United Nations rapid reaction mechanisms: Toward a global force on standby?

This article analyses the main challenges and future prospects of creating United Nations (UN) rapid reaction mechanisms, particularly in the light of past attempts and current discussions about a “UN Vanguard Force” in the wake of the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations report. The article reviews major initiatives (in particular lessons from the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations) and assesses the main achievements, failures, and challenges related to past UN-led rapid reaction mechanisms. In line with the overall aim of this special forum, the article highlights the future potentials and institutional, operational, financial, and political challenges that need to be overcome in order to design and create a pragmatic and effective rapid reaction tool at the disposal of the UN.     

Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

2017年上半年美国对外军贸概况

美国长期以来大量对外国进行武器出口,一方面获取巨额利润,另一方面借此影响相关地区的形势.2017年上半年,伴随着美国政府对外政策的调整,美国对外军事贸易也出现了一些变化,在对亚太地区、中东地区、欧洲地区和其他潜在热点地区的武器出口方面有着不同的表现.     

美国危机管理对我国的启示

美国是世界上危机处理经验十分丰富的国家,我国应当借鉴美国的危机管理机构、管理机制和管理经验,建立一套适应我国国情的、行之有效的危机管理机制。     

从抗日民族统一战线的建立看中国共产党的中流砥柱作用

抗日战争是中华民族进行的一次伟大的民族解放战争。在这场为人类文明而战、为中华民族生存而战的残酷较量中,中国共产党及其领导的人民武装逐步成长为抗日民族统一战线的核心力量,成为中华民族团结抗战中坚不可摧的中流砥柱。     

吴起战争观浅议

吴起是战国时期伟大的军事家,他在继承前人兵学理论、总结当时战争经验的基础上,系统地论述了其战争观念,并形成了许多新的见解。其战争观丰富了中国古代的兵学理论,在中国兵学发展史上具有重大的意义。     

Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.     

“Government contracting options: A model and application“∗

This paper models and simulates a government‐contractor principal‐agent weapon system repair model. Insights are derived as to how government repair contracts should be constructed so as to induce optimal contractor behavior. The paper's general conclusion is that the best contracting approach combines a lump‐sum payment that does not vary with the number of units repaired, expensive item cost‐sharing, and a contractor‐provided availability guarantee. Provided there is intercontractor competition, this type of contract performs well even if the government is poorly informed about weapon system break patterns or repair costs.     

PART I: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF “THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”

Several years ago, Ward Wilson presented in this journal a wide-ranging challenge to what every generation of national security scholars and practitioners since the end of World War II has been taught about nuclear weapons. He asserted that nuclear deterrence amounts to far less than its proponents have claimed and provocatively suggested that nuclear deterrence is a myth. Relying upon both empirical and theoretical objections to nuclear deterrence, he concluded that its failures were clear-cut and indisputable, whereas its successes were speculative. Yet in spite of a flourishing trade in scholarly articles, think tank reports, blog posts, and opinion pieces concerning nuclear deterrence, nobody—including nuclear weapons scholars—has ventured more than a limited critique of Wilson's essay. There are, however, serious shortcomings in Wilson's arguments—deficiencies that make his essay an unpersuasive brief against nuclear deterrence. Wilson's thesis could be correct. His arguments, however, are unlikely to persuade any skeptical members of Congress, upon whom future progress in arms control depends, to reconsider the value they attach to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.

     

KICKING THE HORNETS’ NEST

This article applies the concept of nuclear ambivalence to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear ambivalence differs from other approaches to understanding nuclear proliferation in that it focuses on the deeply misunderstood relationship between the two potential uses of nuclear power: energy and weapons. According to this theory, the civilian applications of nuclear technology cannot be separated from the potential military applications and vice versa. Ambivalence, therefore, extends into the realm of states’ nuclear intentions, making it impossible to know with certainty what a potential proliferator's “true” intentions are. This article will demonstrate that the concept of nuclear ambivalence applies in the case of Iran, suggesting that current international nonproliferation efforts run the risk of encouraging rather than discouraging Iranian weaponization. The final section outlines recommendations for policy makers to reverse this counterproductive nonproliferation approach.