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Andrej Yu Garnaev 《海军后勤学研究》1994,41(2):287-293
Baston and Bostock formulated a zero-sum game of exhaustion modeling the problem of Customs trying to stop a Smuggler attempting to ship a cargo of perishable contraband across a strait, when Customs has n speedboats for patrolling. Thomas and Nisgav solved this problem for one speedboat. Baston and Bostock investigated it for two speedboats. This article addresses the solution of the three-boat variant of the Customs and Smuggler game. © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 相似文献
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Andrej Y U. Garnaev 《海军后勤学研究》1993,40(5):745-753
The article considers a two-person zero-sum game in which the movement of the players is constrained to integer points …, −1, 0, 1, … of a line L. Initially the searcher (hider) is at point x = 0 (x = d, d > 0). The searcher and the hider perform simple motion on L with maximum speeds w and u, respectively, where w > u > 0. Each of the players knows the other's initial position but not the other's subsequent positions. The searcher has a bomb which he can drop at any time during his search. Between the dropping of the bomb and the bomb exploding there is a T time lag. If the bomb explodes at point i and the hider is at point i − 1, or i, or i + 1, then the destruction probability is equal to P, or 1, or P, respectively, where 0 < P < 1. d, w, u, and T are integer constants. The searcher can drop the bomb at integer moments of time t = 0, 1, … . The aim of the searcher is to maximize the probability of the destruction of the hider. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 相似文献
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Andrej Krickovic 《Contemporary Security Policy》2016,37(2):175-199
Russia and NATO have failed to establish binding institutional arrangements and they are now locked in increasingly dangerous security competition. A closer look at two issue areas where their efforts at binding have failed—NATO enlargement and missile defence—shows that Russia and NATO find themselves facing a ‘catch 22’. They need binding arrangements to overcome the relative gains problems that inhibit security cooperation, yet their concerns about relative gains prevent them from establishing these arrangements in the first place. To overcome this dilemma, NATO and Russia have to craft binding arrangements that seriously address each side’s concerns about relative gains. Less formal and institutionalized binding arrangements may better serve this goal. Such arrangements will not put an immediate end to security competition, but they will help them build a higher level of trust, allowing them to gradually develop deeper and more comprehensive binding arrangements. 相似文献
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