基于结构加权的海面编队预定目标选择方法

海面目标运动和编队阵型的约束特性,使得通过对装订阵型和末制导探测阵型进行点集匹配来选择预定目标成为一种有效途径。但当编队目标释放干扰时,会引起阵型结构发生局部变化,导致目标选择性能恶化。本文基于反舰导弹目标选择需求,分析了传感器导航和探测误差、装订信息误差、编队目标运动和释放干扰等因素所引起的位置点集变形,通过利用阵型中未污染的结构信息,提出了基于几何散列法和结构加权平均Hausdorff距离的编队预定目标选择方法。理论分析和实验结果表明,该方法不受传感器导航误差和编队目标整体运动的影响,在编队存在冲淡干扰时能有效提高目标选择能力。     

US technological collaboration for nonproliferation: key evidence from the Cold War

ABSTRACT

Although the existing international-relations scholarship argues that technological assistance in the nuclear domain increases the probability of nuclear proliferation, the historical account indicates otherwise. Congressional legislation for nonproliferation, economic sanctions, and poor state capacity—specifically, inept managerial capabilities of the recipient state—explain merely part of the puzzle, but overlook the role of positive inducements offered to impede nuclear proliferation. Historical evidence shows that the United States often provided technological assistance with the deliberate intent to inhibit proliferation. In other words, Washington employed its technological leverage to attain nonproliferation goals. American technological preponderance since the end of World War II made such an approach feasible. This study examines key Cold War cases—Israel/Egypt, India, and West Germany—where the United States offered technological assistance with the deliberate intent to stall nuclear proliferation, thereby underscoring the role of assistance for inhibitive ends.     

Is strategic studies narrow? Critical security and the misunderstood scope of strategy

Critical security advocates commonly portray strategic studies as crippled by its narrow focus on Cold War-era military issues, as state-centric and as Western-centric. I argue that this conception of the scope of strategy is flawed and I offer a comprehensive rebuttal by working out the logic of the theories advanced by Carl von Clausewitz and Thomas Schelling. The proponents of critical security overlook the striking expansion of strategy during the Cold War, its longstanding inclusion of competing political actors not just states, as well as its capacity to put Western and non-Western actors in a common analytic frame. By breaking out of the conceptual jails in which strategy has been incarcerated, I seek to reconnect International Relations to strategic thought from which it has become increasingly estranged.     

Deterring ‘Able Archer’: Comments Arising from Adamsky’s ‘Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice’

This is a short commentary on Dmitry Adamsky’s recent article ‘The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice’. First, it teases out nuances in the relationship between deterrence and strategy and considers deterrence to be both a strategy and an effect. Second, it explores the culminating point of deterrence in theory and considers it untenable, as it does not conform to the logic of, or to any logic analogous to, Clausewitz’s culminating point of victory. Deterrence logically cannot culminate. Moreover, any culminating point of deterrence would ignore why the potential deteree should perceive the actions of his deterrer in such a way as to render strengthened strategies of deterrence counterproductive. It is the deteree who is the only strategic actor to determine whether the deterrer is actually practising a successful strategy of deterrence or not.     

SOUTH AFRICA'S ANTI-TERROR LAW

This article argues that whereas the waves of democratization which enveloped the continent in the early 1990s following the collapse of Eastern European one-party socialism genera ted expectations of a ‘new dawn’ for ‘good governance’ and sustainable human development on the continent, one wave after another appears to have suffered serious setbacks. Indeed, a decade later, some of the most articulate pro-democracy leaders, who came into office on the crest of the democratic waves of the 1990s have sought to manipulate their countries' constitutions in order to perpetuate their presidential tenure. Such undemocratic behaviour will only fuel speculation in the industrialized world that the New Partnership for Africa's Development is just another decorative blue-print drawn up by beleaguered African despots in order to obtain new resource inflows at a time the international community under the hegemonic leadership of the Uni ted States will be wholly preoccupied with rebuilding post-Saddam Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian roadmap.     

