引导学生积极参与数学课堂学习的探索与实践

树立新理念,创建和谐学习情境,唤醒学生的主体意识,让学生在积极的思维和情感活动中主动地参与教学过程就越来越显现出其重要性了,这也是新课程改革给我们提出的最基本的要求。本文从兴趣引路,激发学生主动参与的积极性;营造民主和谐的氛围,创造学生主动参与的环境;开展小组合作学习,构建学生主动参与的平台;体验成功的愉悦,培养学生的创新能力;正确运用评价,树立学生主动参与的信心等五个方面,阐述了在数学课堂教学中如何让学生主动参与学习。     

防空C4ISR系统指挥引导成功率的一种算法

基于防空C4ISR系统试验和评估,给出了一种指挥引导成功率的计算方法.依据指挥引导高度误差的不同要求,分别定义了二维指挥引导成功区和三维指挥引导成功区.通过对指挥引导散布现象的分析,说明了指挥引导点的分布特性,并且应用概率论和数理统计理论给出了指挥引导成功率的计算方法.通过仿真计算,证明了该算法的正确性和实用性.     

浅析武警部队心理管理的基本途径

部队心理管理针对被管理者的心理活动规律，从激发被管理者的心理潜力入手，充分调动他们的主观能动性，实现部队的和谐管理。本文从心理管理的管理起点、建设重点、主要突破口、实现目标四个方面加以分析和阐述，试图对武警部队心理管理的本质和具体做法作以有益探索。     

潜艇自航式诱饵组合使用方法

潜艇自航式诱饵组合使用方法的优劣主要评判依据是使用的方法最终使得潜艇对抗鱼雷成功的概率,对抗时间和诱骗距离是影响对抗成功概率的两个重要因素,它们又主要围绕发射时机、初始航向以及潜艇机动等几个问题展开。通过分析各个诱饵的作战使命,在一定态势下,根据诱饵的性能、鱼雷报警距离及舷角等各方面因素,建立大小口径声诱饵协同作战的弹道模型,并由此得到了诱饵发射时机、初始航向等参数。     

《孙子兵法》中的“利害观”

兵家的辩证法是中国古代哲学的重要源头之一。在孙子提出的一系列对立统一的矛盾范畴中,尤以对利害关系的把握最为精彩,这是孙子辩证法的精髓。“利害观”是孙子解剖战争问题的一把利器,把握住了利害关系的要义,就不难理解“慎战”“不战”“全胜”等核心观念。同时,它也是人们在面临人生道路上各种得失选择时的方法指南。     

舰船航渡过程中的松弛时间与航渡策略问题

针对舰船特点和任务要求,提出了舰船航渡中的松弛时间问题。在对问题分析的基础上,给出了松弛时间的定义并对其进行了建模,讨论了航渡失败的判断准则,给出了松弛时间的上下限以及航渡中实际的松弛时间的计算方法,并采用仿真的方法进行了典型航渡过程的松弛时间和成功概率的计算。在大量计算的基础上,初步探讨了航渡成功概率与各类航渡参数之间的关系,并对舰船最优航渡策略问题进行了初步分析,最后对于优化目标、计算初值、结果的表达方式等提出了一个可行的解决方案。     

Autocracies and Economic Sanctions: The Divergent Impact of Authoritarian Regime Type on Sanctions Success

There is some consensus in the literature that economic sanctions targeting authoritarian regimes are less effective than those against democratic regimes. This line of research, however, assumes that autocratic regimes are monolithic and that they have similar capacities to resist foreign pressure. This study argues that the success rate of sanctions against dictatorships is contingent on institutional differences across different types of autocracies. I develop a theoretical model indicating that single-party and military regimes are less likely to concede to foreign pressure compared to democracies. This is because they effectively use various repressive tactics and positive inducements to endure the costs of the coercion. Sanctions against personalist regimes, on the other hand, are likely to be as effective as sanctions directed at democracies. Personalist regimes might be inclined to acquiesce to foreign pressure due to their lack of strong institutional capacity to weather the costs of the sanctions. Results from the selection-corrected models show that sanctions against military or single-party regimes are less likely to induce concessions relative to democratic target regimes. The findings also indicate that there is no significant difference in the success rate of sanctions against personalist regimes and democratic governments.     

Right Intention and the Ends of War

The jus ad bellum criterion of right intention (CRI) is a central guiding principle of just war theory. It asserts that a country’s resort to war is just only if that country resorts to war for the right reasons. However, there is significant confusion, and little consensus, about how to specify the CRI. We seek to clear up this confusion by evaluating several distinct ways of understanding the criterion. On one understanding, a state’s resort to war is just only if it plans to adhere to the principles of just war while achieving its just cause. We argue that the first understanding makes the CRI superfluous, because it can be subsumed under the probability of success criterion. On a second understanding, a resort to war is just only if a state’s motives, which explain its resort to war, are of the right kind. We argue that this second understanding of the CRI makes it a significant further obstacle to justifying war. However, this second understanding faces a possible infinite regress problem, which, left unresolved, leaves us without a plausible interpretation of the CRI. This constitutes a significant and novel reason for leaving the CRI out of the international law of armed conflict (LOAC).