Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?

In contrast with a widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, this article argues that Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region. Rather, Moscow's military strategies in the Arctic pursue three major goals: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russia's sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and still has world-class military capabilities. The Russian military modernization programs are quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race. The Russian ambitions in the Arctic may be high, but they are not necessarily implying the intentions and proper capabilities to confront other regional players by military means. On the contrary, Moscow opts for soft rather than hard power strategy in the Arctic.     

The essence of war: French armies and small war in the Low Countries (1672–1697)

In the late seventeenth century during the Dutch War (1672–1678) and the Nine Years War (1688–1697), French armies relied on small war for the accomplishment of essential tasks and as part of an overall strategy of exhausting their opponents in the Low Countries. The purposes of small war included the imposition of contributions on enemy populations, the destruction of the enemy base of operations, blockades of fortresses, and the general support of campaign armies. The expression ‘small war’ in the French language appeared with growing frequency in the 1690s. Small war can be viewed as both a cause and consequence of the characteristics of these wars. The limited policy goals of Louis XIV the king of France required a strategy that minimised risk and accomplished the goal of reducing if not eliminating the Spanish presence in the Low Countries that bordered the north of France. As French armies increased in size during this period, the demand for specialists at small increased in order to provide security and ensure supply. Small war in the late seventeenth century was thus not ideologically motivated insurgency, but in the minds of French commanders an essential component of strategy and the nature of war.     

联合国维和警察防暴队甄选考试改革对维和培训的影响及对策

2012年9月颁布的《联合国维和警察防暴队行动能力评估标准作业程序》对联合国防暴队甄选及行动能力评估的组织、实施程序、考查标准等方面都进行了较大的调整。从联合国维和警察防暴队甄选标准作业程序的改革入手,以考试为突破口和着眼点,研究程序的改革对维和警察防暴队培训的影响,制定应对策略,以时维和培训工作具有指导作用和借鉴意义。     

借鉴传统军事思维 提升我军信息化条件下作战能力

传统军事思维的优秀“内核”是作战能力水平提升的重要“起搏器”,有助于现代条件下部队战斗力的提高。汲取其伐谋思维,注重信息思维,发挥超越思维,完善作战预测,这四种思维能够有助于促进作战思维整合、强化军事信息整合能力和创新能力,提升作战软实力,彰显强军之要,对实现强军目标有理论支撑和实践创新之力。     

电传动履带车辆转向行驶控制策略仿真研究

以双侧电机独立驱动这一典型电传动方案为研究对象,针对转向行驶控制的难题,提出了基于功率-转速复合调节的转向行驶控制策略,对驾驶员操控信号进行了解析,基于Matlab软件和RecurDyn软件建立了电传动车辆的机电一体联合仿真模型,对车辆典型转向工况进行了仿真试验,验证了转向行驶控制策略的有效性。     

学院学科建设与发展策略刍议

通过对学院学科建设现状与问题的分析,探讨了学院学科建设与发展的策略,提出了学院学科设置与调整的发展性、需求性、层次性、整合性及开放性等原则,讨论了学科发展与建设中应注意解决好的几个突出问题,研究了如何突出学科特色、提高学科建设水平的途径和方法.     

L+1容错恢复策略在复杂军事网络中的应用仿真

以标准3×3网格为基础网络,介绍了L+1容错恢复策略的概念和恢复原理,以海上舰艇编队作战系统网络为研究对象,使用Matlab-Simulink仿真工具,通过对阻塞概率、平均路径长度、路径重新分配概率和有效利用率4个指标的仿真,对比了该网络在无策略、备份多路和L+1容错恢复3种策略下网络的恢复程度,验证了L+1容错恢复策略的有效性和可行性。     

编队协同反导决策方案优选

为了充分地调度好编队全部的抗导资源,实现抗导弹群的成功概率最大,在利用随机服务系统理论对编队协同反导决策方案各指标值进行计算的基础上,将"模糊优选理论"与"协同学原理"有机地结合起来,求解了在反舰导弹到达强度与舰空导弹的单发杀伤概率在不同值的情况下,编队协同反导决策方案的隶属度,为编队指挥员进行反导决策方案的优选提供了科学依据。     

弹道平面交叉算法

在飞弹武器使用中,进行弹道分配,通常要采用避免平面交叉方法优化弹道分配结果.但由于弹道分组限制的存在,经常出现无法完成分配的现象.针对这一问题,在建立数学模型的基础上,提出了一种新的优选策略.该策略优先考虑是否可以完成分配,采用从靶点到起射点、飞弹这样一个逆序的分配过程,有效解决了该问题.     

论社会主义核心价值体系引领社会思潮的有效途径

社会主义核心价值体系引领社会思潮的有效途径包括：1．注意选准社会主义核心价值体系引领社会思潮的切入点：要加强对大众文化的引领工作,要优化社会心理环境,创新社会主义核心价值体系的表达方式。2．更加注重社会主义核心价值体系的优化与创新：要注重增强社会主义核心价值体系的吸引力和影响力。要拓展社会主义核心价值体系引领社会思潮的领域。3．要加强社会主义核心价值体系引领社会思潮的机制建设。