The only choice is both choices: balancing assurance and coercion in nonproliferation-focused alliance-management strategies

ABSTRACT

Conventional theories of alliance management often overemphasize the utility of either assurance or coercion in preventing allied nuclear proliferation. Historical analysis reveals that prioritizing either of these two tactics to the exclusion of the other is inadvisable. A strategy that focuses solely on security guarantees or coercive threats is likely to encourage an allied state to pursue a hedging strategy, in which the client state continues to clandestinely develop its own nuclear capabilities while remaining underneath its patron’s defensive “umbrella.” This article introduces a new framework for understanding the effectiveness of nonproliferation-focused alliance-management strategies. By exploring the cases of West Germany and South Korea, the article concludes that the best way to prevent allies from pursuing nuclear weapons is to combine assurance with coercion. This establishes an incentive–punishment relationship that limits an ally’s motivation to develop nuclear weapons. These conclusions have particular salience today, as conversations over nuclear-weapons development have become increasingly normalized in Germany and particularly in South Korea. The United States’s capacity to influence its allies’ nuclear behavior is currently being eroded through the degradation of both patron credibility and client dependence, weakening the long-term viability of the global nonproliferation regime.     

基于跑道平面结构化线特征的固定翼无人机视觉导航算法

针对固定翼无人机在着陆阶段的位姿估计的问题，提出了一种基于跑道平面结构化线特征的无人机视觉导航方法。结构化线特征包括跑道平面上的跑道边缘及共面的垂直于跑道边缘的单条合作标志线。利用单台固连在无人机上的前视相机对跑道区域进行成像，自动提取结构化线特征。在无人机降落前期利用完整的结构化线特征配置解算出无人机的六自由度位姿参数(偏航角、俯仰角、滚转角、纵向位置、横向位置、高度)，并在无人机降落到较低高度时，利用退化的结构化线特征(跑道边缘)解算出无人机的关键位姿参数(偏航角、俯仰角、横向位置、高度)。三维实景仿真实验证明，在距离机场距离为200m处，无人机的距离参数精度为<0.5m，角度参数精度为<0.1°。本文的方法充分考虑到无人机自主着陆过程中的成像特点，具有自动化程度高、工程实用性好的优点。     

复合假设下导弹可靠性指标Bayes检验方法

在用Bayes方法对海防战术导弹可靠性指标进行假设检验时,原假设和对立假设均采用简单假设的形式,而此种方法可能导致使用方Bayes风险增大。从理论上阐述了简单假设Bayes检验方法可能导致使用方Bayes风险增大的原因,同时给出了用于取代简单假设的复合假设Bayes检验方法,并用实例证明了它比简单假设Bayes检验方法科学、合理。     

From control to parasitism

This article sets out to investigate the current paradoxical roles of border control agencies in order to contribute to the theoretical debate on border porosity and related security issues in West Africa. The colonial demarcation of African borders accounts for their porous nature initially, as borderland populations challenged the unjust scission of their cultural, economic, geographical and geopolitical spaces. However, new forms of porosity also evolved over time, masterminded by new actors. Drawing on the Ghana–Togo border case, and through interviews, observation and documentary analysis, this article argues that border control agencies are partly responsible for the current border porosity and attendant security problems as their jurisdiction has shifted to a multi-layered border parasitism. The article is not, however, an attack on border law enforcement agencies; rather it attempts to explore their roles in shielding the region, already exposed to terrorism and piracy, from further security threats.     

基于粒子群优化的点云场景拼接算法

多视点三维点点云场景拼接是解决激光三维主动成像目标自遮挡或被遮挡情况下目标数据不完全问题的一种有效方法,它将直接影响到后续的目标检测与识别处理。本文提出了一种基于粒子群优化（PSO）的点云拼接算法,该方法通过投影分布熵对待拼接场景姿态进行估计,由此获取场景拼接的初值,然后利用PSO实现多视点场景的精确拼接。仿真实验结果表明,本文方法是一种有效可行的方法。