邻频干扰对跳频系统通信容量的影响分析

在已知台站布置的跳频系统中,针对邻频干扰对系统通信容量的影响,从信号信息熵角度,分析了接收点干扰信号和噪声的熵功率,利用信号熵和熵功率不等式,推导得出了以信道参数、干扰台站数和可用频点数为变量的系统通信容量公式。仿真结果表明,在干扰台站数较小时,接收点干扰信号的分布取决于信道参数,而不能简单地假设为高斯分布;并验证了所提理论在nakagami信道下的正确性。     

Flexible capacity strategy in an asymmetric oligopoly market with competition and demand uncertainty

This article studies flexible capacity strategy (FCS) under oligopoly competition with uncertain demand. Each firm utilizes either the FCS or inflexible capacity strategy (IFCS). Flexible firms can postpone their productions until observing the actual demand, whereas inflexible firms cannot. We formulate a new asymmetrical oligopoly model for the problem, and obtain capacity and production decisions of the firms at Nash equilibrium. It is interesting to verify that cross‐group competition determines the capacity allocation between the two groups of firms, while intergroup competition determines the market share within each group. Moreover, we show that the two strategies coexist among firms only when cost differentiation is medium. Counterintuitively, flexible firms benefit from increasing production cost when the inflexible competition intensity is sufficiently high. This is because of retreat of inflexible firms, flexibility effect, and the corresponding high price. We identify conditions under which FCS is superior than IFCS. We also demonstrate that flexible firms benefit from increasing demand uncertainty. However, when demand variance is not very large, flexible firms may be disadvantaged. We further investigate the effects of cross‐group and intergroup competition on individual performance of the firms. We show that as flexible competition intensity increases, inflexible firms are mainly affected by the cross‐group competition first and then by the intergroup competition, whereas flexible firms are mainly affected by the intergroup competition. Finally, we examine endogenous flexibility and identify its three drivers: cost parameters, cross‐group competition, and intergroup competition. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 117–138, 2017     

基于最优Morlet小波的全信息能量熵提取及其在滚动轴承状态监测中的应用

为利用振动信号中隐含的冲击特征成分来反映轴承性能退化趋势,综合利用小波变换技术和全信息技术,提出一种基于最优Morlet小波变换的全信息能量熵提取方法．以最小Shannon熵优化Morlet小波形状参数,通过多源振动数据的小波变换系数,利用信息熵综合反映冲击特征能量在不同频带分布差异．滚动轴承全寿命数据的应用结果表明,全信息能量熵的变化趋势能够监测轴承状态的劣化过程,而伴随的早期故障检测可以提高轴承使用的安全性．     

Cost allocation of capacity investment games

Consider a manufacturer serving a set of retail stores each of which faces deterministic demands in a finite planning horizon. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the production capacity of the manufacturer is built, followed by production, outsourcing to third party manufacturers if necessary and distribution to the retail stores. Because the retail stores are usually managed by different managers who act as independent profit centers, it is desirable that the total cost is divided among the retail stores so that their incentives can be appropriately captured and thus efficient operations can be achieved. Under various conditions, we prove that there is a fair allocation of costs among the retail stores in the sense that no subset of retail stores subsidizes others, or equivalently, the resulting capacity investment game has a nonempty core, that is, the capacity investment game is a balanced game. In addition, our proof provides a mechanism to compute a fair cost allocation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 512–523, 2013     

自润滑关节轴承磨损寿命模型

自润滑关节轴承寿命的计算和预测对于提高装备的运行安全性具有重大的意义。针对自润滑关节轴承磨损寿命计算和预测的需求,本文从自润滑关节轴承的磨损机理出发,依据材料摩擦磨损理论,采用组合磨损计算方法分别建立了自润滑推力关节轴承和向心关节轴承的磨损寿命模型。该模型综合考虑了影响自润滑关节轴承寿命的磨损机理、结构特点、工作特性以及零部件功能要求等因素,特别是将结构参数和功能要求显式的在模型中表示,可直接反映结构变化和功能要求对自润滑关节轴承磨损寿命的影响。计算实例和分析结果表明：相对目前使用的自润滑关节轴承经验计算公式,本文模型计算结果准确,理论依据更充分,对于特殊结构和功能的特种自润滑关节轴承适用性更好。     

一种基于节点资源利用率的无标度网络路由策略

本文研究了节点负载处理能力异质条件下的无标度网络交通动力学过程,提出了一种基于节点资源利用率的全局动态路由策略。该策略利用网络中节点资源利用率构建了一种全局代价函数,选择使该代价函数最小的路径来传输负载。实验结果表明该路由策略在略微增加平均路径长度的情况下成倍地提高了网络负载传输能力,与有效路由策略的比较进一步验证了该策略的有效性。     

Collaboration in contingent capacities with information asymmetry

We study the optimal contracting problem between two firms collaborating on capacity investment with information asymmetry. Without a contract, system efficiency is lost due to the profit‐margin differentials among the firms, demand uncertainty, and information asymmetry. With information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the optimal capacity level is characterized by a newsvendor formula with an upward‐adjusted capacity investment cost, and no first‐best solution can be achieved. Our analysis shows that system efficiency can always be improved by the optimal contract and the improvement in system efficience is due to two factors. While the optimal contract may bring the system's capacity level closer to the first‐best capacity level, it prevents the higher‐margin firm from overinvesting and aligns the capacity‐investment decisions of the two firms. Our analysis of a special case demonstrates that, under some circumstances, both firms can benefit from the principal having better information about the agent's costs. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 54:, 2007     

一种轴承故障等级诊断改进方法

针对频谱分析不能确定轴承故障程度的缺点,提出 PCA（principle component analysis）与优化的 SVM （support vector machine）相结合的方法,研究轴承不同故障类型、同种故障类型不同故障等级的实验振动数据,同时对轴承振动信号的13个特征属性参数进行了主成分分析,确定了最优特征属性参数,并利用优化的SVM 对轴承故障进行诊断。实验结果表明：该方法确定了最优属性参数,减少了冗余信息,提高了诊断准确率,减少了时间消耗,不仅有效地诊断出了轴承的故障类别,而且实现了轴承的故障等级诊断,使诊断更加精细化,为工程实际中轴承的健康管理提供了有益参考。     

基于重构相空间AD-SVM的短期电力负荷预测

利用重庆市九龙坡区电网2009年7月1日000-10月8日4：00 99 d共2 380个历史电力负荷数据,分析其特点和规律.将构建混沌理论的平均位移（AD）法和支持向量机（SVM）相结合,提出了一种新的短期电力负荷预测模型.通过仿真计算,将结果与神经网络法预测结果进行对比,可得新方法能较好反应数据变化趋势,并且具备较好的拟合能力,能够提高负荷预测精度.在实际短期电力负荷预测中,可优先选用平均位移法与支持向量机相结合的新方法.     

Strategic obfuscation of production capacities

Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014