The impact of operational decisions on the design of salesforce incentives

When facing high levels of overstock inventories, firms often push their salesforce to work harder than usual to attract more demand, and one way to achieve that is to offer attractive incentives. However, most research on the optimal design of salesforce incentives ignores this dependency and assumes that operational decisions of production/inventory management are separable from design of salesforce incentives. We investigate this dependency in the problem of joint salesforce incentive design and inventory/production control. We develop a dynamic Principal‐Agent model with both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in which the principal is strategic and risk‐neutral but the agent is myopic and risk‐averse. We find the optimal joint incentive design and inventory control strategy, and demonstrate the impact of operational decisions on the design of a compensation package. The optimal strategy is characterized by a menu of inventory‐dependent salesforce compensation contracts. We show that the optimal compensation package depends highly on the operational decisions; when inventory levels are high, (a) the firm offers a more attractive contract and (b) the contract is effective in inducing the salesforce to work harder than usual. In contrast, when inventory levels are low, the firm can offer a less attractive compensation package, but still expect the salesforce to work hard enough. In addition, we show that although the inventory/production management and the design of salesforce compensation package are highly correlated, information acquisition through contract design allows the firm to implement traditional inventory control policies: a market‐based state‐dependent policy (with a constant base‐stock level when the inventory is low) that makes use of the extracted market condition from the agent is optimal. This work appears to be the first article on operations that addresses the important interplay between inventory/production control and salesforce compensation decisions in a dynamic setting. Our findings shed light on the effective integration of these two significant aspects for the successful operation of a firm. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 320–340, 2014     

面向体系的目标选择形式化描述及分析

针对信息化条件下各类目标相互作用反制作战能力倍增的特点,进行面向体系目标选择的相关问题分析。通过分析目标体系的概念和层次结构,建立目标选择的概念模型,并进行目标选择的形式化描述与分析,提供了一种研究军事概念模型的思路和方法,有助于目标选择决策支持系统的开发与验证。     

基于二元决策图的多阶段任务系统可靠性分析

分析了多阶段任务系统(PMS)可靠性分析中传统二元决策图(BDD)建模方法的不足,提出了一种将多阶段任务失效事件分解为互不相容的阶段失效事件,然后分别建立可靠性BDD模型的新方法。通过该方法建立的PMS可靠性BDD模型不但可以计算总体任务失效概率,同时也能计算任务在各阶段发生失效的概率。最后,给出了一个算例,验证了该算法的有效性。     

基于变异离散粒子群的协同空战攻击决策算法

为了提高智能协同空战攻击决策算法性能,将变异策略引入到DPSO(Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization)协同空战攻击决策算法中,提出了一种新的基于变异离散粒子群(Mutation Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization,MDPSO)的协同空战攻击决策算法。基于典型空战想定背景,仿真验证了算法的有效性。采用对比实验方法,基于准确性、可靠性和快速性等关键性能指标,分析比较了基于MDPSO协同空战攻击决策算法与多种智能决策算法,验证了基于MDPSO的协同空战攻击决策算法有着较好的综合性能。     

改进层次分析法在空面多目标攻击排序中的应用

建立了考虑目标的威胁、政治价值和经济价值属性的空面多目标攻击排序综合价值评估指标,应用模糊多属性理论和G.A.Miller九级量化理论对目标综合价值进行量化.建立了机群多目标攻击排序模型,采用熵值法求取各属性的权重从而构造判断矩阵,在此模型的基础上运用改进的层次分析法求解空面多目标攻击排序矩阵,从而为驾驶员的战术决策提供依据.     

区间数与灰决策的作战效能评估模型

针对作战效能评估过程中评价指标值同时存在精确数、区间数和语言类模糊数的情况,引入区间数与灰决策原理,提出了一种基于区间数与灰决策的作战效能评估模型。结合案例分析,对模型合理性进行验证,结果表明,该模型能够真实地反映武器装备作战效能的综合评估值。     

机载光电传感器视轴指向的智能辅助决策方法

机载光电传感器视轴应尽可能接近目标线,以缩小指向偏差而不使目标偏离传感器瞬时视场,飞行员在复杂的战场态势下进行视轴操控具有一定困难。针对该问题,提出了一种机载光电传感器视轴指向的智能辅助决策方法,该方法以传感器视轴指向的数学模型为基础,通过专家知识建立引导规则,完成目标与各传感器的配对;计算配对后的各传感器视轴指向偏差和偏差变化率,采用模糊控制算法得出视轴偏移率,引导各传感器视轴指向与之配对的目标。仿真结果表明了该方法能够合理引导各传感器视轴指向目标,并能将视轴指向偏差缩小在很小的范围。     

一种面向Agent的概念化建模方法*

面向Agent的建模方法为基于Agent系统的概念化描述提供了一种新的技术.针对多Agent系统分析与建模问题,扩展并规范了面向Agent概念化建模过程,定义了Agent模型及其扩展模型,并给出了形式化描述.同时,给出面向Agent的分析和设计过程,为其具体建模提供了一种高层指导.最后,与其它现有面向Agent的方法在应用方面进行了类比分析,为该方法的广泛和深入地应用研究打下基础.     

MADM中不同属性的规范化研究

不同属性值的规范化是多属性决策问题中的重要过程.提出了一种属性值作为点到优区间和劣区间的距离的定义,依据该定义得到了属性值规范化新方法,并通过实例证明了新规范化方法的有效性.