‘Look like the innocent flower,but be the serpent under’t’: mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations

This paper examines the interaction between a growth-oriented terrorist organization and an uninformed government based on a two-period signalling game. Combining the signalling game and organizational growth approaches of previous contributions, this paper shows that, if a terrorist group follows a growth strategy, it has an incentive to appear weaker than it is by mimicking the behaviour of a smaller organization. Depending on its beliefs about the extent of the terrorist threat, it can be optimal for a government to spend more on second-period counter-terrorism measures if it is not attacked in the first period than if it were attacked.     

Rendezvous search on labeled networks

Two players are independently placed on a commonly labelled network X. They cannot see each other but wish to meet in least expected time. We consider continuous and discrete versions, in which they may move at unit speed or between adjacent distinct nodes, respectively. There are two versions of the problem (asymmetric or symmetric), depending on whether or not we allow the players to use different strategies. After obtaining some optimality conditions for general networks, we specialize to the interval and circle networks. In the first setting, we extend the work of J. V. Howard; in the second we prove a conjecture concerning the optimal symmetric strategy. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 256–274, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10011     

Designing rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns for strategic (but distracted) contributors

In rewards-based crowdfunding, entrepreneurs solicit donations from a large number of individual contributors. If total donations exceed a prespecified funding target, the entrepreneur distributes nonmonetary rewards to contributors; otherwise, their donations are refunded. We study how to design such campaigns when contributors choose not just whether to contribute, but also when to contribute. We show that strategic contribution behavior—when contributors intentionally delay until campaign success is likely—can arise from the combination of nonrefundable (potentially very small) hassle costs and the risk of campaign failure, and can explain pledging patterns commonly observed in crowdfunding. Furthermore, such delays do not hurt the entrepreneur if contributors are perfectly rational, but they do if contributors are distracted, that is, if they might fail to return to the campaign after an intentional delay. To mitigate this, we find that an entrepreneur can use a simple menu of rewards with a fixed number of units sold at a low price, and an unlimited number sold at a higher price; this segments contributors over time based on the information they observe upon arrival. We show that, despite its simplicity, such a menu performs well compared to a theoretically optimal menu consisting of an infinite number of different rewards and price levels under many conditions.     

The timing of contests

We develop a simple model to analyze the timing of contests. When the odds of winning a contest are exogenously given – we show that if either the players discount the future or if the total cost of contest is smaller in the future – there exist subgame perfect equilibria where both players settle, anticipating a contest in the future. With endogenous efforts, the aggregate efforts expanded in a contest are smaller if the contest occurs in the future when the relative effort productivities remain constant or diverge over time, thus creating scope for delay in contests. When the effort productivities converge over time, the total efforts may be greater under a future contest. As a consequence, players either settle over the two periods, or else they initiate a contest immediately.     

中国空间安全形势

随着中国在太空领域的不断崛起,太空地位不断提升的同时,也面临着各种各样的挑战,这些挑战既有源自传统政治领域的大国阻挠,也有来自外太空的人类共同威胁。为了应对这些威胁和挑战,保护中国的太空利益和国家利益,我们需要从多方面着手,多管齐下,以维护日益重要的中国国家太空利益。     

面向能力需求的武器装备组合规划模型与算法

针对武器装备组合规划中存在的选择难、规划难问题,在给定能力需求的条件下,从分析装备的组合变更对整体体系的影响出发,考虑了总的经费预算、年度费用分配、装备规划周期等约束,以能力差距和发展风险最小为准则,构建了双目标优化模型,并设计了基于差分进化和非支配排序的遗传算法的求解算法,获得模型的Pareto解。通过逼近理想解排序法方法从所求Pareto解中求得令决策者满意的折中解。通过一个具体示例验证了模型和算法的有效性,能够为武器装备组合规划提供辅助决策。     

基于能力的武器装备组合规划模型与算法*

针对武器装备组合规划中存在的选择难、规划难问题,在给定能力需求的条件下,从分析装备的组合变更对整体体系的影响出发,考虑了总的经费预算、年度费用分配、装备规划周期等约束,以能力差距和发展风险最小为准则,构建了双目标优化模型,并设计了基于差分进化和NSGA-II的求解算法,获得模型的Pareto解;最后通过TOPSIS方法从所求Pareto解中求得令决策者满意的折中解。通过一个具体示例,验证了本文所提模型和算法的有效性,能够为武器装备组合规划提供辅助决策。     

基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略

以无人车集群系统协同监视再入体着靶过程为任务背景,开展智能集群自组织策略相关技术研究。设计无人车集群执行再入体着靶协同监视的集群行为模式;针对协同监视过程中的集群聚集行为,提出基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略。各智能体以实现群体聚集为"合作目标",以降低自身能量消耗为"竞争目标",开展博弈;基于微粒群算法规划局部路径,最终使群体系统涌现出聚集行为。仿真实验验证了设计的自主聚集策略的有效性。     

军事云环境下基于动态博弈的资源调度方法

针对军事云环境下联合指挥资源调度优化问题,综合考虑了多部队任务需求,多目标优化,多部队资源竞争等约束条件,运用动态博弈理论及方法,建立并提出了一种基于完全信息扩展博弈的资源调度模型及方法,提高了资源调度效率,兼顾了多部队利益,增加了联合作战效益。最后通过实验验证了其有效性及准确性。     

奇型偏微分方程的柯西问题

定解条件给在奇线上的偏微分方程的各种定解问题早已有研究^[1～4],多数作者使用了特殊函数作工具。本文用能量不等式组来解决一类奇型双曲型方程的柯西问题。 本文主要讨论如下问题解尚存在唯一性： Lu≡[(t^a/2?_t-λ₁(x,t)?_x)(t^a/2?_t-λ₂(x,t) ?_x)+a(x,t)?_t+b(x,t)?_x+c(x,t)]u(x,t)=f(x,t) (x,t)∈R×(0,T] u∣_t=0=φ(x),limt^a/2u_t=ψ(x) 这是一个二阶偏微分方程,当 α>0时,?_t²的系数当t=O 时变为零,因而这是一个初始值给在奇线上的柯西问题。我们假定： (A) α为常数,0<α<1;所涉及的都是实函数; (B) α(x,t),b(x,t),c(x,t),λ_j(x,t)(j=1,2)∈C¹([0,T],C²(R)),且上述函数的所有可能的导数都有界; (C) φ(x),ψ(x)∈C₀⁴(R)); （D）f(x,t)∈C((0,T],C₀²(R)),且sup{t^a/2(∣f∣+∣f_x∣+∣f_xx∣}＜+∞（Ⅱ） (E)存在常数δ＞0,使当（x,t)∈R×[0,T]时,有：∣λ₁(x,t)-λ₂(x,t)∣≥δ条件（Ⅱ）中关于实函数的假设不是必要的,作此假设仅为方便。本文主要得到：定理1：在（Ⅱ）的假设下,（Ⅰ）存在唯一弱解u,并 u∈C([0,T),H¹(R))∩C¹((0,T),L₂(R)).为证明该定理作了一系列准备,关键是证得引理1,引理2和引理6。