排序方式: 共有233条查询结果,搜索用时 176 毫秒
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攻方目标被守方兵器选中的概率研究 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
建立了不同情况下攻方目标被守方兵器随机选中概率的数学模型 ,初步分析了突防反突防问题、兵力分配问题及对抗问题 ,供进一步研究和试验参考 相似文献
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导弹攻击是舰艇编队海上行动的主要作战样式,其导弹攻击效能的评估十分重要。首先建立了舰艇编队导弹攻击作战效能评价指标体系,然后介绍了评估舰艇编队导弹攻击效能的一种新方法——优序法,该方法应用简单,既可以处理定性问题,又能处理定量问题。最后给出了应用实例,验证了优序法比较适合于对舰艇编队导弹攻击效能进行评估。通过对舰艇编队导弹攻击效能的评估,可以有效地选用合适的舰艇编队样式。 相似文献
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针对火箭深弹反潜武器系统的组成及其特点,运用可靠性理论和效能评估理论分析系统的作战效能.利用随机过程理论中的马尔可夫过程理论,采用美国工业武器系统效能咨询委员会(WSEIAC)提出的ADC效能模型,建立了系统的效能评估模型.借助Matlab工具对该效能模型进行了仿真研究,经对仿真结果分析后表明,该模型能较符合实际地反映系统各组成要素性能对系统总体效能的影响,较好地满足系统效能评价的需求,有助于系统装备的研制和战术使用决策. 相似文献
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Stephen D. Davis 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):49-71
US military operations are increasingly conducted within urban environments and with these operations come the risk of increasing the number of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. The use of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, is one method for minimizing collateral damage. This method enables US military forces to effectively fight within urban environments through force escalation capabilities. Using a series of historical examples and future scenarios for urban warfare, this article highlights deficiencies affecting military capabilities in military urban operations, addresses the consequences of collateral damage, assesses the effectiveness of directed-energy weapons in military urban operations and encourages further funding, research and integration of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, within the US military. 相似文献
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James M. Acton 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):141-154
ABSTRACTRussian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon. 相似文献
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Joshua H. Pollack 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):155-164
ABSTRACTThe United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers. 相似文献
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Alexander Glaser 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(1):125-135
Unprecedented interest in seeking progress toward nuclear disarmament exists today; even some nuclear weapon states are looking for new ways to strengthen this process. National declarations of fissile material holdings—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—could play an important role in supporting this effort, facilitating not only transparency but also the irreversibility of the process. This article discusses what kind of content such declarations could have in order to be meaningful and effective, the sequence of data on fissile material holdings that states might release, and some of the challenges to be expected in reconstructing historic fissile material production; it also summarizes current attitudes of weapon states toward making such declarations. Initial declarations can be valuable as confidence-building measures, but better and more background data are necessary if declarations are to serve as the groundwork for deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenals. A robust verification approach would ultimately require inspectors to have access to fissile material production and storage sites. The methods and tools of nuclear forensic analysis—in this context also dubbed nuclear archaeology—would be a key element of this process. This article discusses the capabilities and limitations of potential approaches to verifying declarations of historic production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium; it also identifies and discusses opportunities for further research and development. 相似文献