Dynamic institutionalization: the foundations of Japan’s radioactive problem

Many have suggested that the true purpose behind Japan’s development of a closed nuclear-fuel cycle is to maintain the technical potential to develop nuclear weapons. However, closer examination of the development of Japan’s nuclear industry shows that, although Japan possesses advanced nuclear technologies, there has been no deliberate strategy to create a nuclear-weapon option. There is no “nuclear hedge.” To illustrate this point, this article presents a framework called “dynamic institutionalization” to explain the origins of Japan’s nuclear policies and the different sets of institutionalized pressures and constraints that have perpetuated these policies over time. Japan’s continued development of closed fuel-cycle technologies is primarily driven by domestic politics and the lack of a permanent spent-fuel management solution. On the other hand, Japan’s institutionalized nuclear forbearance is driven by the calculation that, as long as US extended deterrence remains credible, Japan’s security is best guaranteed through reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. By analytically untangling the policy of closed fuel-cycle development from the rationale for nuclear forbearance, this article provides a more nuanced view of the relationships between the domestic and international variables shaping Japan’s nuclear policies.     

利用Roothaan-Hartree-Fock 原子波函数计算的低能电子被He和Ar原子弹性散射截面

利用原子的Roothaan-Hartree-Fock波函数计算了低能e~--He和e~--Ar弹性散射截面。计算采用模型势方法,其中包括静电势、交换势和极化势。计算结果和实验吻合较好。通过把我们的计算结果和其他作者利用不同原子波函数的计算结果进行比较,讨论了不同原子波函数之间的差别对计算结果的影响。     

l壳层状态的QSL分类与耦合波函数的计算

本文从准旋、自旋、轨道角动量算符的二次量子化形式出发,讨论了l壳层状态的QSL分类,推导了QSL分类的递推公式并给出了p,d,f壳层的分类结果。应用计算单体、二体算符矩阵元的Slater-Condon规则和解线代数本征值问题子程序,编制了计算l壳层QSL耦合波函数的计算程序,在VAX-11/730机上,对p-壳层和d-壳层共约需半分钟,对f-壳层约需24分钟。     

近代物理实验教学改革与创新性人才培养

近代物理实验教学应积极进行改革，以适应时代发展的需要。本文结合石河子大学师范学院物理系实际，提出通过对实验教学模式调整，在教学上采用分层次的模式来进行教学。在近代物理实验室开展科研，实施开放实验室，创造个性发展空间，培养学生勇于探索、善于研究创新的精神。     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.     

Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

India’s nuclear doctrine and posture has traditionally been shaped by minimum deterrence logic. This logic includes assumptions that possession of only a small retaliatory nuclear force generates sufficient deterrent effect against adversaries, and accordingly that development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and platforms are unnecessary for national security. The recent emergence of Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear missile platform has generated pressures on Indian minimum deterrence. This article analyzes Indian official and strategic elite responses to the Nasr challenge, including policy recommendations and attendant implications. It argues that India should continue to adhere to minimum deterrence, which serves as the most appropriate concept for Indian nuclear policy and best supports broader foreign and security policy objectives. However, the form through which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be rethought in light of this new stage of regional nuclear competition.     

Regional integration and nuclear energy in Africa

African states are hampered by unreliable electric energy that has not complemented economic development efforts. Recently, several African states announced plans to pursue nuclear energy in the future. However, several challenges remain for these states, notably insecurity and financial deficiencies. This paper proposes the use of regional integration arrangements to address these challenges faced by African states, as a way of complementing other efforts enabling African states to obtain nuclear energy. The existence of these arrangements and their institutional mechanisms can enable African states to enhance security and cost-effectively develop nuclear power infrastructure.     

NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH

The funding of international nuclear risk mitigation is ad hoc, voluntary, and unpredictable, offering no transparent explanation of who is financially responsible for the task or why. Among many non-nuclear-armed states, this exacerbates a sense of injustice surrounding what they see as a discriminatory nuclear regime. The resulting erosion of the regime's legitimacy undermines support for efforts to prevent nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism. This article proposes a transparent, equitable “nuclear-user-pays” system as a logical means of reversing this trend. This system envisions states contributing financially to international efforts to mitigate nuclear risks at a level relative to the degree of nuclear risks created by each state. “National nuclear risk factors” would be calculated by tabulating the risks associated with each state's civilian and military nuclear activities, as well as advanced dual-use and nuclear-capable missile activities, multiplying the severity of each risk by the probability of it occurring, and combining these results. A nuclear-user-pays model would create financial incentives for national and corporate nuclear risk mitigation, boost legitimacy and support for nuclear control efforts among non-nuclear-armed states, assist in preventing nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism, and advance nuclear disarmament by helping progressively devalue nuclear weapons.     

SPARRING ON THE SUBCONTINENT

South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime, by Mario Esteban Carranza. Ashgate, 2009. 208 pages, $99.95.     

ATOMS FOR PEACE

Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity, by Matthew Fuhrmann, Cornell University Press, 2012, 344 pages, $29.95.