基于规则的CGF实体行为建模技术

CGF行为建模的目的是使行为模型能更好地体现出人类行为特征,提高作战仿真系统的可信性和科学性。在介绍CGF、CGF行为建模概念的基础上,对当前几种主要的CGF行为建模方法进行了比较,并分析了CGF行为模型的一般结构。构建了基于规则的CGF行为模型,重点对基于规则CGF行为模型的决策推理方法进行了研究。采用产生式规则方法对决策知识进行了描述,定义了决策推理过程中的3个要素:态势、动作、决策推理,并对其决策推理过程进行了研究。     

新型防空警戒雷达训练

在防空兵警戒雷达专业传统训练方法的基础上,结合新型警戒雷达技术体制特点,对新型警戒雷达训练进行的一系列探索,对于防空部队作战能力的提升起到了重要的推动作用。     

Country survey: military expenditure and defence policy in Norway 1970–2013

This article examines military expenditure and defence policy in Norway from 1970 to 2013. Until 1990 Norwegian military expenditure remained between 2.5 and 3.0 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite constant GDP shares, the military expenditure could not sustain a large and properly armed mobilization army. The constant nominal defence budgets of the 1990s accentuated the Norwegian Armed Forces' underlying imbalance between tasks, structure and budget. Around year 2000, large organizational reforms were effectuated, in which costs, the number of man-years, and underlying imbalances between tasks, structure and budget were reduced. Military expenditure increased in nominal terms between 2003 and 2013, while real military expenditure remained practically constant.     

“Effing” the military: a political misunderstanding of management

The use of commercial business management techniques is widespread in all government departments, including the Ministry of Defence. This article examines the use of popular management techniques in the Armed Forces and argues that their application is misplaced. It looks at what the “effs” – “efficiency” and “effectiveness” – mean in the business world and to the Armed Forces. It compares the definitions both in business and the Armed Forces and finds that there are few, if any, situations where the same measurements can be applied. Whilst many management techniques are suited for business, the function of the Armed Forces and its output cannot be measured in the same way, complicated by the different metrics of “efficiency” in peace and in war. This difference may not be clearly understood by some politicians, or indeed by some senior military personnel. Using examples from some of the most popular management techniques such as “Lean” and “Agile” it is possible to see that their use might actually diminish the capabilities of the Armed Forces when it comes to performing their principal role – the use of force to achieve political objectives.     

陆军防空兵体制编制信息化评估模型研究

针对信息化条件下陆军防空兵体制编制的主要特点和发展趋势,研究了如何定量评估其信息化程度问题。运用模糊综合评判法和综合评分分析法建立了防空兵体制编制信息化评估模型。并以某防空旅为例进行了实例测评,基本上反映了该旅体制编制信息化建设的真实水平,证明建立的模型是可行和正确的。而且,通过对不同元素测评结果的对比分析,可以清楚地看出测评对象体制编制各元素信息化建设的发展态势,找出下一步建设的努力方向。     

Advancing “Defence-in-depth”: intelligence and systems dynamics

This article aims to encourage the fostering of more systems thinking, and its greater exploitation, within the domain of contemporary intelligence. With particular focus on “micro systems thinking” and with reference to key intelligence processes, such as intelligence analysis, the utility of many systems dynamics within the intelligence context seeks to be further revealed. Through their greater collective harnessing, including up to “System of Systems” (“SoS”) dynamics, and promoting all that they can offer, more sophisticated overarching operational-to-strategic/policy “ends,” notably that of “defence-in-depth,” can be viably further advanced in a sustainable manner into the future. Arguably, a much-needed transformative impact on contemporary intelligence can also be increasingly realised through comprehensively engaging in and with more systems and SoS thinking. Aiding civil protection tasks, crisis management, emergency planners, and civil contingency practitioners likewise gain.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.