Born violent: Armed political parties and non-state governance in Lebanon's civil war

We know little of the internal governing practices of non-state actors once in control of territory. Some territories have witnessed the establishment of new institutions of public goods remarkably similar to state institutions. This article compares four armed political parties governing territory during the Lebanese civil war. These non-state violent actors established complex political and economic institutions and administrative structures. Despite the wide range of ideologies and identities of these actors, they all converged in their institutional priorities, although not in their capacities or the particular ways of achieving those priorities. Data from interviews and the actions of the armed political parties suggest a combination of ideology and desire for control is causal in generating public institutions, partly attributable to the high degree of citizen activism marking the Lebanese case.     

Lessons learnt? Cultural transfer and revolutionary wars, 1775–1831

Did participants in small wars in the period 1775–1831 learn from previous or contemporary examples? While this is difficult to prove for participants who left no written records, there is considerable evidence in existing publications by practitioners that they did indeed draw out lessons from recent insurgencies, either from their own experience or from events elsewhere which they studied from afar, especially the Spanish Guerrilla, which had already become legendary. Most authors showed an interest in how to stage insurgencies rather than in how to quell them. Even then, transfer did not come in a package of tactics-cum-values, but in each case in different configurations.     

In pursuit of accountability during and after war

ABSTRACT

This article aims to identify and elaborate the causes and ramifications of applying transitional justice, in particular accountability measures, to situations of war. It focuses on the correlations between peace and justice – and hence an important perspective on the question ‘how do wars end’. The article seeks to understand some of the main challenges associated with pursuing accountability for crimes committed in contemporary forms of conflict, including civil wars and abuses committed by major powers in armed conflict.     

战争设计工程中专家思维收敛过程的建模与分析

专家意见能否达成共识是战争设计工程中的一个关键问题.首先从复杂理论视角对专家思维过程的适应性、聚集性、非线性进行分析,接着将专家群体划分为两类并且运用马尔科夫转移矩阵对研讨过程建模,提出并证明了两类专家群体思维收敛的充分必要条件,得到群体思维收敛不仅与研讨过程中专家之间的关系影响矩阵有关,而且与专家的初始意见有关.最后通过计算机仿真进一步探索了群体思维收敛过程的影响因素.     

网络战中的安全主动防护系统构想

根据网络战的要求,提出了一种网络安全主动防护系统,该系统把一种新型防火墙和网络监测系统结合起来,做到了对黑客入侵及病毒攻击的实时监测、捕获和主动防护,克服了传统网络防护系统的不足,如能开发研制,将有利于我军在未来的网络战中取得主动地位。     

基于两级供应关系的军械战备器材存储模型研究

提出了在一定经费的约束条件下,使所有二级存储场站的所有战备器材期望缺货数最小的模型,通过对后方仓库存量初值和场站库存量的确定,求解出后方仓库和场站之间库存量的优化分配调整方案。最后通过实例得出发散型布局形态模型。     

直升机攻潜时的接近航向

直升机攻潜策略是反潜战中值得研究的一个问题。研究攻潜策略实质是确定最优投雷点,即直升机的最优接近航向和投雷时刻。本文研究的结果是:如果目标作等速直线运动,则直升机的最优接近策略为平行接近法。     

The mother of all post-mortems

The most striking finding of the Chilcot Report is that the record reveals little that was previously unknown. A key point for its authors is that diplomatic alternatives had not been exhausted when the US and UK went to war. But, short of an armed attack by the other side, it is hard to say when they would have been. Here what was crucial was the belief shared by Bush and Blair that Saddam Hussain would not and could not change. For the British the issue of whether alternatives to war remained is particularly important because of its implications for international law, something that did not trouble the Americans. It remains unclear if Blair would have gained or lost leverage over Bush had he made British participation contingent on better American policy, for example on developing a workable plan for the reconstruction of Iraq.     

Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia

China’s expanding strength and ambition may foreshadow a violent conflict with the United States. I describe two scenarios about how such a conflict would unfold. The article begins by examining the prospects for nuclear escalation, drawing on theories about politics, psychology, and inadvertent escalation. It then examines the prospects for protracted conventional war, a scenario that has received far less attention. I present a new theory of protraction based on technology, geography, and domestic politics. After assessing the logic of both scenarios against a hypothetical US–China conflict, I discuss which is more likely. The conclusion points to a sobering trade-off: efforts to avoid nuclear catastrophe increase the chance of a long and grueling fight.     

The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): ‘War-Making and State-Making’ as an Insurgency Strategy

This paper examines the institutional and functional aspects of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The Taliban’s coercive approach and its entire reliance on “war-making” to “state-making” shows the difficulty of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure. The Taliban was primarily capable of establishing a two-track system of governance. However, the assessment of the IEA’s institutional and functional capabilities shows that the military–political organization formed by the Taliban lacked statehood in all three areas of legitimacy, authority and capacity.