitable to reconciliation, recovery or development. By 2012, AMISOM was able to break the deadlock and force al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and Kismayo. In order to continue the momentum, the African Union and other partner nations must support the TFG in neutralising al-Shabaab throughout Somalia and providing good governance to its constituents. Al-Shabaab's revenue streams must be shut down and its offensive capability must be degraded while the strategic environment is shaped to ensure that conditions conducive to a revival do not exist. Failure to do so will likely see Somalia continuing to produce Islamist extremists and pirates to menace international maritime traffic in the western Indian Ocean, destabilise East Africa and adversely impact millions.