战略联盟中知识转移影响因素概念模型构建：网络角度的思考

根据知识转移的一般过程,从社会网络视角出发,不同于以往研究中二元维度的分析,从网络结点能力、网络关系和认知、网络结构三个维度提出了影响战略联盟网络组织中知识转移绩效的关键影响因素,并深入分析各个关键因素的细分变量对知识转移绩效的影响作用机理,最后提出战略联盟网络知识转移影响因素的相关假设和概念模型,为下一步对假设的验证做铺垫。     

爱民固边的战略思维论要

爱民固边战略是＂十一五＂时期公安边防部队在建设社会主义和谐社会中的一项重大战略部署。＂十二五＂时期,形势任务更加严峻,必须进一步找准爱民固边是促进边境经济社会发展的新型人民战争的战略定位,完善以战略目的、战略原则、战略力量、战略措施为主要内容的战略架构体系,有效探索＂爱民—固边—发展—固边—利民＂的战略路线图,突出＂维稳主导、服务民生、强基固本、多元联动＂等战略重点,坚持＂并轨发展、标本兼治、无缝对接＂基本战略路径,使爱民固边战略更加系统化、规范化,纵深推进,打造公安边防特有品牌,不断产生更大的政治社会价值。     

战略机遇期公共消防安全热点解析

在重要战略机遇期,消防工作保障和服务经济社会发展的作用更加凸显。在研判重要战略机遇期的消防安全形势任务的基础上,从解决制约消防工作的体制性、机制性和保障性问题入手,提出了加强和改革消防工作的对策措施。     

Reconciling strategic studies … with itself: a common framework for choosing among strategies

Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war,” a second, “context-dependent,” approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a “paradoxical logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.     

Making defense planning meaningful: the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense

Hungary, a former communist state, adapted a Western-style defense planning system during the 1990s and 2000s. Although on the surface the elements of this planning system were similar to the planning programming budgeting system (PPBS) developed by the US Department of Defense, strategic guidance for defense planning has not been properly developed until recently. Thus, albeit PPBS-based defense plans were developed in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense (Hungarian MoD) regularly, they lacked both an expression of clear priorities and strategic focus. This article delineates the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian MoD concentrating on current developments, and introduces the newly elaborated analytical concepts and tools, which helped to create needed strategic guidance in Hungary.     

推进颠覆性技术发展是大国博弈的战略选择

世界新一轮科技革命为颠覆性技术涌现创造了新的机遇,推进颠覆性技术发展已成为大国博弈的战略选择。文章简要分析了主要国家发展颠覆性技术的做法,从历史视角回顾了颠覆性技术发展对人类战争形态演变的历程,系统阐述新一轮科技革命为颠覆性技术发展创造的新机遇及其发展对未来战争形态的影响,提出加快推进我国颠覆性技术发展的几点建议。     

From the sea to outer space: The command of space as the foundation of spacepower theory

Colin Gray once lamented the absence of a ‘Mahan for the final frontier’ and spacepower theory in strategic studies. This article proposes the command of space as the fundamental concept of spacepower theory, and that Mahan himself has much to offer in the endeavour of spacepower theory-making than has hitherto been realised. The theory is advanced by tempering versions of the ‘command of space’, stressing its educational intent, and explaining the nuanced sub-concepts of space control and denial through understanding some precedents set by seapower theory. In the process, aspects of Mahanian and Corbettian seapower theory are unified.     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.     

THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR LEARNING

This article seeks to elucidate the concept of nuclear learning. It explores both the “nuclear” and the “learning” aspects of the concept. On the nuclear side, it distinguishes between learning basic facts about nuclear arms and drawing inferences about the larger implications of those facts. On the learning side, it discusses three issues: whether to use the term in a normative or value-neutral manner; the difference between learning that leads to a change in means versus learning that leads to a re-evaluation of ends; and whether learning only takes place at the level of individuals or whether there can also be learning by collective entities. The article argues there is no universal best answer to these questions and that the particular concept of learning that should be employed depends on the goals of the analyst. If the goal is to reduce the chances of nuclear war, however, one type of learning that will be important to consider is whether there is shared, cross-national learning.