开口电极在海水中的电场特性研究

利用稳恒电磁场理论,通过基本假设和单个电极电场计算公式的推导,计算了某一深度平面的电场值,绘制了平面分布图。接着利用相似理论进行了模型缩比实验,测量了二电极电场在某一平面上的分布值,绘制了平面分布图,进行了基本特性分析。该结果对进行船舶电场模拟和海缆断点探寻等工作,具有很好的参考价值。     

一种参数曲线实时数控插补计算新方法

根据参数曲线数控插补原理,指出了Taylor展开算法、"参数-弧长"分段拟合算法等常用的参数曲线直接插补算法存在理论上的局限性.给出了一种新的基于牛顿迭代计算的参数曲线直接插补方法,并给出了算法流程.新算法稳定性好、收敛速度快、运算量小、计算结果精度高.仿真实验表明,同Taylor展开法相比,能够在计算量相当或增加不大的情况下将插补进给速度波动率减小102～107倍.     

Becoming a disarmament champion: the Austrian crusade against nuclear weapons

ABSTRACT

The making of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has put Austria and its involvement in nuclear disarmament in the spotlight. This study highlights several factors that led Austria to become a prominent voice in nuclear-disarmament debates. First, its involvement dovetails with the emphasis on humanitarian disarmament it has promoted since the 1990s. Second, a strong antinuclear identity pervades Austrian society. This “nuclear allergy” combines antimilitarism inherited from the Cold War and, more broadly, an aversion to nuclear power, including for energy purposes. These two considerations form the background to the increased activism of the Austrian Foreign Ministry on nuclear disarmament in international fora. But, equally, Austria’s crusade for the TPNW can be attributed to the engagement of a small team of diplomats implementing personal as well as national preferences in favor of disarmament.     

Legitimate Authority as a Jus Ad Bellum Condition: Defense of a Procedural Requirement in Just War Theory

ABSTRACT

Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus ad bellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war. Or, if it is necessary, it is said to be a trivial requirement, as mobilization for war requires some political authorization. Those who would retain the legitimacy requirement have differing views about who the proper authority is. I argue that, reasonably understood, legitimate authorization is necessary for jus ad bellum. Considerations of agency and consent in force combine with the social contract to commit us to deferring to recognized authorities. These obligations are strengthened by the epistemic reliability and pragmatic value conferred by governing institutions and procedures limiting recourse to war. These same rationales imply that the U.N. Security Council should regulate the international use of force. I qualify that if higher authorities fail to act, other subsidiary authorities may then authorize force. However, the move to each subsequent level of authorization must be justified. Understood in this way, the requirement that wars not be fought without legitimate authorization is a non-trivial, necessary procedural jus ad bellum condition.