威布尔分布的战术导弹可靠性试验信息融合方法

针对战术导弹可靠性试验小子样问题,提出了基于威布尔分布,利用小概率原理,针对不同试验环境下试验数据的融合方法。该方法扩大了战术导弹可靠性试验的统计子样,提高了可靠性评定的可信度。     

Landau相变中的自由能

Landau用序参量的幂级数展开来表示相变温度附近的自由能,强调对称性与序参量在相变中的作用.正确书写自由能形式,可以计算可能相的温度曲线,得到关于序参量的方程,从而推知系统的结构.     

SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.     

Arms trade,arms control,and security: Collective action issues

This article puts forth collection action as a unifying theme for the conference essays on arms trade, control, and production. For each of these topics, collective action failures are related to group size and group composition considerations. Other issues are also examined including the manner in which individual contributions determine the overall level of the associated collective good ‐ the so‐called aggregation technology of public supply. Based on alternative aggregation technologies, the game‐theoretic underpinnings of these arms issues are explored.     

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.     

Japan's plutonium policy: Consequences for nonproliferation

ABSTRACT

What do we mean by nuclear proliferation? What does it mean to proliferate? This article investigates both the literal and figurative meaning of the term “proliferation.” It argues that many of the definitions and conceptualizations of nuclear proliferation often used by scholars are either limited in their utility or logically inconsistent. It then reconceptualizes and redefines the term, incorporating an understanding of both its etymological origins and the geopolitical context in which the phenomenon occurs. It concludes by exploring the potential impact that the politicization of the phenomenon may have on the identification of occurrences of proliferation, from both an academic and a policy-making perspective.     

基于云理论一二元语义的雷达装备保障指挥效能评估模型

针对云重心和云模型评判方法存在的信息丢失、难于评判以及信息扭曲等问题,从确定权重等级、评价集和评价结果3个方面对模型进行了改进和完善．应用二元语义确定指标权重,避免了评价信息的丢失和扭曲,采用综合云的思想确定评价集,充分利用评价者给出的信息,简化相似云的理论来定量衡量评价结果,从而建立了基于云理论一二元语义的雷达装备保障指挥效能评估模型．