关于颠覆性技术发展的理性认知

随着美国揭开第三次\"抵消战略\"重点发展对象的面纱,研发\"颠覆性技术\"已成为主要军事大国获得技术优势的手段。当前世界新一轮科技革命、产业革命、军事革命交织并行,给颠覆性技术提供了难得的良好机遇。但当我们看见颠覆性技术引领时代新型武器装备潮流发展的同时,也应理性看待其背后潜藏的风险。通过概述总结颠覆性技术研究现状,分析其推动的科技内生性变革,从本质上对其进行理性认知。研究表明,发展颠覆性技术必须积极作为,谨慎对待。     

美军电子信息装备系统集成技术评析

信息综合集成技术已成为电子信息装备研发的重要手段。叙述了美军最新电子信息装备综合集成技术的发展目标、发展重心和发展措施;介绍了美军信息装备综合集成技术发展策略和方法;分析了其主要功能及技术特性;并对美军电子信息装备的发展现状、技术水准和存在的问题给予了较为客观的评价。     

基于变异离散粒子群的协同空战攻击决策算法

为了提高智能协同空战攻击决策算法性能,将变异策略引入到DPSO(Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization)协同空战攻击决策算法中,提出了一种新的基于变异离散粒子群(Mutation Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization,MDPSO)的协同空战攻击决策算法。基于典型空战想定背景,仿真验证了算法的有效性。采用对比实验方法,基于准确性、可靠性和快速性等关键性能指标,分析比较了基于MDPSO协同空战攻击决策算法与多种智能决策算法,验证了基于MDPSO的协同空战攻击决策算法有着较好的综合性能。     

Slow failure: Understanding America’s quagmire in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

The United States government has no organised way of thinking about war termination other than seeking decisive military victory. This implicit assumption is inducing three major errors. First, the United States tends to select military-centric strategies that have low probabilities of success. Second, the United States is slow to modify losing or ineffective strategies due to cognitive obstacles, internal frictions, and patron-client challenges with the host nation government. Finally, as the U.S. government tires of the war and elects to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries prevent successful transitions (building the host nation to win on its own) or negotiations.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.