新的自适应渐消扩展卡尔曼滤波在GPS定位中的应用

当实际数据出现突变时,基于最小二乘、扩展卡尔曼滤波的GPS定位解算存在定位结果精度低和稳定性差的问题。提出一种自适应渐消扩展卡尔曼滤波算法,通过自适应渐消迭代系统噪声协方差,来实现抑制数据突变影响。试验结果表明:该算法相比最小二乘、扩展卡尔曼滤波,其定位精度有所提高;相比传统渐消扩展卡尔曼滤波,其收敛速度、稳定性有所提高。     

不同海拔地区发射药安定性试验数据差异分析

按照同一试验方法，同一发射药分别在高原地区和内陆地区两地进行安定性试验对比。结果表明：同海拔高差测得的CO2体积分数差别为36％左右。因此，在对不同海拔地区发射药安定性试验数据进行处理时，需考虑气压因素影响，进行气压校正。     

基于降低运算复杂度的子空间跟踪算法稳健性分析

FDPM和FOOJA是目前两种最为有效的适用于主、次子空间跟踪的方法,属于低复杂度算法。进一步降低算法运算复杂度,对保证算法的实时性具有非常重要的意义。以降低算法运算复杂度为背景,通过对FDPM、FOOJA算法的分析,指出存在两种简化运算量的FDPM1stcol、FOOJA1stcol方法。在有限精度运算条件下,对四种方法的稳定性、数值鲁棒性进行了深入分析和讨论。通过实验仿真,对分析的结论进行了验证。     

稳定特征选择的多目标蚁群优化

为了提高进化算法特征选择稳定性,提出一种面向稳定特征选择的多目标蚁群优化方法。通过抽样策略集成三种特征排序法的输出作为多目标蚁群优化的稳定性指导信息,聚合特征的费舍尔分值和最大信息系数值作为多目标蚁群优化的启发式信息,以分类正确率和扩展昆彻瓦指标值作为两个优化目标,兼顾算法的分类性能与特征选择稳定性。在四个标准数据集上进行对比实验,结果表明,所提方法能够在分类性能与稳定性方面达到较好的平衡。     

带挠性附件双自旋卫星的 Liapunov 稳定准则

本文研究了带挠性附件双自旋卫星的姿态稳定性问题。假定挠性双自旋卫星由无内部活动部件的半刚性平台、半刚性转子以及固连于平台的挠性附件构成,选择姿态角和模态坐标表示的相对能量函数为Liapunov 函数,建立了挠性双自旋卫星姿态稳定性判据。     

系统仿真中的模型校核问题

分析了由模型到仿真程序的问题的基本原因,指出了模型校核的必要性。对模型校核中的稳定性问题、系统状态不连贯问题和代数环问题进行了阐述和分析。针对一个二阶线性连续系统模型的离散化,通过模型校核,发现了隐含其中的稳定性问题,进而指出了相关稳定性理论在应用上的局限性,给出了解决此稳定性问题的方法,并最终通过模型校核,确认了该解决方法的有效,从而保证了对该二阶连续系统的精确的离散化。     

EDITOR'S NOTE

This article offers a survey of risks that might arise for strategic stability (defined as a situation with a low probability of major-power war) with the reduction of US and Russian nuclear arsenals to “low numbers” (defined as 1,000 or fewer nuclear weapons on each side). These risks might include US anti-cities targeting strategies that are harmful to the credibility of extended deterrence; renewed European anxiety about a US-Russian condominium; greater vulnerability to Russian noncompliance with agreed obligations; incentives to adopt destabilizing “launch-on-warning” strategies; a potential stimulus to nuclear proliferation; perceptions of a US disengagement from extended deterrence; increased likelihood of non-nuclear arms competitions and conflicts; and controversial pressures on the UK and French nuclear forces. Observers in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states who consider such risks significant have cited four possible measures that might help to contain them: sustained basing of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe; maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture; high-readiness means to reconstitute US nuclear forces; and enhanced US and allied non-nuclear military capabilities. These concrete measures might complement the consultations with the NATO allies that the United States would in all likelihood seek with respect to such important adjustments in its deterrence and defense posture.     

US Advanced Conventional Systems and Conventional Prompt Global Strike Ambitions:

ABSTRACT

The dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions.     

At war with social theory: Instrumental and communicative action in US military doctrine during the War on Terror

As US counterinsurgency campaigns draw to a close, doctrine for asymmetric warfare written during the War on Terror has come under heavy criticism. While many have argued that this shift to ‘winning hearts and minds’ is evidence that the United States is taking humanitarianism and nation-building seriously, others argue that a wide gap exists between US counterinsurgency doctrine and the protection of civilians afflicted by conflict. In this article, I show that the latter is true by comparing theories of instrumental and communicative action to US doctrine for operational design, stability operations, and counterinsurgency. I argue that these texts treat the people as an object to be manipulated for the achievement of pre-determined self-interested strategic goals rather than members of a community that jointly designs operations to fulfill shared objectives. However, US doctrine does contain communicative elements that, if prioritized, would better support humanitarian and state-building objectives otherwise subordinated in the War on Terror.