环境水平不变的水声环境参数盲估计与实验验证

为秘密、隐蔽地获取非常时期或非合作海区的水声环境参数,提出了水声环境参数盲估计的概念,分析和研究了水声环境参数盲估计理论,并对其中的目标函数进行了详细探讨,同时利用SWelIEx-96海试的部分数据对基于水平不变的水声环境参数盲估计方法进行了实验验证.实验结果表明,基于环境水平不变的水声环境参数盲估计技术是可行和有效的.     

雷诺应力模型的初步应用

针对SSG/LRR-ω雷诺应力模型,选取NASA湍流资源网站上的四个典型算例,即湍流平板边界层流动、带凸起管道流动、翼型尾迹区流动和NACA0012不同攻角绕流,开展初步的验证与确认工作,将部分结果和CFL3D进行对比。对于NACA0012翼型绕流,对比雷诺应力模型和SA模型的升力系数,结果表明:在失速攻角附近,雷诺应力模型明显优于SA模型。在此基础上,将该模型应用于DLR-F6翼身组合体的数值模拟,计算得到的机翼表面典型站位压力分布和实验值吻合良好,同时该模型捕捉到翼身交汇位置的小范围分离。     

Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

可执行体系结构研究

体系结构是系统设计与实施的蓝图,它能否正确、合理地指导实践在很大程度上依赖于体系结构的验证与评估.可执行体系结构研究为体系结构验证与评估开辟了新的途径.为了使各体系结构产品在整体上形成一个执行体,提出了可执行体系结构执行规则描述这一个概念.执行规则描述体系结构产品的执行、调用与数据流关系,为体系结构的执行提供了特定的背景信息.它通过标准的动态可执行模型接口分别调用该模型的执行引擎,从而达到体系结构在整体上执行的目的.体系结构的正确执行为体系结构验证提供依据,同时其运行结果为体系结构的评估提供依据.     

The value of losing control: Competition in markets for complements

When selling complementary products, manufacturers can often benefit from considering the resulting cross‐market interdependencies. Although using independent retailers makes it difficult to internalize these positive externalities, the ensuing double marginalization can mitigate within‐market competition. We use standard game theoretic analysis to determine optimal distribution channel strategies (through independent retailers or integrated) for competing manufacturers who participate in markets for complements. Our results suggest that a firm's optimal channel choice is highly dependent on its competitive positioning. A firm with a competitive advantage in terms of product characteristics (customer preferences) or production capabilities (cost) might benefit from selling through company‐controlled stores, allowing coordinated pricing across the two markets, whereas a less competitive firm might be better off using independent channel intermediaries to mitigate price competition. We consider two scenarios depending on whether the two firms make their distribution channel decisions sequentially or simultaneously. Although firms are unlikely to make such decisions at exactly the same instant, the simultaneous model also serves as a proxy for the scenario where firms decide sequentially, but where they cannot observe each other's strategic channel choices. For the sequential case, we find that the sequence of entry can have tremendous impact on the two firms'profits; whereas in some cases, the first mover can achieve substantially higher profits, we find that when the two markets are of sufficiently different size and only loosely related, a firm with a competitive advantage might be better off as a follower. Interestingly, our results suggest that, when the markets are of rather similar size, both firms are better off if they enter the industry sequentially. In those cases, the first entrant has incentive to reveal its planned channel strategies, and the follower has incentive to seek out and consider this information. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Modeling of the whole process of shock wave overpressure of free-field air explosion

The waveform of the explosion shock wave under free-field air explosion is an extremely complex problem. It is generally considered that the waveform consists of overpressure peak, positive pressure zone and negative pressure zone. Most of current practice usually considers only the positive pressure. Many empirical relations are available to predict overpressure peak, the positive pressure action time and pressure decay law. However, there are few models that can predict the whole waveform. The whole process of explosion shock wave overpressure, which was expressed as the product of the three factor functions of peak, attenuation and oscillation, was proposed in the present work. According to the principle of explosion similarity, the scaled parameters were introduced and the empirical formula was absorbed to form a mathematical model of shock wave overpressure. Parametric numerical simulations of free-field air explosions were conducted. By experimental verification of the AUTODYN numerical method and comparing the analytical and simulated curves, the model is proved to be accurate to calculate the shock wave overpressure under free-field air explosion. In addition, through the model the shock wave overpressure at different time and distance can be displayed in three dimensions. The model makes the time needed for theoretical calculation much less than that for numerical simulation.     

