Misapplying lessons learned? Analysing the utility of British counterinsurgency strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971–76

This article examines the British Army's deployment in support of the civil power in Northern Ireland. It argues that the core guiding principles of the British approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) – employing the minimum use of force, firm and timely action, and unity of control in civil–military relations – were misapplied by the Army in its haste to combat Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism between 1971 and 1976. Moreover, it suggests that the Army's COIN strategy was unsuccessful in the 1970s because commanders adhered too closely to the customs, doctrine, and drill applied under very different circumstances in Aden between 1963 and 1967, generally regarded as a failure in Britain's post-war internal security operations. The article concludes with a discussion of the British government's decision to scale back the Army's role in favour of giving the Royal Ulster Constabulary primacy in counter-terrorist operations, a decision which led ultimately to success in combating IRA violence.     

British operations among the people and civilian risk

ABSTRACT

Debates on military intervention and small wars often include the claim that soldiers should operate among civilians in order to avoid civilian casualties and to protect civilians against third-party violence. This article, by contrast, points at negative unintended consequences of military operations taking place in close proximity to local populations: it argues that also risk-tolerant militaries cause civilian casualties and that their presence triggers third-party violence against civilians. The British military, in particular the British Army, exported risk-tolerant practices from Northern Ireland to the Balkans, with sporadic success. But in southern Iraq and in Helmand, British ground operations harmed civilians. The findings suggest that the chances for protection are better in operations where levels of violence are relatively low than in counterinsurgency where troops face ruthless and well-endowed enemies operating among civilians.     

Whistleblowing in the Irish Military: The Cost of Exposing Bullying and Sexual Harassment

Whistleblowing has gained increasing media attention over the past 40 years, as incidents of abuse and wrongdoing associated with businesses, religious institutions, the media and politics have come to light. In this article, we investigate the consequences of a military whistleblower’s actions for both himself and the military institution that he was a part of. The case concerns former army officer Dr. Tom Clonan and his findings concerning the bullying and sexual harassment of female personnel in the Irish Defence Forces at the turn of the century. As these revelations came to light over 17 years ago we are able to examine their consequences for the military since that time.     

A Sign of Victory?: ‘Scottish Swords’ and Other Weapons in the Possession of the ‘Auld Innemie’

Many late medieval documents, notably inventories of arms and armour, of Englishmen contain references to ‘Scottish swords’ and other weapons. What did the compilers of these documents mean when they described a weapon as ‘Scottish’? How did such weapons come to be in the possession of these men? This article will attempt to explain this phenomenon drawing on primary documentary sources and surviving material culture from Glasgow Museums’ collections and others, as well as artworks from the period.     

The Bullet in the Brick: The Materiality of Conflict in Museum Objects

Tangible traces of conflict in visual artefacts can take viewers uncomfortably close to the realities of war—violence, destruction and fatalities. This article questions the evidential force of objects associated with conflict and their eventual display in exhibitions. Through a study of the display of a brick in which is embedded a bullet that is said to have passed through the body of Francis Sheehy Skeffington when he was executed by firing squad during the Easter Rising in Dublin in 1916, this article explores the historical configuration of the brick and analyses its public display in the National Museum of Ireland (NMI). By examining the actions carried out by the NMI in collecting and archiving the object and analysing the narrative strategies of its display, this article considers how the visual aspects of exhibition displays can perpetuate a particular version of historic events and accredits objects with assumed authenticity.     

Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.