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31.
为评估炸药在封闭容器内爆炸产生的振动效应对周围环境的影响,对封闭式爆炸容器小药量TNT炸药爆炸产生的爆炸振动效应进行了爆源邻近实地监测和测试。结果表明:小药量炸药爆炸引起的爆炸振动效应对距爆源100 m以外的普通砖结构民用住宅产生的速度强度远低于其临界峰值速度,不会对其结构产生明显影响。  相似文献   
32.
用药室增长量预估线膛火炮初速下降量精度很低,根据火炮身管烧蚀磨损特点,本文提出了用身管严重磨损段阳线磨损量表征火炮初速减退量,在130mm加农炮上所做试验表明,用该方法可提高大口径火炮初速下降量的预估精度。  相似文献   
33.
Although quantity discount policies have been extensively analyzed, they are not well understood when there are many different buyers. This is especially the case when buyers face price‐sensitive demand. In this paper we study a supplier's optimal quantity discount policy for a group of independent and heterogeneous retailers, when each retailer faces a demand that is a decreasing function of its retail price. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game whereby the supplier acts as the leader and buyers act as followers. We show that a common quantity discount policy that is designed according to buyers' individual cost and demand structures and their rational economic behavior is able to significantly stimulate demand, improve channel efficiency, and substantially increase profits for both the supplier and buyers. Furthermore, we show that the selection of all‐units or incremental quantity discount policies has no effect on the benefits that can be obtained from quantity discounts. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005  相似文献   
34.
假目标配置数量模型及其效费比分析   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
在现代战争中,示假伪装的地位越来越重要。引入了真假目标的发现识别概率的指数分布模型,综合考虑作战时间、真假目标价格比等因素,确定战场生存能力和配置假目标成本两个目标函数,并以最小加权偏差法确定两者权重,建立基于多目标决策的假目标配置数量模型。最后结合实际问题,将各参数条件带入模型计算出假目标的最佳配置数量,同时利用假目标的效费比模型进行检验分析,从而为战时假目标配置数量的确定提供参考依据。  相似文献   
35.
Consider a manufacturer serving a set of retail stores each of which faces deterministic demands in a finite planning horizon. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the production capacity of the manufacturer is built, followed by production, outsourcing to third party manufacturers if necessary and distribution to the retail stores. Because the retail stores are usually managed by different managers who act as independent profit centers, it is desirable that the total cost is divided among the retail stores so that their incentives can be appropriately captured and thus efficient operations can be achieved. Under various conditions, we prove that there is a fair allocation of costs among the retail stores in the sense that no subset of retail stores subsidizes others, or equivalently, the resulting capacity investment game has a nonempty core, that is, the capacity investment game is a balanced game. In addition, our proof provides a mechanism to compute a fair cost allocation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 512–523, 2013  相似文献   
36.
We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.  相似文献   
37.
曲面的三个基本形式的系数矩阵之间关系的证明及其应用   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
给出R3 中曲面的 3个基本形式的系数之间关系的一个直接证明 ,并由此得到曲面的 3个基本形式之间的关系及其它一些结果 .  相似文献   
38.
从防空战斗的实际需求出发,结合现行防空作战运筹理论中存在的问题,提出了防空导弹火力单元战斗效率指标应包括完成射击任务概率和毁歼空中目标数量等分指标的观点,利用概率论和军事运筹等方法,分析了这两项分指标的构成要素及其相互关系,并建立了相应的评估模型,结合实例说明了模型的具体应用.  相似文献   
39.
弹药数质量管理数据仓库数据模型研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
对弹药数质量管理数据仓库的数据整理、数据模型及使用作了研究。应用ER图描述了弹药数质量管理数据仓库的数据模型 ,应用函数依赖的极小覆盖算法优化了弹药数质量管理数据仓库的数据模型。  相似文献   
40.
针对战时基于定点调拨的弹药储备与基于定期调拨的弹药储备中存在的断供与盲供问题,从弹药消耗及补给数据出发,围绕弹药消耗量、补给量与储备量之间的相互关系,以优化技术为手段,兼顾基于定点调拨弹药储备与基于定期调拨弹药储备的优点,通过寻求最佳弹药储备量和最佳弹药补给点的方法,实现了弹药储备量的优化控制,为今后的弹药储备控制方法研究提供了理论依据和参考。  相似文献   
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