VLMC控制流软件可靠性度量方法

针对现有软件可靠性模型普遍不适用于实际软件的问题,分析了软件内部模块间控制转移机理,通过分离入口模块,提取一阶控制转移概率矩阵;弱化内部模块与出口模块间差异,重构二阶以上转移概率矩阵,在改进Cheung模型的基础上建立一个更符合软件实际的可靠性度量模型。针对变阶依赖（ VLMC）控制转移导致的可靠性度量难问题,通过对导致复杂依赖的多入多出模块进行节点扩展,将VLMC控制流转化为Markov链,利用所建立的软件可靠性模型对VLMC控制流软件进行可靠性度量。研究利用演绎推理对所建立模型进行了正确性形式化证明。最后给出了方法的实例验证。     

无人作战飞机通信延时仿真

通信作为无人作战飞机任务控制站与无人作战飞机之间的纽带,在无人作战飞机系统中起着至关重要的作用。简要阐述了引起无人作战飞机通信延时的具体因素,分析了无人作战飞机使用的几种通信方式,提出并运用网络仿真工具NS2(networksimulation-2)针对视线通信方式和不同中继方式下的通信延时进行了仿真,最后对仿真作了分析和解释。     

基于飞行时间的弹道导弹火力控制

为了达到最佳射击效果,弹道导弹突击目标时经常需要多枚导弹同时击中目标,因此根据飞行时间确定发射时间则成为弹道导弹火力控制问题的重要内容。以具体导弹为例,采用仿真的方法分析了影响飞行时间的内在原因,得出了明确的结论,使导弹部队能够根据飞行时间确定发射时间,从而合理地进行火力控制,提高毁伤效果和震慑力。     

链约束下加工时间恶化的Flow Shop排序问题

讨论作业具有线性加工时间,作业间具有链约束的两台处理机流水作业排序问题,目标函数为极小化完工时间。在作业加工时间简单线性恶化下,提出作业的非负开始和停止延迟恶化率,构造了满足约束条件的复合作业。在此基础上,给出作业间具有平行链约束的两台处理机流水作业排序问题的最优多项式算法。     

高铁大风预警模式挖掘

高铁大风预警的传统方法基于风速预测,当瞬时值高于限速阈值时触发报警,存在大量的误报警,不必要的限速控制影响了高铁行车效率。创新地提出了基于序列模式的预警方法,旨在挖掘报警事件前序数据中的频繁模式,找出报警事件的变化规律,通过滤除与非预警序列共有的频繁模式,得到预警序列独有的序列特征,构建了预警模式库。经兰新高铁沿线的监测数据验证,该方法在提高预测准确率的基础上降低了漏报率,同时有效地减少了模式匹配所需的时间,为提前预警预留充分的时间窗口,更加符合实际应用的需求。     

Application of Markov renewal theory and semi-Markov decision processes in maintenance modeling and optimization of multi-unit systems

In this paper, a condition-based maintenance model for a multi-unit production system is proposed and analyzed using Markov renewal theory. The units of the system are subject to gradual deterioration, and the gradual deterioration process of each unit is described by a three-state continuous time homogeneous Markov chain with two working states and a failure state. The production rate of the system is influenced by the deterioration process and the demand is constant. The states of the units are observable through regular inspections and the decision to perform maintenance depends on the number of units in each state. The objective is to obtain the steady-state characteristics and the formula for the long-run average cost for the controlled system. The optimal policy is obtained using a dynamic programming algorithm. The result is validated using a semi-Markov decision process formulation and the policy iteration algorithm. Moreover, an analytical expression is obtained for the calculation of the mean time to initiate maintenance using the first passage time theory.     

电磁发射用脉冲电抗器应力分析及结构设计

基于对电磁力以及热应力的解析计算公式的推导,运用ANSYS有限元仿真软件对固定电抗器顶底端面情况下的铜箔进行电磁-温度-结构耦合分析,分别得出热应力及所受总应力与应变的分布情况。进一步对电抗器的结构进行优化,综合考虑其结构强度要求与连发温度要求,确定电抗器的最优设计结构,最终通过试验验证出仿真与设计方案真实可信。     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

区块链在分队战术协同中的应用构想

从战术分队角度出发,探讨了区块链技术在作战实体之间的信息交互及智能协同方面的应用设想,分析了战术分队信息交互的相关技术及面临的挑战,阐述了区块链在未来战术分队指挥体系构建中的发展构想。     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.