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41.
Richard B. White 《The Nonproliferation Review》2014,21(3-4):261-274
The Indian government has not made a public comment about the status of its nuclear weapon program since approving a nuclear doctrine in 2003. However, there is now enough information in the public domain to determine that the command-and-control system for the nuclear program has steadily matured in accordance with the intent of the approved nuclear doctrine. The Indian government has successfully mitigated many of the issues that plague the conventional military. The result is a basic command-and-control system that is focused only on the delivery, if ordered by the prime minister, of nuclear weapons. The system is not as robust as those of the United States and Russia, but is in place and ready as new Indian nuclear weapons enter into operation. The command-and-control system is developing to meet India's needs and political compulsions, but not necessarily as part of a more assertive nuclear policy. 相似文献
42.
Heinz Gaertner 《Defense & Security Analysis》2014,30(4):336-345
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) justifies its nuclear weapon arsenal with the concept of deterrence. It means that it will try to miniaturize and modernize its warheads and missiles. This leads to a first-use doctrine of nuclear weapons. Obama's policy of engagement does not offer a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue as yet. In the context of its policy of critical engagement with the DPRK, the European Union has three key interests: regional peace and stability, denuclearization, and human rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) could be a precedent. The CSCE process was based on three “baskets”: security, economics, and humanitarian. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership is a step in this regard. This article looks at three theoretical approaches: realism, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internationalism. It concludes that a political strategy to create a stable North Korean peninsula has to go beyond nuclear deterrence that is based on the realist notion of balance of power. 相似文献
43.
本文以聚碳硅烷(PCS)为先驱体,SiC晶须,SiC微粉或C纤维为增强剂,热解转化制得SiC/SiC或C/SiC复合材料,研究其制备工艺过程对材料的力学和热物理性能的影响。结果表明:PCS在1300℃下转化为β-SiC微晶并将未烧结的增强剂网络在一起形成SiC/SiC或C/SiC复合材料。该SiC基复合材料具有较好的常温和高温机械强度,优异的耐热疲劳和抗热震性能,在1300℃空气中具有良好的抗氧化性。 相似文献
44.
文中利用自由电子气体近似(HFEGE)定域交换势和修正的半经典近似(MSCE)定域交换势,加上正交化方法(Orthogonalization technique),对能量在0.1~20eV的低能电子被He,Ne和Ar 原子的弹性散射过程进行了计算。其中靶原子的电荷分布以及入射电子和靶原子的静电作用利用原子的Roothaan-Hartree-Fock 波函数求出;相关和极化作用则用一个无参数的相关极化势近似表示。通过本文计算结果和严格计及交换作用的结果及实验数据相比较,对HFEGE和MSCE 交换势的准确性以及正交化过程对计算结果的影响进行了分析。 相似文献
45.
The article is devoted to problems of defining quantitative criteria for the physical protection system (PPS) effectiveness of nuclear facilities. The article briefly describes the scheme of the PPS development used in the nuclear industry in Russia, gives a review of existing approaches to defining the minimal acceptable value of the system's effectiveness, and reveals advantages and disadvantages of the approaches. The article describes in detail an approach based on facility categorization by potential losses and a technique of defining the minimal acceptable value of the PPS effectiveness developed on its base. 相似文献
46.
Mohammad Hossein Sabouri 《Journal of Military Ethics》2016,15(3):227-245
For more than a decade, Iran has been referring to a fatwa issued by its Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, proscribing nuclear weapons. The fatwa, however, not only failed to influence the process that led to the resolution of Iran’s nuclear crisis, but also has been met with a good deal of skepticism. The most commonly held suspicions about the credibility of the fatwa can be summed up in five central questions: (1) Has the nuclear fatwa actually been issued? (2) Does the fatwa apply to all the aspects of nuclear weapons including their production, possession and use? (3) What is the juridical status of the fatwa? (4) Was the nuclear fatwa issued only to deceive other nations? (5) Is the fatwa really irreversible? This article tries to answer these questions by providing a chronological review of the fatwa and analyzing all the relevant statements by Khamenei. The analysis is conducted against the background of Islamic principles, Shi’a jurisprudence and the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The article concludes that the fatwa is a credible religious decree and could indeed contribute to the cause of nuclear disarmament. 相似文献
47.
Frank O’Donnell 《Contemporary Security Policy》2017,38(1):78-101
India’s nuclear doctrine and posture has traditionally been shaped by minimum deterrence logic. This logic includes assumptions that possession of only a small retaliatory nuclear force generates sufficient deterrent effect against adversaries, and accordingly that development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and platforms are unnecessary for national security. The recent emergence of Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear missile platform has generated pressures on Indian minimum deterrence. This article analyzes Indian official and strategic elite responses to the Nasr challenge, including policy recommendations and attendant implications. It argues that India should continue to adhere to minimum deterrence, which serves as the most appropriate concept for Indian nuclear policy and best supports broader foreign and security policy objectives. However, the form through which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be rethought in light of this new stage of regional nuclear competition. 相似文献
48.
Stephen J. Cimbala 《Defense & Security Analysis》2017,33(3):193-208
Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities. 相似文献
49.
船用反应堆堆芯物理计算软件包的研制 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
基于船用反应堆结构特点与运行方式 ,通过对核电站大型机版堆芯物理计算软件的移植与修改 ,研制了微机版船用反应堆堆芯物理计算软件包 .可用于船用反应堆燃料组件参数及堆芯三维细网临界与燃耗的计算研究 相似文献
50.
Strengthening the United States' ability to prevent adversaries from smuggling nuclear materials into the country is a vital and ongoing issue. The prospect of additional countries, such as Iran, obtaining the know‐how and equipment to produce these special nuclear materials in the near future underscores the need for efficient and effective inspection policies at ports and border crossings. In addition, the reduction of defense and homeland security budgets in recent years has made it increasingly important to accomplish the interdiction mission with fewer funds. Addressing these complications, in this article, we present a novel two‐port interdiction model. We propose using prior inspection data as a low‐cost way of increasing overall interdiction performance. We provide insights into two primary questions: first, how should a decision maker at a domestic port use detection data from the foreign port to improve the overall detection capability? Second, what are potential limitations to the usefulness of prior inspection data—is it possible that using prior data actually harms decision making at the domestic port? We find that a boundary curve policy (BCP) that takes into account both foreign and domestic inspection data can provide a significant improvement in detection probability. This BCP also proves to be surprisingly robust, even if adversaries are able to infiltrate shipments during transit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 433‐448, 2013 相似文献