Excess procurement strategies by a dominant buyer under constrained supply

Supply chains are often characterized by the presence of a dominant buyer purchasing from a supplier with limited capacity. We study such a situation where a single supplier sells capacity to an established and more powerful buyer and also to a relatively less powerful buyer. The more powerful buyer enjoys the first right to book her capacity requirements at supplier's end, and then the common supplier fulfills the requirement of the less powerful buyer. We find that when the supplier's capacity is either too low (below the lower threshold) or too high (above the higher threshold), there is no excess procurement as compared to the case when supplier has infinite capacity. When the supplier's capacity is between these two thresholds, the more powerful buyer purchases an excess amount in comparison to the infinite capacity case.     

Social benefits of government investment in enterprises

A critical issue for many governments is boosting the adoption rates of products or technologies that enhance consumer surplus or total social welfare. Governments may, for example, pay subsidies to producers or to consumers to stimulate the manufacture or consumption of specific products, for example, energy-efficient appliances or more effective drugs. This research proposes a strategic government investment policy, namely, share acquisition, and demonstrates its effectiveness in reaching societal objectives. We consider a Cournot quantities-choice market comprised of homogeneous firms where the government intervenes to buy shares, and turning private firms into state-owned enterprises. We recognize that purchasing a single private firm is the optimal policy for the government to reach its societal objectives. Additionally, taking into consideration financial constraints, we find that the optimal stake increases with the budget. Compared with the optimal output-based subsidy policy, when the budget is low, the optimal government investment policy induces a higher consumer surplus. In addition, in differentiated Cournot competition, under which firms compete in selling substitutable products, we find that when the budget is sufficient, the optimal stake purchased first decreases and then increases according to the substitutability level among products.     

Impacts of sequential acquisition,market competition mode,and confidentiality on information flow

We investigate information flow in a setting in which 2 retailers order from a supplier and sell to a market with uncertain demand. Each retailer has access to a signal. The retailers can disclose signals to each other (horizontal information sharing), while the supplier can solicit signals by offering retailers differential payments as incentives for signal disclosure (vertical information acquisition). In the base setting, market competition is in quantity, and a retailer can fully infer the signal that the other retailer discloses to the supplier. We show that the supplier prefers to sequentialize the procedure for information acquisition. Moreover, vertical information acquisition by the supplier is a strategic complement to horizontal information sharing between the retailers to establish information flow. In the equilibrium, the retailers have no incentive to exchange signals, but system wide information transparency can be realized through a combination of information acquisition and inference. We further study the signaling effect, whereby the supplier utilizes wholesale pricing as an instrument to affect the retailers' inference of the shared signals, and price competition to explore their impacts on the supplier's preference for sequential acquisition and the sustainability of information flow.     

众核处理器访存链路接口的FPGA验证

面向众核处理器提出一种访存链路接口的现场可编程门阵列(Field-Programmable Gate Array,FPGA)验证平台,用于对处理器访存链路关键部件进行功能及可靠性测试。提出片上读写激励自动产生与检查机制、以太网接口硬件用户数据报协议(User Datagram Protocol,UDP)协议栈和FPGA芯片间多通道并行链路三项关键技术并进行设计实现。实验结果表明提出的各项关键技术功能正确,不仅丰富了功能验证中随机激励产生及结果验证的手段,而且实现了对链路数据检错和多lane间延迟偏斜纠正逻辑的可靠性测试与评估。经过该平台验证的访存链路接口在实际芯片中通过了功能正确性测试,证明了验证的有效性。