The Choice for Proportional Representation: Electoral System Design in Peace Agreements

After a civil war, there is a keen interest in ‘getting the institutions right’. This article summarizes our knowledge of one particular institution, the electoral system, through a review of the literature on power sharing and electoral systems in post-conflict societies. Surprisingly, there is little statistical support for the conviction that proportional representation (PR) contributes to inclusive political institutions and thereby to peace and democracy. More positively, a closer look at electoral system design as integral part of peace agreements reveals that PR is the standard choice, that it works as intended, and has a good record in securing peace, though less so of democracy. Future research should look at electoral system design as part of the peace process to explain these findings and draw lessons.     

Opportunity-based age replacement: Exponentially distributed times between opportunities

This article gives a full analysis of a component-replacement model in which preventive replacements are only possible at maintenance opportunities. These opportunities arise according to a Poisson process, independently of failures of the component. Conditions for the existence of a unique average optimal control limit policy are established and an equation characterizing the optimal policy and minimal average costs is derived. An important result is that the optimal policy can be described as a so-called one-opportunity-look-ahead policy. Such policies play an important role as heuristics in more general models. It is shown that there is a correspondence with the well-known age-replacement model, which can be considered as an extreme case of the model. Finally, some numerical results are given.     

How viable is international arms control for military artificial intelligence? Three lessons from nuclear weapons

Many observers anticipate “arms races” between states seeking to deploy artificial intelligence (AI) in diverse military applications, some of which raise concerns on ethical and legal grounds, or from the perspective of strategic stability or accident risk. How viable are arms control regimes for military AI? This article draws a parallel with the experience in controlling nuclear weapons, to examine the opportunities and pitfalls of efforts to prevent, channel, or contain the militarization of AI. It applies three analytical lenses to argue that (1) norm institutionalization can counter or slow proliferation; (2) organized “epistemic communities” of experts can effectively catalyze arms control; (3) many military AI applications will remain susceptible to “normal accidents,” such that assurances of “meaningful human control” are largely inadequate. I conclude that while there are key differences, understanding these lessons remains essential to those seeking to pursue or study the next chapter in global arms control.