Regular and irregular forces in conflict: nineteenth century insurgencies in South America

ABSTRACT

In the decades following independence from Spain, ‘civil wars’ ravaged the newly established polities in South America. Former vice-regal capitals inherited a larger portion of the colonial administration and had larger economic resources and a hegemonic project they were able to have permanent and professional armed forces, capable of leading the offensive and giving battle following the European rules of military art. The central hypothesis of this work is that there is a necessary relationship between the shape of these asymmetrical conflicts, their outcome and the political territorial configuration of each country in post-revolutionary Spanish America. When permanent armies took over from local militias, the capital kept the integrity of its territories and there was a tendency towards political centralization. When this did not happen and the militias managed to find a way to defeat their centralizing enemies, the local powers had an opportunity to renegotiate their participation in the political body, and sought to maintain their independence, which was manifest in federal agreements, otherwise a process of territorial fragmentation began. More than a difference between regular and irregular forces there was one between intermittent, and permanent mobilization.     

大深度锚雷定向攻击误差分析

误差分析是计算武器射击 (攻击 )效果的基础 ,在简述了大深度锚雷工作过程和命中原理模型后 ,着重对其攻击过程中存在的误差进行了详细的分析 ,并举例进行了计算     

球锥体高超声速绕流的俯仰阻尼导数的数值计算

采用Navier Stokes方程描述球锥体外形非定常振动流场 ,在Etkin理论下给出俯仰阻尼导数的计算公式。对定常流场的计算采用ADI形式的NND格式 ,对非定常流场的计算采用四步Runge Kutta方法 ,并引入变系数残值光顺技术加速收敛。将俯仰阻尼导数计算结果与实验及工程计算进行了比较 ,并数值研究了其随振动中心的变化规律。     

海杂波背景中的一种恒虚警率检测方法

提出了一种适用于机载预警(AEW)雷达海杂波背景中目标检测的双参数有序统计恒虚警(CFAR)处理方法———BOS CFAR方法,并对该方法在非高斯海杂波背景、多脉冲非相参积累和多目标干扰环境下的检测性能进行了讨论和分析。理论分析和仿真结果表明,该方法能有效地提高AEW雷达海杂波背景中的CFAR检测性能。     

基于深度学习的网络攻击检测模型

为提高复杂网络条件下网络攻击的检测检测精度、降低时间开销,提出一种基于卷积神经网络、双向长短时记忆网络和注意力机制融合的网络攻击检测模型GP-CABL。GP-CABL能够有效抽取网络流量的最优特征,并能够充分学习网络流量的空间和时序特征,有效提升了检测精度、降低了计算开销。实验表明,GP-CABL针对主要网络攻击识别精度可达99.87%,相较当前研究有较大性能提升,并具有较好的鲁棒性。     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.