Book reviews

Use of Force: The Practise of States by A. Mark Weisburd, Penn: Penn State Press, University Park, 1997, ISBN 0-271-01679-5 (hbk), $65.00/£58.00, ISBN 0-271-01680-9 (pbk), $25.00/£22.50

Late Breaking Foreign Policy: the News Media's Influence on Peace Operations by Warren P. Strobel, Washington DC: United States Insititute of Peace Press, 1997, ISBN 1-878379-68-2 (hbk), £23.25, ISBN 1-878379-67-4 (pbk)

The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War by Richard N. Haass, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997, 148pp, index, ISBN 0-87609-201-6 (hbk), $24.95

The UN, Peace and Force edited by Michael Pugh, London: Frank Cass, 1997, ISBN 0-7146-4795-4 (hbk), £29.50, ISBN 0-7146-4320-3 (pbk), £15.00

Confidence-Building in South East Asia by Malcolm Chalmers, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, ISBN 1-85143-116-0 (pbk), £19.95

Britain's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: From Before the V-Bomber to Beyond Trident by Robert H. Paterson, London: Frank Cass, 1997, ISBN 0-7146470-3 (hbk), £35.00, ISBN 0-7146-4297-5 (pbk) £18.00

OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War by Maochun Yu, London: Yale University Press, 1997, ISBN 0 300 06698-8 (hbk), £25.00

Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy by Michael S. Lund, Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996, ISBN 1-878379-52-6 (pbk), £11.75     

Book reviews

This paper defines the global economic costs of conflict and suggests two key criteria, namely comprehensiveness and consistency, which are necessary for a valid calculation of such costs. A critical review of the literature reveals that most studies focus on national income losses, using counterfactual regression models, finding a negative impact on growth both for conflict countries themselves and for their neighbors. However, the debate is quite fragmented and the literature fails to combine these insights in a comprehensive and consistent manner. Furthermore, there is little work thus far on integrating aggregate and micro‐level estimates of the costs of conflict.     

The Amritsar Massacre and the minimum force debate

This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework.     

Research communication security in the 90s: A view from the UK

This paper develops a methodology for measuring the capital value of military assets in monetary terms. We distinguish between two military capital measures. One measure, called the value of military capital (services) summarizes the value of military defense assets during a particular year. A comparison of the capital‐services value of U.S. and Soviet tactical combat aircraft is provided for the period 1970–1984.

One feature of the capital‐services measure that makes it particularly interesting is that its size can be compared with such military expenditures as operating and support. While these latter expenditures reflect the readiness of a defense establishment, the relevant capital‐services measure reflects force structure and modernization.

A second measure, called the value of military capital (wealth), summarizes the military benefits obtained from defense assets over the remainder of their service lives. This measure depreciates the capital as it ages, and is useful for comparing military wealth with other types of wealth in the economy. We provide this measure for the U.S. military capital stock for 1925–1984.     

A case study of redundant defence workers

In this article, the influence of conflict on the economies of neighbouring countries is discussed. The results from previous papers show a strong negative effect for an entire area around a country suffering from conflict, but this paper reaches a different conclusion, by using more recent data and adjusting the methodology previously employed. Additionally, a new type of contiguity matrix is constructed and used in the actual analysis. The final analysis consists of a large number of regressions and concludes that conflict actually has two opposing effects. First, like conflict countries themselves, directly contiguous countries actually suffer from the negative effects of proximate conflict. Secondly, however, there is also a positive spillover of conflict, which affects non‐contiguous countries and this effect is larger for countries that are closer to the conflict country. The results from the paper predominantly hold for the most violent kind of conflict.