Don't stop with Joint Forces Command … cut AFRICOM too

Abstract

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has been a military success but a strategic messaging failure. The United States’ relationships across Africa cannot be boiled down to military affairs. This paper argues that Africa has many more opportunities than challenges and thus requires a more balanced foreign policy solution from Washington DC than a new military command. For the military engagement that does need to take place, a more low-profile approach would benefit the United States in Africa.     

The ‘African COP’

The 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) had been anticipated as the ‘African COP’, not only due to the African venue but also due to the opportunity it would afford African countries – with South Africa at the helm – to steer the debate on a global climate change regime. With the conference now over, lobby groups, international organisations, negotiators, observers and commentators alike have been taking stock of its outcome. Despite the litany of developmental and security implications of climate change, COP17 got underway with little hope that much might actually be achieved. In light of the discouraging condition of the global economy, with leading developed economies suffering financially, states were hardly in a mood to be making concessions that would impact their fiscal health. Nonetheless, an agreement was reached. Questions remain, however, about the significance of the outcome of the African COP for the world at large, but ultimately also for Africa.     

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) 2012–2019 Strategy Framework has proposed that the CEWARN mechanism expand its conflict typologies and geographic coverage. The argument advanced in this paper is that the proposed CEWARN expansion should be welcomed. Since its establishment in 2003, CEWARN had restricted itself to dealing with cross-border pastoral conflicts among the member states. However, conceptually and legally, CEWARN was not precluded from dealing with other types of conflict. Firstly, in the past, any conflict, other than cross-border pastoral ones, had been considered by the member states as firmly within their national jurisdiction that mechanisms like CEWARN are precluded from handling. Secondly, CEWARN, which has hitherto been dependent on external donations, just does not have the requisite financial resources to expand its coverage. Thirdly, and most importantly, governments often know the imminence of some, if not all, of the conflicts because they cause them. Thus, they are not interested in reacting to them. In the end, the paper concludes that the proposal to expand CEWARN's conflict portfolio and geographic spread may just remain that – a proposal.     

Natural resource degradation and conflict in the East African pastoral drylands

Based on a literature review, this article examines the dynamics in pastoral systems, natural resource conservation and conflict in the drylands of East Africa. It argues that, in the context of East Africa, pastoralism and biodiversity conservation in general are distinct forms of land use that are complementary rather than competitive. The present state of natural resource degradation in the drylands is explained in terms of factors related to ecological and demographic pressures, land use conflicts and inefficient land administration policies. When the customary pastoral institutions of land administration and resource management are threatened, the problem of degradation is further exacerbated and violent conflicts occur among multiple resource users, including pastoralists, farmers and the state. The article recommends the revitalisation, empowerment and recognition of pastoral institutions in a way that ensures effective synergy between the formal and customary structures of resource governance.     

Increased Chinese and American defence involvement in Africa

There is often a perception put forth of a fight for supremacy between China and the USA. This is often the case when discussing the continent of Africa. Both countries have recently increased their involvement in Africa for a variety of reasons. In 2011, China surpassed the USA as Africa's largest trading partner, with Africa predicted to be Beijing's largest trading partner by 2017. As expected, their bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation with strategic countries and organisations has matured and expanded along with it. Washington's own economic interests, al-Qa'ida and threats to maritime security are some of the crucial elements behind the US's presence on the continent. This article analyses both the USA and China's rising defence involvement in Africa. It compares and contrasts their similarities and differences, and argues that cooperation in certain areas can prove beneficial for all parties involved.     

Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.     

50000m~3油罐壁厚设计比较与分析

油罐的壁厚设计关系到油罐的经济性和可靠性,如何把握两者的辩证关系对油罐的设计与建设具有十分重要的意义。传统上大型油罐壁厚设计采用的是变点法;以可靠度理论为基础,以可靠性分析模型为核心,提出利用可靠度法求解大型油罐壁厚的新方法。以50 000 m3油罐为例,编程分析并计算以2种方法设计的壁厚。变点法设计的底圈罐壁厚度与圈数无关;以中心点可靠度法求解壁厚,可靠性指标一定时,底圈罐壁厚度同样与圈数无关。探讨可靠度法求解壁厚的可行性,验证变点法设计壁厚的可靠性。     

Kinetic responses to global terrorism: Lessons from Africa

This essay recalls the immediate and longer-term responses of the US and its allies to the events of 9/11. It contends that the die for contemporary developments in transnational terrorism was cast in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 – in particular the launching of sustained ‘anti-terrorist’ military combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more covert ‘kinetic’ operations elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa. The essay seeks specifically to expose the counter-productivity of using military operations as the primary antidote to transnational terrorism. Focusing on the African ‘laboratory’ and the spread of transnational terrorism and Islamic militancy, particularly in West and East Africa, the essay concludes that radical Islamists have mastered the ‘battle of the narrative’ and that the Western penchant for dispensing a kinetic brand of medication is feeding rather than fighting the virus of global terrorism.     

Fragmented forces: The development of the Gambian military

This article provides a detailed look at the history of the Gambia Armed Forces (GAF), a military that has received very little academic attention within the study of African state security forces. It identifies key turning points in the GAF’s history, and highlights the vastly different roles the military played in the state under President Jawara (1965–94) and President Jammeh (1994–2017). Yet, it also highlights important similarities regarding internal patterns within the armed forces and shows the ways in which these continuities may challenge attempts to restructure the security sector. The article draws on archival research and interviews conducted with retired and active duty Gambian military personnel, government officials, and Gambian scholars.     

Programming challenges and impediments to reform: identifying pragmatic solutions

Using two recently published essays by the current writer that assesses the dismal record of performance of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in enabling communist legacy defence institutions in Central and Eastern Europe to develop viable defence plans, this essay argues the need for deep reforms in the region’s defence institutions. To guide this reform effort, pragmatic solutions are suggested to improve the ability of these organisations to produce viable defence plans. Recommended reforms are: (1) conduct conceptual and cultural “audits,” (2) make operational and financial data central to decision-making, (3) change current organisational sociology, (4) examine planning methods and practices, and (5) stress the need to adopt policy frameworks to drive the operation of defence institutions.