AID,GLENEAGLES AND THE RUN-UP TO THE MILLENNIUM +5 SUMMIT

Africa has emerged as a strategic location for transcontinental narcotics trade. Particularly the West African subcontinent has turned into a cocaine warehousing and trans-shipment hub along the way to the European underground markets. At this juncture, African drug networks (ADNs) began to play a momentous role in global drug trade, and pose a considerable threat to international security, as they operate in more than 80 countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Interpol, and Europol perceive ADNs as one of the primary issues in international counter-narcotics policy. These agencies have launched several multilateral initiatives to contain the West African threat. None of these initiatives, however, retarded the expansion of the problem. Indeed, the containment efforts turned out to be quite embryonic. The ADNs eventually entered the Turkish market by the early 2000s. West African drug networks (WADNs) in particular have begun to operate within Turkey extensively, often supplying and distributing drugs. The gravity of the threat became ever more serious by 2012. The upsurge of the new threat has compelled the Turkish drug-law enforcement agencies to adopt new policies and counter-strategies. These policies have to be based upon proper strategic analysis of the threat. This paper seeks to address the need for a threat assessment of ADNs. It investigates the dimensions of the problem, profiles the members of WADNs, their modes of operation, and the factors that compelled them to exploit the illicit Turkish drug markets. The analyses are based upon the scrutiny of 227 narcotic interdictions files and statements from the African individuals in these case files. The paper concludes by presenting policy implications and recommendations for the Turkish security and foreign-policy institutions to cope with this impending threat.     

FOUNDATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY: PREPARING TO KEEP THE PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the continent of Africa, particularly Greater East Africa, has played an increasingly signifi cant role in United States (US) national security strategy. Transnational security threats and political authoritarianism continue to plague the region, creating calls for greater US and international involvement. Before reacting to the situation, however, it is prudent to pause, reflect, and understand that the United States developed strategic relations with nation-states in the region well before contemporary concerns for international terrorism and ungoverned spaces entered the strategic lexicon. Toward a more comprehensive understanding of Greater East Africa's strategic history, this paper examines the core strategic relationship in the region, US-Kenya relations, its origins and implications, and offers policy recommendations that will affect future international security.     

NUCLEAR ISLANDS

Current International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards do not provide adequate protection against the diversion to military use of materials or technology from certain types of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In view of highly enriched uranium's relatively greater ease of use as a nuclear explosive material than plutonium and the significant diseconomies of commercial spent fuel reprocessing, this article focuses on the need for improved international controls over uranium enrichment facilities as the proximate justification for creation of an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Association (INFCA). In principle, the proposal is equally applicable to alleviating the proliferation concerns provoked by nuclear fuel reprocessing plants and other sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The INFCA would provide significantly increased nonproliferation assurance to its member states and the wider international community by holding long-term leasehold contracts to operate secure restricted zones containing such sensitive nuclear facilities.     

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EVOLVING ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN

In 2003, the “E3”—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—engaged Iran in talks over Tehran's nuclear program and were joined in negotiations the next year by the European Union (EU). Given the dim prospects of success for these talks, why did the E3/EU pursue nuclear negotiations with Iran? This article's three-track analysis attempts to answer that question by examining the emergence of the EU nonproliferation policy prior to the E3/EU-Iran talks, analyzing the European-Iranian relationship as it pertains to cooperation and negotiations over nonproliferation and other issues, and considering contemporary influences on the E3/EU. The European Union was ultimately unsuccessful in its negotiations with Tehran, but its efforts were worthwhile. In the future, the organization can play a vital nonproliferation role; today, the circumstances that hampered previous European efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear standoff have improved and could be capitalized on by the European Union and the international community.     

In spite of reform: NATO HQ still in the grips of nations

Security Intergovernmental Organizations, here illustrated by NATO, persist in a “permitted interval” of internationalization, i.e. permitted by its member-states. On the one hand, they are seldom or never permitted to vanish due to member-states' vested interests in retaining them as tools of statecraft, even if their original purposes have become redundant. On the other hand, there is an internationalization ceiling that they must respect: they should not become too autonomous and thereby no longer be suitable as member-state tools. In spite of post-Cold War reform, interviews carried out at NATO Headquarters (HQ) in the late 1980s compared to interviews in 2012 display that a continuous pulling and hauling of forces of internationalization and renationalization have taken place around NATO HQ. The only instance of clear internationalization can be observed in the proactive diplomacy of Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen. There is stiff opposition to the internationalization of abolishing the Military Committee/International Military Staff among minor and South European states, and there is no waning in states' attempts to micro-manage the International Staff. Only external shocks can overcome resistance to internationalizing reform.     

Aligning national “logics” in a European military helicopter program

This article analyzes the public side of the NH90 network consisting of four participating countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands) and their industrial partners. Comparable to observations in earlier international projects in the defense sector, the development and production of the NH90 defense helicopter did not match original plans and costs estimates. On the basis of four mechanisms that were intended to facilitate the cooperation between the partnering countries (the General Memorandum of Understanding; coalition formation; the role of the central agency; and the process of vertical escalation) the question is posed whether or not there was a true alignment of national interests and “logics.” The lack of standardization, as well as program delays and issues concerning the division of the work-share, lead to the emerging alignment being characterized as “quasi-alignment” at best.     

载人飞船上升段轨道的Newton迭代设计法

本文对载人飞船上升段轨道的一种工程设计方法进行了探讨。该方法的特点是根据上升段飞行的特征,运用飞行力学原理选定其控制规律的数学模型,然后根据上升段轨道的中间约束条件和终端约束条件,利用Newton迭代法确定模型中的各待定参数。本文给出了该设计方法的流程图,并通过模拟计算论证了该设计方法的可行性。     

再入机动弹头的速度控制

本文详细地讨论了再入机动弹头的速度控制问题。根据优化原理找到了对固定目标进行攻击的最优制导规律,讨论了理想速度曲线的设计方法,以及具体实施减速控制的方法。仿真计算表明,对落速控制的精度是较高的。     

基于热力学第二定律的直喷式柴油机性能分析

这项研究的目的是发展用热力学第二定律分析柴油机在不同运行工况性能的能力.研究是针对一台12150L型柴油机进行的,以发动机气缸内部压缩、燃烧、膨胀、瞬时传热和换气过程的理论模拟模型为基础,应用热力学第二定律分析,度量各种能量品质的优劣和不可逆损失值,并且与热力学第一定律的能量平衡进行了比较.分别改变循环喷油量、燃烧开始角、燃烧持续期及燃烧品质指数.研究了参数变化对缸内可用能和热力学第一定律效率和第二定律效率的影响.