Economic Competition and Nuclear Cooperation

The number of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements surged during the “nuclear renaissance” of the past decade. This proliferation is only partially explained by the prevailing approaches that focus on strategic imperatives. To supplement these explanations, this study draws on neoliberal models of economic competition to posit that bilateral agreement negotiations also exhibit conditions of “uncoordinated interdependence” and maneuvering to gain market share. Case evidence suggests the contours of supplier state bids for civilian assistance are determined at least as much by considerations about economic competition as they are by positive strategic goals. In addition, this study identifies several cases of cooperation where there appears to be little or no strategic motive for export agreements. The study concludes that patterns of economic competition and the influence of peers in defined competitive spaces alter material payoffs and impact policies. It also identifies a surprising role for principled restraint in dampening strategic and economic competition in some dyads.     

The Moral Dimension of “Global Zero”

Regrettably, moral arguments are largely absent from the current debate on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, complementing politico-strategic thinking with ethical categories could significantly strengthen the abolitionist call. To fill the gap, this article analyzes the evolution of the nuclear ethics of the Roman Catholic Church and especially its position on nuclear deterrence. If this strategy was granted interim and strictly conditioned moral acceptance during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence is today increasingly considered ineffective, an obstacle to genuine disarmament, and hence morally unjustifiable. In the new security context, the conditions for the Catholic Church's “interim nuclear ethics” have altered, and nuclear disarmament has become a feasible option and an alternative strategy to deterrence.     

North Korea,deterrence, and engagement

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) justifies its nuclear weapon arsenal with the concept of deterrence. It means that it will try to miniaturize and modernize its warheads and missiles. This leads to a first-use doctrine of nuclear weapons. Obama's policy of engagement does not offer a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue as yet. In the context of its policy of critical engagement with the DPRK, the European Union has three key interests: regional peace and stability, denuclearization, and human rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) could be a precedent. The CSCE process was based on three “baskets”: security, economics, and humanitarian. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership is a step in this regard. This article looks at three theoretical approaches: realism, liberal institutionalism, and liberal internationalism. It concludes that a political strategy to create a stable North Korean peninsula has to go beyond nuclear deterrence that is based on the realist notion of balance of power.     

How long until midnight? Intelligence-policy relations and the United States response to the Israeli nuclear program, 1959–1985

Why did the United States fail to stop Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons? Existing research argues that patrons such as the U.S. should have an easy time halting proliferation by militarily and economically vulnerable clients. Nevertheless, Israel acquired nuclear weapons with relatively little American opposition. Utilizing extensive primary source research, we argue that problematic intelligence-policy relations hindered U.S. efforts to arrest Israeli proliferation as (1) policymakers often gave mixed guidance to the intelligence community, resulting in (2) limited information on Israeli efforts that reinforced policy ambiguity. The results carry implications for understanding the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and intelligence-policy relations.     

Defining quantitative criteria for the physical protection system effectiveness of nuclear facilities

The article is devoted to problems of defining quantitative criteria for the physical protection system (PPS) effectiveness of nuclear facilities. The article briefly describes the scheme of the PPS development used in the nuclear industry in Russia, gives a review of existing approaches to defining the minimal acceptable value of the system's effectiveness, and reveals advantages and disadvantages of the approaches. The article describes in detail an approach based on facility categorization by potential losses and a technique of defining the minimal acceptable value of the PPS effectiveness developed on its base.     

War and rumours of war,do improvements in space technologies bring space conflict closer?

Combat in near-Earth orbit is emerging as a more realistic possibility. The argument here is that changes in space technologies combined with a sea change in political rhetoric is bringing the possibility of military conflict in space technologies. This movement reflects a generational shift as the original decisions regarding military conflict in space are now being reassessed by a generation who did not experience World War II or the Cold War. For these, the sanctuary approach to space activities is not as persuasive and new enhanced space technologies bring the possibility of victory or at least survival possible during a conflict in space.     

基于平衡计分卡的武器装备维修绩效评价指标体系构建

武器装备维修是武器装备维修保障的重要内容,加强装备维修绩效评价,建立科学规范的绩效评价指标体系,对深入推进装备维修工作健康发展将发挥积极作用。以平衡计分卡为研究手段,运用"5M1E"分析法,从一个内核和四个维度出发,分析武器装备维修绩效评价的影响因素,据此建立评价指标体系,并应用于装备维修管理实践,为有效提高装备维修保障效益提供有益借鉴。     

MAD,not Marx: Khrushchev and the nuclear revolution

The revival of nuclear strategy in US policy and scholarship has been strengthened by arguments that the ‘nuclear revolution’ – the assumption that thermonuclear bombs and missiles had made major war too dangerous to wage – does not affect international behaviour as much as nuclear revolution advocates claim. This article shows that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev indeed regarded nuclear war as too dangerous to wage, a decision which manifested itself not so much in foreign policy or military doctrine but in his determination to avoid war when the possibility arose. We argue that Khrushchev’s experience provides us with a more useful way to characterise the nuclear revolution and suggest some implications of this argument for contemporary debates about nuclear weaponry.     

应用神经网络评估舰载武器系统作战效能

为评估水面舰艇舰载武器系统作战效能,最大程度地提高舰艇整体作战能力,采用神经网络评估舰载武器系统的作战效能,按照建立BP网络模型、设计模型结构及确定训练样本的步骤,实现神经网络评估模型创建的全过程。该模型把各个评估指标作为输入,通过历史数据的训练确定神经网络输入、输出的对应关系,从而得出系统的效能值。神经网络评估模型可动态地评估舰载武器系统的作战效能,其评估过程确定的各指标项相互关系能很好地指导舰载武器的战术使用。     

炮兵武器毁伤效能的后验计算方法研究

根据试验结果和武器性能对毁伤效能的计算和排序问题,给出了计算炮兵武器毁伤效能的指数法模型和加权平均模型;结合实例计算并排序,使对压制兵器和反坦克兵器的综合毁伤效能有定量的直观认识;进而分析了两种模型的特点;并提出了需要进一步研究的问题。