Chains,networks and shifting paradigms: the UK defence industry supply system

Industrial supply chains have emerged as the focus of much economic and business research over the previous decade and defence is no exception. This paper reviews contributions made to the body of knowledge in this field with particular attention given to primary research undertaken on the UK defence industrial supply system. In doing so, the author assesses the quantity and quality of knowledge available to researchers, analysts and policy makers. There have been a number of valuable contributions to the literature and this paper reveals a subject that is extremely complicated, dynamic and yet under‐researched. It is suggested that it may well be this complexity and dynamism, coupled with difficulty in accessing data, that has inhibited research development in this field. Defence industry supply systems are repeatedly referred to as ‘chains’; however, primary research consistently suggests this is a misnomer – the author concludes that future analysis of the UK defence sector must embrace directly the economics of networks if understanding of the same is to progress and industrial ‘invisibility’ is to be avoided.     

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

The UN relies on regional organisations to carry out peacekeeping activities and has very good reasons for doing so: resource constraints and relevant political influence. In Africa, however, the UN Security Council seems unwilling to take decisive action when faced with complex emergencies and leaves the burden to the OAU which has its own problems. The UN charter does allow regional organisations to take enforcement action even without prior armed attack. The OAU charter converges with that of the UN in ways that should make cooperation easier than it has been. Despite the rhetoric, the UN Security Council has undertaken very little visible action in Africa when it is most needed. A lack of significant African representation in the Council is perhaps a cause. The Council will improve its global authority if it undertakes reforms that reduce the power of the US and the UK over its decisions.     

A Survey of Lebanese Shi'i attitudes towards Hezbollah

The Taliban has recently re-emerged on the Afghan scene with vengeance. Five years after being defeated in Afghanistan by a US coalition, the resurgent Taliban, backed by al-Qaeda, are mounting an increasingly virulent insurgency, especially in the east and south, near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The Taliban now represents a significant challenge to the survival of President Hamid Karzai's government. This article assesses the narrative strategy the Taliban has employed to garner support with the Afghan people. Specifically, this paper assesses the narratives of Taliban shabnamah, commonly referred to as ‘night letters’ in an effort unravel what the Taliban represents.     

TERRORISM AND AFRICA

This article first looks at the relationship between international terrorism and terrorism in Africa. Since sub-state terrorism is already endemic to Africa, the future threat potential in the continent lies in a complex mixture of sub-national and international terrorism. Africa may come to play a central role in international terrorism. The motivation, means and targets all exist and these opportunities will not go unheeded for much longer. Africa presents both a facilitating environment and a target-rich environment for terrorists that seek to attack the United States, and indeed the global system. The article concludes with some remarks on counter-strategies.     

AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW

As an institution of state, the military in Lesotho was marred by controversy and steeped in intrigue from the start. For much of the post-colonial period the military was used as a politicised and partisan tool, which even seized power and governed in its own name. The current problem, as this brief history aims to demonstrate, is essentially two-pronged. It involves putting in place structures, mechanisms and philosophies designed to promote the military's acceptance of civil supremacy. The process should also include alterations to political society's perception of the military as a tool to be used in partisan games that almost always have calamitous outcomes. Lesotho's political development is classified in this article into four broad phases and the type of civil-military relations is assessed under each phase. The reasons for the military coup in 1986 are analysed, the emergence of a democratic order and the challenges facing this order are highlighted, and the reform measures that have thus far been instituted are evaluated. The essay concludes with a few projections into the future course of events.     

Orde Wingate, ‘Guerrilla’ Warfare and Long-range Penetration, 1940–44

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long-range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943–44. A review of Wingate's own official writings on this subject reveals that long-range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situations regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins' doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.     

Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in Counterinsurgency Campaigning1

This paper argues on the basis of a series of historical examples that include the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaya and Northern Ireland, that there is no perfect counterinsurgency model and that each counterinsurgency campaign is different. Counterinsurgents need to have a series of basic tenets to wage successful war against guerrillas and insurgents. These include: a clear political policy from the government under insurgent attack, a strategy to keep the population safe, successful intelligence gathering, a recognition that successful counterinsurgency is manpower intensive and a high priority on the destruction of the insurgent infrastructure. This paper urges that in period of peacetime it is essential that militaries develop a Standing Counterinsurgency Concepts Unit that can conceptualise past and present insurgent patterns and build this into military and strategic planning.     

QUANTIFYING GREED AND GRIEVANCE IN CIVIL WAR: THE AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

‘Greed’ vs. ‘grievance’ is weighed using a generally applicable methodology as motivations in the American War of Independence. Greed is quantified as the expected economic benefit of Independence – escaping colonial trade burdens and expected increased economic growth rates. Grievance is measured as willingness to pay to escape perceived political burdens. Quantification of the relative contributions is made possible by using estimates of expected war-costs. To the extent that the economic burden was insufficient to explain the War, the residual is ascribed to the grievance motivation. Both motives are shown to have contributed to the War, but grievance dominates.