Damage functions and estimates of fratricide and collateral damage

There are multiple damage functions in the literature to estimate the probability that a single weapon detonation destroys a point target. This paper addresses differences in the tails of four of the more popular damage functions. These four cover the asymptotic tail behaviors of all monotonically decreasing damage functions with well‐behaved hazard functions. The differences in estimates of probability of kill are quite dramatic for large aim‐point offsets. This is particularly important when balancing the number of threats that can be engaged with the chances of fratricide and collateral damage. In general, analysts substituting one damage function for another may badly estimate kill probabilities in offset‐aiming, which could result in poor doctrine. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 306–321, 2003.     

Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game‐theoretic model

Consider a distributed system where many gatekeepers share a single server. Customers arrive at each gatekeeper according to independent Poisson processes with different rates. Upon arrival of a new customer, the gatekeeper has to decide whether to admit the customer by sending it to the server, or to block it. Blocking costs nothing. The gatekeeper receives a reward after a customer completes the service, and incurs a cost if an admitted customer finds a busy server and therefore has to leave the system. Assuming an exponential service distribution, we formulate the problem as an n‐person non‐zero‐sum game in which each gatekeeper is interested in maximizing its own long‐run average reward. The key result is that each gatekeeper's optimal policy is that of a threshold type regardless what other gatekeepers do. We then derive Nash equilibria and discuss interesting insights. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 702–718, 2003.     

装备综合保障基础理论及技术的若干问题

从装备综合保障的定义分析入手,给出了更为合理的装备综合保障的定义,分析了装备综合保障定义的内涵,以及与装备综合保障相关的概念定义。阐述了美军装备综合保障的发展历程、现状,以及我国装备综合保障发展历程、现状和存在的主要问题。详细研究了装备综合保障的基本问题,提出了装备综合保障的基础理论框架、参数体系与模型体系框架、技术体系框架、基础技术体系框架、支撑技术体系与演示验证体系框架、应用技术体系框架。给出了加强装备综合保障基础理论与技术研究的有关建议。     

装备保障信息化研究初探

装备保障信息化是我军装备保障工作的发展方向,但目前尚无系统理论的指引,现借鉴外军经验,结合从事我军现阶段装备保障信息化工作的体会,较系统地对装备保障信息化的概念、外延、内涵、目标和建设原则与应优先考虑的问题等,作出了探索性地阐述,以期推动我军装备保障信息化理论的形成与发展.     

模糊多目标群决策的装备采办问题研究

对模糊多目标群决策的装备采办问题,根据模糊数学理论和多目标决策理论方法,综合现有各种方法的优点,给出了无约束条件下模糊多目标群决策的装备采办问题的一般解法,并通过实例说明了该方法的有效性及通用性。     

谈谈政治理论课的基地教学

当前,军队院校的政治理论课教学,以教员课堂讲授为主,重课堂理论教学、轻社会实践锻炼的现象比较严重。这种传统的教学模式不利于创新型人才培养和教育转型的需要。政治理论课必须向基地教学延伸。     

Forces of heresy versus forces of conservation: making sense of Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan’s and the Taleban’s positions in the Afghan insurgency

Ethnicity and ideology are frequently used to determine whether an armed group is hostile or friendly vis-à-vis the state. By contrast, I argue that the social structure of insurgent movements holds more explanatory power for their respective positions than ethnicity or ideology. To illustrate this, I apply Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of a contest between forces of ‘conservation’ and forces of ‘heresy’ to the current Afghanistan war. I demonstrate that the social structure of the Taleban renders them prone to ‘heresy’, while the formerly second biggest insurgent group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s party, has rather been an impeded force of ‘conservation.’