ESCAPE FROM NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Since the post-World War II genesis of nuclear deterrence, two presidential initiatives have been presented to deliver humanity from the threat of its failure. The first was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a constellation of space- and ground-based systems that President Ronald Reagan envisioned would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” The second is President Barack Obama's roadmap to “a world without nuclear weapons,” commonly referred to as “Global Zero.” While these proposals appear to have little in common, deeper investigation reveals a number of provocative similarities in motivation and presentation. Moreover, both generated fierce debate, often with ideological overtones, about their strategic desirability and technical feasibility. We use these parallels, as well as prominent dissimilarities, to draw lessons from the SDI experience that can be applied to the debate over Global Zero.     

Reconsidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to Mirski

Sean Mirski's assessment of a naval blockade is an important contribution to the debate over how the United States should respond to China's growing military power. Nevertheless, it has three limitations. First, although distant and close-in blockades could be employed in tandem, analyzing them separately helps to explain when they might be used and how they could influence escalation. Second, while conventional countervalue and counterforce options could also be employed together, this would depend on the degree to which they overlapped and the order in which they were implemented. Third, a blockade could lead to unanticipated prewar, intra-war, and postwar challenges.     

Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States

The People's Republic of China (PRC), no longer content with its longstanding ‘minimalist’ nuclear posture and strategy, is enhancing the striking power and survivability of its theater and strategic missile forces and rethinking its nuclear doctrine in ways that may pose serious challenges for the United States. Although the modernization of Chinese nuclear and missile forces may ultimately result in greater strategic deterrence stability, this change will not come about immediately or automatically. Indeed, it is entirely possible that China's growing missile capabilities could decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, especially in the event of a US–China conflict over Taiwan.     

Arming China: Major powers’ arms transfers to the People’s Republic of China

The rise of China has been fuelled by a massive military modernisation programme relying, in large part, on the acquisition of foreign military equipment. The question of how the world’s major powers define their arms transfer policies towards China is therefore crucially important. This article makes two original contributions. First, drawing on neoclassical realism, it proposes an explanatory framework integrating international and domestic factors to explain variations in major powers’ arms transfers. Second, based on a large body of elite interviews and diplomatic cables, it offers the first comprehensive comparison of American, British, French and Russian arms transfer policies towards China since the end of the Cold War.     

中国维和警察学科理论体系基本框架构想

中国维和警察参与联合国维和行动已成为我国公安工作的重要内容，把中国维和警察理论作为中国警学的新兴学科，研究由联合国维和行动基本理论、中国维和警察特色理论、中国维和警察基础理论、中国维和警察专业理论、中国维和警察应用理论构建的中国维和警察学科理论体系基本框架，对我国维和警察工作的发展具有重要的促进作用。     

Choosing the Right Sidekick: Economic Complements to US Military Grand Strategies

ABSTRACT

Scholars and practitioners of grand strategy agree that the use of military force should be supplemented by appropriate economic policies. However, strangely few accounts of economic complements to military grand strategies have been presented in recent discourse on US grand strategy. This paper takes a first step to fill this information gap. I first assess the role that could be played by economic measures under two types of grand strategies – one focusing on the balance of power and the other emphasising influence and order. Second, I introduce what I call ‘the influence-capability dilemma’ and discuss tradeoffs in adopting certain economic policies in order to help the US sustain pre-eminence in the international system. Third, I discuss how the US should address this dilemma of economic means in dealing with the rising China.     

Understanding China’s goals and strategy in the South China Sea: bringing context to a revisionist systemic challenge – intentions and impact

ABSTRACT

The slow moving conflict in the South China Sea has been characterized by some as “not worth the candle.” China claims the entirety of the South China Sea pursuant to a nine-dash line, the legal impact of which has been limited by international courts. At the same time, China has changed the reality of control over the South China Sea by building a number of fortified islands in the Spratly Islands and elsewhere. The US has either refused to stand up to China's behavior (Obama) or responded unevenly (Trump). This paper examines the impact of China's behaviour on local parties, US interests, and the liberal international system.     

中国与西方民主社会主义国家的混合经济体制比较

混合经济体制在科学社会主义的中国与民主社会主义的西方世界同时存在，并且都发挥了积极的作用。但是，学者们对混合经济体制的认识却存在较大差异，进而导致了论证上的分歧，文章在论述上将采取在国家意志层面上的混合经济体制概念内涵。通过对两种混合经济体制从所处的文明发展阶段、国家的指导思想、发生学、组成成分的功能以及目标趋向等层面进行比较分析，改变传统对混合经济体制研究中对两者在政治哲学、历史哲学等方面的不足。两种混合经济体制的相似点关涉到混合经济体制模式未来发展和对二者关系的认识问题，而传统对此研究的认识论基础主要是一分为二的矛盾分析法，故而在思想认识产生了上一些问题，文章将采用“一分为三”的方法论对此进行一些尝试。     

Reforming China’s defense industry

ABSTRACT

Even with sizable economic inputs, access to foreign technologies, and considerable political will, China, up until the late 1990s, experienced only limited success when it came to the local design, development, and manufacture of advanced conventional weapons. Not surprisingly, therefore, reforming the local defense industry in order to upgrade its technology base and manufacturing capabilities and to make armaments production more efficient and cost-effective has long preoccupied the Chinese leadership. The fact that most of these efforts had little positive impact on the country’s military technological and industrial capabilities only encouraged Beijing to experiment with additional reforms in the hopes of finally getting it right.