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131.
Joan Johnson-Freese 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):337-340
Asia's Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks, by James Clay Moltz. Columbia University Press, 2012. 290 pages, $35. 相似文献
132.
The Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Clandestine Struggle Against the World's Most Dangerous Terrorist Power, by Ronen Bergman. Free Press, 2008. 432 pages, $28 Fallout: The True Story of the CIA's Secret War on Nuclear Trafficking, by Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz. Free Press, 2011. 304 pages, $26. The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year War with Iran, by David Crist. Penguin Press, 2012. 638 pages, $36. Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War, by Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel. Potomac Books Inc., 2012. 254 pages, $30. Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel's Secret Wars, by Dan Raviv. Levant, 2012. 356 pages, $17. Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, by David E. Sanger. Crown Publishers, 2012. 476 pages, $28. 相似文献
133.
Wade L. Huntley 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):305-338
The prospect of the United States continuing to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal to “very low numbers” has raised questions in Japan and South Korea, where US extended deterrence guarantees are premised on the “nuclear umbrella.” In both countries, however, concerns focus less on numerical arsenal size than on the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet evolving threats and on the degree of broader US commitment to these alliances. This article assesses developments in US-Japan and US-South Korea relationships in response to the Obama administration's nuclear disarmament policies, focusing on how the evolutionary course of those relationships may in turn condition prospects for sustaining this US nuclear policy direction. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term, but also that US nuclear arsenal size is secondary to broader political, strategic, and military factors in meeting these challenges. The evaluation concludes that strong alliance relationships and strategic stability in East Asia can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, but also that deterioration of these relationships could imperil core US nuclear policy and nonproliferation objectives. 相似文献
134.
Agnes Katona 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):253-272
ABSTRACTSince 2002, NATO's territorial missile defense has evoked continuous debates between NATO states and the Russian Federation. Thirteen years have passed without reaching a common denominator. This article provides a comprehensive overview of the historical background of the debate and the technical details of the missile defense system, highlighting its shortcomings and the state of its deployment process. It also contrasts the military-technical and political arguments of both sides, before addressing the applicable norms of international law to highlight violations and the effect of this noncompliance on existing arms control measures. 相似文献
135.
Dennis M. Gormley 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):123-139
ABSTRACTThe dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions. 相似文献
136.
David O. Smith 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):99-105
ABSTRACTIn No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration. 相似文献
137.
Martin Schönteich 《African Security Review》2013,22(4):34-44
In recent international armed conflicts private security contractors (PSCs) have played an ever increasing role and military advisors and tribunals are facing the dilemma of assessing the primary and secondary status of PSCs under international humanitarian law. In this article the misconception that PSCs are necessarily mercenaries will be dispelled. The possibility that PSCs might be categorised as combatants or civilians will then be explored. The conclusion is that where they are incorporated into the armed forces of a state, PSCs might attain combatant status. However, given that states are reluctant to formally incorporate PSCs into their armed forces, they will most likely remain essentially civilian. Their degree of participation in hostilities will determine whether they retain their immunity under international humanitarian law from attack and prosecution (as civilians) or whether they are rendered unlawful belligerents. 相似文献
138.
Some have argued that the transatlantic rancor over the Iraq war made cooperation, especially on nonproliferation, unlikely. In contrast, this article, documents post-invasion instances of nonproliferation cooperation, with particular emphasis on the Proliferation Security Initiative and the EU-3 Initiative—the British, French, and German negotiations with Iran over its suspected nuclear activities. In addition to documenting French and British participation in these initiatives, the article analyzes why they have chosen to participate and argues that France and Britain have participated in both efforts because they are committed to avoiding future Iraq-like preventive wars. 相似文献
139.
140.
Daniel Wirls 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):181-187
Reagan's Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster, by Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson. Crown Publishers, 2009. 464 pages, $32.50. The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War, by James Mann. Viking, 2009. 410 pages, $27.95. 相似文献