NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The latest general elections in Mozambique, in December 2004, saw the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) emerging as a clear victor—its third national election victory since the start of the multiparty system. FRELIMO has now governed Mozambique continuously since independence in 1975. Its candidate, Armando Guebuza, has become Mozambique's third president, following Samora Machel (who died in 1986 while in office) and the current president, Joaquim Chissano, who stood down in February 2005.

For Mozambique's political elite, whose image was greatly damaged by corruption scandals and the related murder of well-known journalist Carlos Cardoso in 2000, challenging tasks lie ahead. Part of the challenge entails bringing people back into formal politics, as the December 2004 elections showed a poor turnout. Even more worrying, when one considers the historical distrust between the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and FRELIMO, was the almost complete lack of political voices other than these two main contenders. RENAMO emerged with 27 fewer parliamentary seats than it had held before the election, and no other party made it into parliament. FRELIMO will therefore meet little opposition in the next five years. But will the change of presidency in Mozambique offer opportunities for a fresh approach to the country's problems?     

ECOSOCC

Provision for an Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) among the new organs of the African Union (AU) offers to bridge the distance between African governments and their peoples. Designed and implemented correctly, the Council could be an influential forum for the diverse voices of civil society. Greater popular involvement in government is a prerequisite for stability on the continent—particularly since governance is often weak, corruption endemic and democracy in a number of countries little more than a façade.

The essay considers comparative institutions at national, regional and international levels as examples of how ECOSOCC could work. We argue that its structure will have to take account of the varying strengths and weaknesses of social and economic actors in different parts of Africa, and between those from AU countries and other regions of the world. Ultimately, success depends on whether African civil society is ready and able to take the lead in this initiative. The paper concludes with a number of recommendations.     

THE RIGHT INTERVENTION

Sovereignty has often been used to protect leaders at the expense of citizens. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) allows for intervention without the consent of the target state in a way that the OAU system of complete consensus never did. Ensuring that intervention is effective is as important as the decision of when and why to intervene. Sanctions, criminal prosecutions and military interventions are the broad options available to the AU. To be effective, though, the AU will need to agree on how intervention will be authorised and on mechanisms for its implementation. While the AU may have limited resources, not all action is costly. If African leaders speak out against human rights violations whenever they occur and combine this with a small, well-trained regional force, the benefits will far outweigh the costs.     

AMENDMENT TO THE AFRICAN UNION'S RIGHT TO INTERVENE

Heads of State and Government passed the first amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union within seven months of the launch of the organization. This article provides a legal analysis of the broadening of Article 4(h) of the Act, the right of intervention, to prevent a “serious threat to legitimate order”. It argues that this clause is inconsistent with the other grounds for intervention, which aim to protect African peoples from grave violations of human rights when their governments are unable or unwilling to do so. The amendment, by contrast, aims to uphold state security, rather than human security. The context in which this and other amendments were adapted from proposals by Libya in Durban 2002 is considered in terms of political implications for the African Union.     

THE AU PLAN ON TERRORISM

At a senior officials' meeting held in Algiers from 11–14 September 2002, the African Union proved ready and able to provide the political cohesion and sense of purpose needed for Africa to combat terrorism. While member states inevitably played to a global gallery in demonstrating their commitment to the ‘war on terrorism’, the practical counter-terrorist proposals adopted at the meeting substantially address Africa's security challenges. The resulting Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism focuses on state building and inter-governmental co-operation, to literally and figuratively close Africa's borders to terrorist activities. Implementing the plan will be a tough challenge for many African governments, especially to ensure that their counter-terrorist measures adhere to international and regional human rights accords.