Operational idealism: doctrine development of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army under Soviet threat, 1969–1989

This article analyses the doctrine development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) coping with the Soviet military threat between 1969 and 1989. In the 1970s, the PLA applied a doctrine of ‘active defence and luring the enemy into depth’ based on its traditional operational art. In 1980, the PLA decided to focus its doctrine on positional defence. In 1986, the PLA introduced ‘integrated operations and prioritised strike’, a generalised doctrine that originated from its war history. Many organisational and intellectual challenges in peacetime doctrine development contributed to the PLA’s operational idealism, including its aging leadership, command structure, attitude towards its previous experience, limited analysis of contemporary military developments, and failure in test and validation of doctrines. In the post-Cold War decade, many of these challenges persisted in spite of military modernization efforts. The ongoing military reform has to address these challenges and improve the PLA doctrine development in peacetime.     

Too much Western bias? The need for a more culturally adaptable approach to post-conflict security sector reform

The existing guidelines for security sector reform (SSR) tend to draw on theoretical work in the field of civil–military relations, which in turn has been derived from Western, liberal democratic models of governance. Although guidelines strongly advise that local culture and context need to be considered when drawing up objectives for post-conflict SSR programmes, this is not often reflected in practice. This article considers some of the reasons for this, citing both in-country challenges and donor-related issues, and suggests that one of the biggest problems is a lack of alternative, non-orthodox models of civil–military relations to draw upon. It is further suggested that elements of suitable alternative models may be found in states which possess political structures not entirely dissimilar to the Western, liberal democratic ideal, but which can offer different perspectives. Detailed research of these structures should produce a pool of sub-models which could then be employed to create bespoke, culturally appropriate objectives for use in post-conflict SSR programmes.     

解读《2017美国海军陆战队航空建设计划》

海军陆战队是美军在海外执行任务的主要作战力量,其发展建设的重点将决定未来美军的海外战略重心。本文以《2017年美国海军陆战队航空兵建设计划》的主要内容为研究对象,概述了未来美国海军陆战队作战的总体构想,对美国海军陆战队主要更新换代的海空装备进行了研究分析,总结了美军海军陆战队航空建设的启示。以分析结果为依据,对未来美军的战略重心进行了判断。     

2017年上半年美国对外军贸概况

美国长期以来大量对外国进行武器出口,一方面获取巨额利润,另一方面借此影响相关地区的形势.2017年上半年,伴随着美国政府对外政策的调整,美国对外军事贸易也出现了一些变化,在对亚太地区、中东地区、欧洲地区和其他潜在热点地区的武器出口方面有着不同的表现.     

装备技术体系结构演化和超网络建模

装备技术体系结构演化模型是把握装备技术发展规律和制定发展战略的基础。文章系统梳理装备技术发展的体系特征,深入分析了其体系演化动力、要素和过程,将演化实体与关系抽象为超网络的节点和边,可以给前沿技术探测和装备技术体系评估提供新思路。     

“Effing” the military: a political misunderstanding of management

The use of commercial business management techniques is widespread in all government departments, including the Ministry of Defence. This article examines the use of popular management techniques in the Armed Forces and argues that their application is misplaced. It looks at what the “effs” – “efficiency” and “effectiveness” – mean in the business world and to the Armed Forces. It compares the definitions both in business and the Armed Forces and finds that there are few, if any, situations where the same measurements can be applied. Whilst many management techniques are suited for business, the function of the Armed Forces and its output cannot be measured in the same way, complicated by the different metrics of “efficiency” in peace and in war. This difference may not be clearly understood by some politicians, or indeed by some senior military personnel. Using examples from some of the most popular management techniques such as “Lean” and “Agile” it is possible to see that their use might actually diminish the capabilities of the Armed Forces when it comes to performing their principal role – the use of force to achieve political objectives.     

What is the global landpower network and what value might it provide?

US national security guidance, as well as the US Army’s operational experiences since 2001, emphasizes the importance of working closely with partner countries to achieve US strategic objectives. The US Army has introduced the global landpower network (GLN) concept as a means to integrate, sustain and advance the Army’s considerable ongoing efforts to meet US national security guidance. This study develops the GLN concept further, and addresses three questions. What benefits can the GLN provide the Army? What are the essential components of the GLN? What options exist for implementing the GLN concept? By developing the GLN concept, the Army has the opportunity to transition the GLN from an often ad hoc and reactive set of relationships to one that the Army more self-consciously prioritizes and leverages as a resource to meet US strategic objectives.