Deterrence Beyond Downunder: Australia and US Security Guarantees since 1955

ABSTRACT

From 1944 to 1973 Australia attempted to acquire atomic weaponry. This ambition was driven by the desire to contribute to defending British interests in Asia, fears of invasion by China, Indonesia, and Japan, great-power war, and the belief that nuclear weapons were merely bigger and better conventional weapons, that they would proliferate, and that US security assurances lacked credibility. Although the pursuit of the bomb was eventually abandoned, this was not the result of US assurances. Rather, geopolitical changes in Australia’s environment meant that a major attack on the continent was unlikely to occur outside the context of a confrontation between the US, China, and the Soviet Union. This article argues that Australia may soon have to rethink its policies towards US extended deterrence and instead focus on developing its own deterrent.     

Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age

While the arrival of nuclear weapons coincided roughly with the development of short, medium, intermediate, and eventually intercontinental missiles, the contribution of missile technology to the deterrence equation is often lost. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, even new generation missiles with conventional payloads could struggle to render effective deterrence. But some of the physical and psychological effects commonly ascribed to nuclear weapons could still be in play. And in a world without nuclear weapons, thinking about the use and control of force from the nuclear age would also deserve renewed attention.     

Economic impact and the notion of compensated procurement

The paper consists essentially of two parts. In the first part a linear economic impact model is presented whose structure is based on subcontracting flows. The structural coefficients are defined in terms of flows per area. The model is derived from two identities that are analogous to the income and expenditure identities of national income accounting. The parameters are prime contracts and when one or several of the prime contracts are changed, the model determines the impacts of such changes on the various regions that have been selected. The impacts can be combined with regional multipliers to derive changes in regional income and regional employment. Fragmentary data for this kind of model have been collected on a one-time basis by DOD in 1965 and some results based on the data are presented. The second part of the paper is concerned with normative economics. A scheme is suggested, called compensated procurement, that outlines how the Department of Defense might employ the impact model in a macroeconomic setting. The basic idea is that a stabilization fund be established to finance an array of potential projects which are contracted for to balance sudden shifts in defense demand. Only short-run stabilization is advocated.     

On online bin packing with LIB constraints

In many applications of packing, the location of small items below large items, inside the packed boxes, is forbidden. We consider a variant of the classic online one‐dimensional bin packing, in which items allocated to each bin are packed there in the order of arrival, satisfying the condition above. This variant is called online bin packing problem with LIB (larger item in the bottom) constraints. We give an improved analysis of First Fit showing that its competitive ratio is at most , and design a lower bound of 2 on the competitive ratio of any online algorithm. In addition, we study the competitive ratio of First Fit as a function of an upper bound (where d is a positive integer) on the item sizes. Our upper bound on the competitive ratio of First Fit tends to 2 as d grows, whereas the lower bound of two holds for any value of d. Finally, we consider several natural and well known algorithms, namely, Best Fit, Worst Fit, Almost Worst Fit, and Harmonic, and show that none of them has a finite competitive ratio for the problem. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009