Combating Islamist radicalisation in South Africa

Is radical Islamism spreading in South Africa? The answer has to be an emphatic ‘yes’. When discussing issues of radicalisation in Africa, commentators often examine the case of Somalia's al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda's North African franchise, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Very little attention is paid to radicalisation amongst South Africa's Muslim population. Yet, there is growing evidence that South Africa has come to play an important role in global jihadi networks, from the provision of safehouses and identity documents to the movement of funds and the existence of paramilitary camps for local and foreign jihadis. This paper aims to briefly examine radicalisation and its attendant sources in the country, as well as seeking ways to combat it utilising lessons learned from other countries. ‘Institutional socialisation’ by means of the sources of radicalisation, as well as the concept of what could be termed ‘the democratisation of jihad’ are discussed. The author also proposes ways to combat radicalisation in South Africa utilising lessons learned from other countries, concluding that issues of radicalisation and deradicalisation have to be dealt with on the part of both government and the South African Muslim community.     

Size Still Matters: Explaining Sri Lanka’s Counterinsurgency Victory over the Tamil Tigers

The military effectiveness literature has largely dismissed the role of material preponderance in favor of strategic interaction theories. The study of counterinsurgency, in which incumbent victory is increasingly rare despite material superiority, has also turned to other strategic dynamics explanations like force employment, leadership, and insurgent/adversary attributes. Challenging these two trends, this paper contends that even in cases of counterinsurgency, material preponderance remains an essential—and at times the most important—factor in explaining battlefield outcomes and effectiveness. To test this, the paper turns to the case of the Sri Lankan state’s fight against the Tamil Tiger insurgency, a conflict which offers rich variation over time across six periods and over 25 years. Drawing on evidence from historical and journalistic accounts, interviews, memoirs, and field research, the paper demonstrates that material preponderance accounts for variation in military effectiveness and campaign outcomes (including military victory in the final campaign) better than strategic explanations. Additionally, a new quantitative data-set assembled on annual loss-exchange ratios demonstrates the superiority of materialist explanations above those of skill, human capital, and regime type.     

Brinkmanship,not COIN,in Pakistan’s post-9/11 Internal War

Politics is critical to making sense of Pakistani successes and failures in dealing with non-state armed groups. This includes domestic political currents; regional political currents; and the global impetus of the post-9/11 era. How these currents overlap renders to any reading of insurgency in Pakistan real complexity. This article engages with this complexity rather than shirking from it. Its hypothesis is that while the insurgency bordering Afghanistan has been an epicentre of Pakistani military efforts to fight the Taliban, this theatre is in of itself insufficiently inclusive to grasp the nature of Pakistan’s security challenges and its consequent responses.     

Business and peace in the Niger Delta: what we know and what we need to know

The global restructuring of state–society relationships driven by neoliberal logic has not only allowed for the taming of the ‘state’, which has paradoxically accentuated its inadequacies, but has also facilitated, for better or for worse, the emergence of business – especially transnational corporations – as a major political force in global governance. Consequently, while the issues of peace and conflict have traditionally been the concern of governments, businesses are now increasingly being expected to make peace and conflict their concern. However, despite claims and counterclaims that businesses can be moneymakers and peacemakers, analyses of the relationship between business and peace remain largely embryonic. This paper seeks to contribute to this emerging business and peace debate by drawing on insights from the Niger Delta conflict to ascertain what we know and what we need to know if businesses are to become peacemakers in conflict zones in Africa.     

A Reversal of Fortunes? Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Europe and East Asia1

ABSTRACT

The extended deterrence relationships between the United States and its allies in Europe and East Asia have been critical to regional and global security and stability, as well as to nonproliferation efforts, since the late 1950s. These relationships developed in different regional contexts, and reflect differing cultural, political and military realities in the US allies and their relations with the United States. Although extended deterrence and assurance relations have very different histories, and have to some extent been controversial through the years, there has been a rethinking of these relations in recent years. Many Europeans face a diminished threat situation as well as economic and political pressures on the maintenance of extended deterrence, and are looking at the East Asian relationships, which do not involve forward deployed forces as more attractive than NATO’s risk-and-burden-sharing concepts involving the US nuclear forces deployed in Europe. On the other hand, the East Asian allies are looking favorably at NATO nuclear consultations, and in the case of South Korea, renewed US nuclear deployments (which were ended in 1991), to meet increased security concerns posed by a nuclear North Korea and more assertive China. This paper explores the history of current relationships and the changes that have led the allies to view those of others as more suitable for meeting their current needs.     

Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia

Stability among the great powers during the Cold War is widely theorized in terms of nuclear deterrence. Rationality of States and their preference for survival are the basis of nuclear deterrence. The rationality of non-state terrorist groups is different from that of nation-states. Even though they are also rational actors with their own hierarchy of preferences, survival may not be their ultimate goal. Deterrence of nuclear terrorism is therefore different from deterrence against states. South Asia is more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than any other region of the world for many reasons. This article analyzes the possibility of nuclear terrorism and the ways of deterrence against it in the context of South Asia.     

Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.     

The Management of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal

Pakistan, the fastest growing nuclear weapon state in the world, has established over the last decade a nuclear management system it holds to be “foolproof.” Despite the explosion of radical groups challenging the writ of the state, it dismisses concerns by critics that its nuclear weapons are not safe and secure as “preposterous” and an attempt to “malign” the state. This article examines Pakistan's nuclear management system in four functional areas: command-and-control, physical security, nuclear surety, and doctrine. It describes what is publicly known in each area, identifies areas of omission and inadequacy in each one, and examines several premises of the nuclear program the author considers to be unfounded. Comparing these deficiencies in Pakistan's nuclear management system to the current problems plaguing the US nuclear management system, the author concludes that complacency and unfounded confidence in the efficacy of such programs, if not addressed and corrected, could lead to a future nuclear catastrophe in South Asia.     

地缘政治视角下的中巴军事技术合作

中国和巴基斯坦是社会制度和意识形态完全不同的两个国家,但是自1951年正式建立外交关系的50多年来,两国之间发展起来的睦邻友好＂全天候和全方位＂的国家关系堪称世界上双边关系的典范。中巴友好关系的存在有力的支撑了南亚地缘政治格局的安全与稳定,其中,中巴军事技术合作又是这一友好关系中极为重要的一个侧面。通过分析中巴军事技术合作的背景、历史和现状,可以有效的了解南亚地缘政治格局的复杂性以及我国在其中的核心战略利益所在。文章分为三个部分：第一部分分析中巴友好的地缘政治因素和历史原因;第二部分分析中巴军事技术合作的历史、现状以及其在中巴关系起到的重要作用;第三部分在前几部分的基础上,对中巴军事技术合作中存在的一些不足之处提出看法并对未来进行展望。     

India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn

For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, ‘Cold Start’, intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine's architects.