Moral Aspects of “Moral Injury”: Analyzing Conceptualizations on the Role of Morality in Military Trauma

In clinical circles, the concept of “moral injury” has rapidly gained traction. Yet, from a moral philosophical point of view the concept is less clear than is suggested. That is, in current conceptualizations of moral injury, trauma’s moral dimension seems to be understood in a rather mechanistic and individualized manner. This article makes a start in developing an adequately founded conceptualization of the role of morality in deployment-related distress. It does so by reviewing and synthesizing insights from different disciplines into morality and trauma. This discussion will lead to three positions: (1) values and norms are by definition characterized by conflict, (2) moral conflict may entail important social dimensions, and (3) moral conflict may lead to altered beliefs about previously held values. These insights provide important steps in further developing conceptions of the role of morality in deployment-related suffering.     

The Hungarian experience with Gripen fighter aircraft

The post-communist countries transition from the Warsaw Pact style of platforms and systems to Western-compatible capabilities has never been an easy task or a process without conflicts. This was no different for the Visegrád countries either, in which case the Hungarian Gripen procurement stands out. After much debate, Budapest decided to modernize its fighter fleet with the not battle tested Swedish-made Gripen fighter aircraft. This decision received several critiques due to the lack of transparency in the selection process and the initial lack of NATO-required systems. Subsequently, the fleet has had to operate in a financially demanding environment. Moreover, the air force has lost two aircrafts in accidents. Now that the jets are in the middle of their envisaged life cycle, it is more than appropriate to answer the question if the Gripens can utilize their full combat potential or will they fail the test of time?     

The crisis of American military assistance: strategic dithering and Fabergé Egg armies

ABSTRACT

The United States has provided substantial amounts of military assistance and aid since the end of World War Two. During the Cold War, it proved vital in protecting numerous regimes from communist takeovers. Successful outcomes occurred when American leaders made large initial aid commitments, and the states had the capacity and political willpower to use it effectively. However, Vietnam was an example of how U.S. support lagged, as leaders in Saigon preferred political survival instead of creating regime legitimacy. Following 9/11, American security aid focused on making weak countries develop stronger security forces. Unfortunately, this created Fabergé egg militaries: expensive and easily broken by insurgents. This article suggests long-term strategic commitments need to be made alongside more resources for the American State Department and similar organizations to focus on the politics of state-building. Finally, this article suggests strategies, such as “whole-of-government” approaches, to improve long-term security and political institution building.     

美国网络空间作战能力建设

网络空间越来越被世界各国公认为是继陆地、海洋、空中和太空之后的第五个作战域,为获得和保持像其它作战域那样世界领先的军事优势,美国正在大力进行网络空间作战能力建设。提出了美国网络空间作战能力建设框架,从战略规划、作战力量、作战理论、作战训练、武器装备、战场基础环境、人才培养和作战联盟八个方面全面总结了美国近年来在网络空间作战能力建设方面的主要做法。     

面向军事定向越野训练的数据挖掘思路

军事地形学是军队院校本科必修课程。按图行进的军事定向越野,是军事地形学野外教学的重点和难点。本文借鉴了当前流行的"大数据"思想,针对当前军事定向越野教学训练的特点,研究提出了若干数据挖掘思路,能够从大量训练数据中提取可辅助教员组织教学、制定训练计划的有价值知识,而且具有较好的实用价值和军队院校推广价值。     

科技军民融合政策制度

科技军民融合政策制度是推动军民科技协同创新向纵深发展的基本保障和环境条件。分析了我国科技军民融合政策与管理制度的内涵、分类和组成,调研了我国科技领域军民融合有关政策现状及最新试点情况,分析了当前我国科技军民融合政策制度的缺陷点、薄弱环节,研究了国外科技有关的军民融合政策体系构建的规律及启示,提出了我国科技军民融合政策制度建设的基本思路、组织框架、建设重点和推进措施,以为我国科技军民融合政策的制定提供理论保障和决策依据。     

Learning ‘Under Fire’: Israel’s improvised military adaptation to Hamas tunnel warfare

What organisational attributes enhance a military’s ability to effectively adapt on the battlefield? Upon the outbreak of war in July 2014 between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) encountered an expansive network of tunnels from which Hamas was launching large-scale assaults into Israel. This article illustrates that the IDF’s ability to successfully adapt ‘under fire’ to this battlefield surprise was facilitated by several important attributes related to its organisational learning capacity: a dynamic, action-oriented organisational culture, a flexible leadership and command style, specialised commando units which acted as ‘incubators’ for learning and innovation, and a formal system to institutionalise and disseminate lessons learned.     

The military as a learning organisation: establishing the fundamentals of best-practice in lessons-learned

The post-Cold War era has witnessed the rapid expansion of organisational learning initiatives within NATO militaries, especially formal “lessons-learned” processes. The effectiveness of national lessons-learned processes in recalibrating military activity to the demands of ongoing operations has been highly-differentiated. However, the academic literature on military change and practitioner guidance has been slow to investigate the key features of best-practice in military learning. This article breaks new ground by drawing upon the literature on dynamic organisational capabilities to explore the fundamental organisational processes and activities which are necessary to implement successful lessons-learned. It examines, in particular, the organisational features which facilitate “knowledge transformation”: the effective combination of new knowledge gained from intra- and inter-organisational learning with existing organisational knowledge. The article concludes by highlighting several potential future empirical and theoretical research agendas in military learning and the importance of engagement between lessons-learned practitioners and organisational learning scholars.     

Spaghetti: systems thinking and the US Army

In the mid-2000s, the United States Army was embroiled in counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan that required deeper understanding of local social systems. The Army turned to systems thinking and design thinking to model and understand the world, define problems, and develop approaches to strategic and operational challenges. However, the Army’s approach as expressed in publications and doctrine encourages the development of complicated, unsupported, and unfalsifiable hypotheses. The risk is that the Army will act on incorrect assumptions and develop plans that are fragile.     

Precision cyber weapon systems: An important component of a responsible national security strategy?

Given the advances made in conventional weapon capabilities, precision should by now be the accepted and expected norm in cyberspace as well. In this article I argue that developing precision cyber weapon systems, to be used during a lawful conflict, can be an important part of a responsible national security strategy to reduce the amount of violence and physical destruction in conflicts. I first describe a precision cyber weapon system in a military context. I then present three compelling rationales for the development of precision cyber weapon systems based on ethical, operational, and financial considerations. To support the position, I address several arguments that have been levied against their development. Thereafter I present several recommendations for a way ahead.